

How to Choose Among Security Offerings—See Page 78

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JUL 16 1923

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK  
OF N. Y.

# The ANNALIST

A Magazine of Finance, Commerce and Economics

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The New York Times Company

## The Annalist Barometer of Business

### Prices:

	Week Ending July 14, 1923.		Previous Week.	
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
Stocks (Average of 50 Issues)...	80.85	78.71	80.46	77.82
Bonds (Average of 40 Issues)...	76.31	76.20	76.18	75.95
Annalist Food Cost of Living...	172.607		168.047	
			82.08	80.06
			80.93	80.44
			193.672	

### Finance:

	Week Ending July 14, 1923.	Previous Week.	Same Week, 1922.
Federal Reserve Ratio.....	75.4	74.4	77.3
Money Rates in New York. { Call Time	4½ to 6 5 to 5¼	4 to 6 5 to 5¼	2¾ to 4½ 4 to 4¼

### Production:

ITEM.	June, 1923.	May, 1923.	June, 1922.
Unfilled Steel Orders..... Tons	6,386,261	6,981,351	5,635,531
Pig Iron Production..... Daily, tons	122,280	124,764	78,701
Building Permits..... { Cities	153	131	141
	Amount	\$245,714,752	\$258,674,449
Commercial Failures..... { Number	1,378	1,530	1,740
	Liabilities	\$52,003,736	\$41,022,277
			\$38,242,450

\*Revised figure.

### Transportation:

	Period or Date.	1923.	Normal.	Per Cent. Departure from Normal.
Revenue Car Loadings:				
Year to.....	June 30	24,012,825	19,905,827	+20.6
Week ending.....	"	1,021,770	891,956	+14.6
Grain and grain products.....	"	37,127	36,037	+3.0
Coal and coke.....	"	200,502	158,560	+26.5
Forest products.....	"	79,249	55,109	+43.8
Manufactured products.....	"	593,422	491,571	+20.7
Freight car shortage.....	4th Qtr. June	11,217	32,664	-65.7
Per cent. of freight cars serviceable.....	"	91.6	88.7	+3.3
Per cent. of locomotives serviceable.....	"	82.0	76.9	+6.6
Gross revenues.....	May	*\$547,300,000	\$441,946,956	+23.8
Expenses and taxes.....	"	*\$457,400,000	423,119,405	+8.1
Rate of return on tentative valuation:				
Year to.....	June 1	*5.69	5.75	-1.0
Month of.....	May	*6.33	5.75	+10.1

\* Estimated.

New York, Monday, July 16, 1923

Vol. 22, No. 548

Ten Cents



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## Forces and Trend in Business

**A**REASSURING and therefore welcome indication of the essential soundness of the country's business appeared last week in the Federal Reserve report showing a decrease of 96 millions in the rediscounts with the system as a whole. The report for the previous week had shown a sudden increase of approximately 154 millions. This could be accounted for in the main by the special requirements attending the end of the half year, and in part by the call for cash in connection with the holiday. Yet bankers were aware that manufacturers in some lines had produced in the first half-year more goods than they had succeeded in moving, and they were watching keenly for any unfavorable signs in last week's Reserve statement.

If rediscounts had increased last week, or even if there had been no reduction from the figures of the preceding week, it would have been a sound inference that some of the credits previously granted by member banks were not being liquidated according to expectation—or in other words, that some lines of business had already become burdened with an excessive inventory. That would have been an unfavorable business sign, indicating a material overestimate of certain markets, and the possibility that the strain on the resources of the member banks might still further increase. Fortunately, the marked decrease in rediscounts last week relegates this perfectly sound line of reasoning to the harmless limbo of things which might have happened, but didn't. While the decrease in rediscounts still leaves the total some 60 millions higher than it was two weeks ago, the change in the right direction is great enough to bring reassurance. Any substantial increase appearing in next week's report might fairly be considered in principle a mildly unfavorable sign.

Another favorable indication of the course of business was the record total of freight car loadings, the total of 1,021,770 cars for the week ending June 30 exceeding by 3,231 cars the previous high record, made in the week ending Oct. 14, 1920. The loadings for the first six months of this year were nearly 3,000,000 cars in excess of the loadings during the same period in 1920, which was the peak in all previous traffic. Manufactured products, made up largely of building materials, after three weeks of lessened shipments, returned to about the percentage above normal which prevailed during the first three months of the year. Grain and grain products rose above normal for the first time since the first week of May. It is of course true that car loadings may fall off very suddenly, and also that the shipments represented by these figures are on orders placed for the most part at least weeks ago. Yet, in the absence of any evidence of credit strain, there is no reason for refusing to take these immense shipments as the sign of a very active and healthy business.

It is worthy of notice that in spite of this immense volume of railroad traffic, car shortage shows another small decline, and surplus cars a slight rise, indicating a distribution of cars which is serving almost perfectly the transportation needs of the country. With serviceable freight cars at almost 92 per cent. of the total number, and serviceable locomotives at 82 per cent. (the ideal mark set by the railroads being 85 per cent.), the present adequacy of our railroad transportation system leaves no room for reasonable criticism, and is a good augury for the adequate movement of what are expected to be the peak loads of the year, a little later.

The two business indications already discussed—rediscounts and freight loadings—comprise about the only current signs of business conditions that are affirmatively and definitely favorable, in the sense of showing a very large volume of easily financed business activity. There are no indications of a sudden shrinkage in business—on the contrary, the necessary ordering for the Fall and Winter trade that must be provided for, and in the main must be covered soon, is certain to provide a large volume of manufacturing and of railroad traffic.

Yet the present pace of new business, as for several weeks past, is rather moderate. Since the middle of June it has been assumed in most of the comment on the business outlook that the perceptible pausing and moderation in new business was merely the normal seasonal slackening. That explanation served well enough for a time. But the persistence of the moderate pace, and the appearance of visible declines in several different directions, suggest that the "seasonal" explanation has performed its full tour of duty, and that some other theory, more obviously related to current business events, should now shoulder the task of explanation.

Current signs of business in a number of important directions indicate that although the probable influx of new Fall and Winter orders will produce some acceleration during the early Autumn (at which time there is likely also to be greater activity in the stock market), nevertheless the course of business as a whole will show gradually decreasing activity, lower prices, and at some stage in the process of decline—a stage which may not be reached before next Winter—a more or less pronounced break when wage scales excessively high in relation to prices have to be met by curtailment of production, for the reason that workers will not consent to the wage reductions which would make possible the continuance of production.

In this direction perhaps the most notable indication last week was the decline of 595,000 tons in the unfilled orders on the books of the Steel Corporation, leaving the smallest total of unfilled orders since August, 1921. Pig iron, it now appears, has been somewhat

Continued on Page 91

# The Foreign Situation



PREMIER BALDWIN'S eagerly, and indeed anxiously, expected speech of last Thursday on the German reparations issue established three points of capital importance in the world's most vexing problem:

(1) That the Entente will not be disrupted if British policy can prevent it.

(2) That Britain is determined that Germany shall pay reparations up to the limit of her capacity to pay.

(3) That the German proposal of June 7 warrants serious consideration, and a reply from the Allies; and that Britain will take the initiative in framing such a reply, hoping to secure the adhesion of France, Belgium and Italy in a common statement of the purpose and requirements of the Allies.

The text of the proposed common reply to the German offer is now in process of preparation, and it is expected that it will be submitted to the other Allies some time this week.

After the many evidences of British irritation over the present state of the reparations issue, and many intimations asserted to come from more or less "inspired" sources that the British Government had at last decided to follow its own course, leaving the rest of the Entente to agree or disagree as it might choose, Mr. Baldwin's statement (read in identical form in the upper house by the Foreign Secretary) was somewhat of a surprise in its studied and elaborate expressions of British sympathy with the feelings of the Allies, and its exaltation of the claims of solidarity of action by them in regard to Germany. This tone is evidence, however, of London's rather acute understanding of how much that solidarity depends on the recognition of considerations that might be termed largely "sentimental" in character. To any who may be inclined to minimize the reality of such considerations, it may be pointed out that the present impasse on reparations, which some critics are ready to charge wholly to the French "sentiment" of revenge upon Germany, may with equal justice be charged to the "sentiment" of German national solidarity which is the backbone of passive resistance in the Ruhr. In having to deal with the "sentimental" consistency of each of the five nations involved, and in addition with the practical consequences of the Franco-Belgian policy in Germany, Premier Baldwin faced—and for that matter, still faces—a problem of the utmost complexity. His practical course will not be disclosed until the British text of the suggested joint allied reply to Germany has been made public—an event which will very likely be delayed by consideration of it in Paris and Brussels. If France and Belgium will not agree to what London thinks essential, Mr. Baldwin's practical course may finally make its appearance as the individual policy of his Government, with the other allies still in disagreement.

As expressing cardinal points on which the British policy is to be based and carried out, certain brief passages in Mr. Baldwin's speech deserve a record here. Of the solidarity of the Entente he said in part:

"It cannot be made too clear in the interests alike of the powers concerned and of any who may hope to gain by exploiting the differences between them, that the sole grounds of positive divergence is as to the most effective means of reaching the ends which are vital to all and upon which all are in agreement. These ends are, as they remained throughout, the payment of reparations and the recovered security of Europe. To assure them the Allies have grudged nothing in the past nor will they grudge anything in the future. This responsibility is acknowledged and is shared in equal measure by France, by Italy, by pay up to the amount of her capacity."

"In a common desire for settlement and pacification, and still more for no further or unreasonable delay, we can speak together frankly and with the full comprehension of partners bound by an equal destiny to the same task. Whispers of interested parties cannot be allowed on either side of the Channel or in any part of Europe to deflect us from that duty by any reservations or by carefully fostered misunderstandings."

"In all that we are about to say or to do his Majesty's Government is moved, as we know the heart of France to be moved, and the same applies equally to our other allies, by the single desire that the good-will between the nations who have endured together shall be maintained, and that each shall obtain which is her due."

These paragraphs might reasonably dispel any lingering hopes in Germany that a split in the Entente will give support to her resistance.

That Germany must pay to the limit of her capacity is thus set forth:

"We are as determined as any of our allies that Germany shall make reparations for the damage done in the great war up to the fullest extent of her capacity. We have never wavered on this point. I do not believe that our people ever will. Indeed, we go further and we are ready, as we have said on many occasions, and as was repeated in Paris in January last, to use every measure to compel Germany to pay up to the amount of her capacity."

But the demand for reparations may be so excessive as to defeat its own purposes:

"We are conscious, however, as a business nation, that if we ask Germany to pay in excess of her capacity we shall not succeed. We and our allies will be the main sufferers. And we are firmly convinced that methods which can only result in the ruin of Germany will be fatal to this country, to our allies, and to the whole of Europe. From the beginning we have made clear that in our opinion occupation of the Ruhr was not calculated to produce the maximum amount of reparation payment for the Allies. \* \* \* Many of the consequences which were then anticipated are in course of fulfillment. The Allies are obtaining less reparations than they did before the occupation. What reparation they are receiving is being exacted at the price of growing dislocation of the German economic system, and, as seems probable, of the future total collapse of that system itself. \* \* \* Nor is this a situation which concerns Germany alone: In proportion as the productive power of that country is exhausted so does the recovery of her credit and payment of her debts recede into dimmer distance. Every country in Europe is paying the price for this condition of affairs. One country pays it in steadily falling exchange, another in diminished trade, a third in increasing unemployment. \* \* \* It is not too much to say that the recovery of the world is in danger, and that the peace for which so many sacrifice were borne is at stake."

Peace will not finally be obtained and recovery will not be insured, the Premier asserted, until a solution is found to three great questions. They are:

- (1) Payment of reparations.
- (2) Settlement of interallied debts.
- (3) Security of a pacified Europe.

In Items (2) and (3) it is probable that Premier Baldwin is laying the ground for meeting in part two of the contentions most persistently—and obstinately—some would say, insisted upon by the French. It is no doubt quite clear in Mr. Baldwin's mind that the United States Government will make no contribution on the debt issue by offering to cancel the French monetary obligations to America. The Washington Government has no power in itself to take decisive action in that direction; and Mr. Baldwin, after his experience in this country in negotiating the settlement of the British debt is peculiarly well aware that public sentiment in this country will not support, much less force, a remission of the French debt from a Congress which has the sole power to act in the matter. It must be assumed that any adjustment Mr. Baldwin has in mind will be concessions from Britain to France which may induce France to remove her debt to America from the list of causes requiring her to insist on impossible reparations payments from Germany.

Possibility of a British guarantee against German aggression on France and Belgium may be covered by Item (3), security of a pacified Europe. America is definitely out of such a guarantee; but Britain may consider a defensive alliance with France and Belgium a price she can afford to pay for a French retreat on the safety element in the occupation policy. Such an offer would seemingly compel a rearrangement, at least, of the French "security" argument in support of occupation; and it might pave the way for a recession on the whole policy of occupation. It may properly be assumed that such indications on these points as the Premier's speech suggests are in some degree the outcome of the diplomatic conversations of the past two weeks between London and Paris. Despite its reserve on the specific measures which will be presented in the proposed reply to Germany, the Premier's speech is nevertheless tolerably specific on the major points of allied solidarity, and British determination to insist on the maximum practicable payments from Germany. It pretty fully supports, also, the intimations of the past few weeks from London that the Baldwin Government was working out a positive and forward course which it would carry into decided action.

Destruction of Germany's economic capacity by the Ruhr occupation and the German policies to which that occupation have given rise—a contention put forward by Mr. Baldwin as one of the reasons for an immediate solution of the reparations crisis—is an interpretation of recent events which France is known not to agree to, and the French view of the matter will no doubt be shared in many quarters.

But this part of the problem is of far less importance than the reality behind the French insistence on occupation. If that insistence is influenced mainly by reluctance to retreat now in face of the announced high expectations of returns from the occupation, that is one thing. But if that insistence represents a determination on the part of Paris to use occupation as a means of splitting Germany into parts which cannot reunite in such a way as to be in future a military menace to French security, that is quite another thing. Possibly the course of the consultations on the proposed joint reply which London is drafting will bring this question more into the open.


Despite the repeated French disavowals of political separatist objects back of the Ruhr occupation, the history of the two French statesmen who are responsible for the occupation lends some color to the suspicion that they may be willing for France to take her

# Official Washington: By RODNEY BEAN

## Intermediate Credit Banks a "Big Stick" in the Farmer's Hands? Co-operative Marketing of Farm Products

Special Correspondence to *The Annalist*.

Washington, July 14.



CERTAIN organizations representing the farming interests, and particularly the wheat growers, it is learned, intend to use the intermediate credit banks, established under the so-called rural credits legislation, as a "big stick" to shake at the rest of the banking world. The movement is already under way and the flurry in the grain market at Chicago, with the price of wheat breaking under \$1 a bushel, helped it along, rather than held it back.

The word is going out to the farmers to make their plans to hold wheat from the market, except in sufficient quantities to meet demand—in other words, to map out a program of orderly marketing, spread over the entire consuming year—and to give thought to the availability of the new intermediate credit banks, in bringing this about. These intermediate credit banks are not yet functioning effectively but they will be soon. Advocates of the "orderly marketing program" among the representatives of the farming organizations are satisfied that low prices for wheat will now result in heavy demands by the farmers on the intermediate credit banks in the hope of bettering their condition later on.

Provision for the establishment of twelve intermediate credit banks which have the privilege of discounting agricultural paper with the Federal Reserve system, was made in the Rural Credits act, passed by the last Congress, in face of opposition on the part of Treasury Department officials who believed that it was possible to give the farmers too easy credit and thus work them an injury. President Harding, it is said, was first inclined to oppose their establishment, but later, when the farm bloc asserted itself, agreed to the inclusion in the law of sections which set them up.

This legislation makes it possible also for about 20,000 small country banks which are not now eligible to membership in the Federal Reserve system because they are unable to meet capitalization requirements and other conditions, to have dealings with the intermediate credit banks. Co-operative marketing organizations also have the same privilege.

The Federal Government underwrites the new banking system with \$60,000,000 of working capital, or \$5,000,000 for each of the twelve. If this capital is not sufficient to meet the credit demands made on the new banks by agricultural interests there is authorization to issue debentures, secured by farm paper, up to a maximum of ten times the working capital provided by the Government, or \$600,000,000.

After the legislation was adopted Treasury officials expressed the opinion that the intermediate credit banks would not be called on to make heavy advances, but would merely be there as a second line of credit in times of stress, the theory being that existing banking facilities would be able to grant all of the credit needed by the farmers in ordinary times.

Gray Silver, Washington representative of the American Farm Bureau Federation, an organization which fought hard and long for the new intermediate credit system, takes a somewhat different viewpoint. He does not admit that the farming interests have been able to obtain all of the credit or the kind of credit that they need, under the existing system. And he is just as forceful in stating that the farmers are prepared to make the intermediate credit bank system a rival of, rather than a supplement to, the Federal Reserve system and purely private banking interests, if that appears to be the necessary course to pursue.

The representatives of the farmer are ready to admit that the intermediate credit banks are unnecessary if the farmers can get the credit they desire from other banking sources. Here is where the "big stick" idea comes in. If the farmers do not get what they want elsewhere, says Mr. Silver, they are going to seek it at the hands of the intermediate credit banks and thus make the intermediate credit system one of the big factors in banking circles of the United States. The law provides that these intermediate banks must grant credits under certain conditions. When the question of ability to obtain the funds is raised, the advocate of farmers' rights points to the authorization to float debentures up to \$600,000,000. Will the intermediate credit system agree to meet the demand of the farmers if the demand comes? If it does not meet the demand, the farmer representative answers, Congress will be asked to take a hand. If Congress fails the farmer, then Congress must suffer when election day comes.

There has been much heard about charges that the wheat farmer, because of inability to obtain credit on a satisfactory basis, has been forced to rush his crop to market at harvest time and thus bring

about a sharp reduction in the price which he receives. This, of course, has not been admitted in banking circles, but, on the other hand, Mr. Silver asserts that it is so. In a letter sent recently to Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas, Mr. Silver, who it is generally agreed is one of the most powerful figures in the farm movement, expressed succinctly why he thought the new intermediate credit system could work wonders and why he was urging farmers to make use of it.

"The American farmer," he said, "will no longer be compelled to dump his production at harvest time in response to the demand of the banker, the merchant, the fertilizer man or others who have extended him credits maturing with the harvest, which compels liquidation by the dumping process; but armed with these credit instrumentalities he is enabled to do the thing so close to the head of all agriculture—market his production co-operatively and in an orderly manner."

"Through the co-operatives he will authorize a monthly distribution throughout the consumptive year of the twelve months' supply which he produces at harvest time, forgetting the old method by which, the records show, two-thirds of our entire production was thrown on the market within one-third of the year following harvest and the remaining one-third before the first two-thirds was fully consumed, so that not only was the price level destroyed by the first movement but was kept at low ebb throughout the consumptive year."

It has been said that knowledge of the attitude of some of the farm organizations, notably the American Farm Bureau Federation, which is by far the most powerful, toward the use of the intermediate credit banks, and the advice that is being spread among the farmers, has given reason for much thought in certain circles in official Washington. It was a Government official, who has given much time to a study of the situation, who was first heard to apply the term "the big stick" to the intermediate credit banks. He was then of the opinion that the movement which had been started among the farming communities by powerful farm organizations would not grow to a point where the intermediate credit banks would be raised to the dignity of a serious rival of the Federal Reserve system in the agricultural districts, but he was not unimpressed by the importance of the snowball which had been started rolling or the possibility of its gaining size.

The whole situation has been the subject of more than one long discussion among officials in the last week or ten days, and it has been said that talk in official circles about seeking legislation in the next Congress which would make it possible to admit a majority of the 20,000 small country banks into the Federal Reserve system, has been based, in part, on the probability of these small banks attempting to deal on a large scale with the new intermediate credit system and thus create a rival of considerable importance.

There is another angle to the fight now being conducted by the representatives of the farmers to make the intermediate credit banks an agency through which they can obtain what they desire in the way of credits. Under the rural credits act, the intermediate credit banks, with certain restrictions, must grant credit on wheat and other farm products stored in warehouses which have been given Federal licenses by the Department of Agriculture. They may grant credits on wheat stored in warehouses which have not been licensed by the Secretary of Agriculture, but that is entirely within their discretion.

What the American Farm Bureau now wants and is fighting for is a ruling by the Secretary of Agriculture that credit may be advanced on wheat stored on farms, and that such storage shall be licensed and inspected by the agents of the Department of Agriculture.

Mr. Silver contends that it was the intent of Congress, in framing and adopting amendments to the warehousing laws in the last session, that agricultural products stored on farms should be proper collateral for loans. He so expresses it in his annual report which has just been printed for distribution to hundreds of thousands of farmers. In this report he says:

"Related and equally important to the basic legislation of co-operation and rural intermediate credits are such laws as that amending the warehouse act so that, instead of four commodities and their terminal warehouses, it includes all agricultural products and all proper warehouses, even granaries, corn cribs, root cellars, &c., located on the farm, when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture."

There has been, up to this time, however, no ruling by the Secretary of Agriculture to the effect that granaries, corn cribs, &c., on farms shall be ranked as licensed warehouses and neither has there been any formal ruling by the Farm Loan Board, although some announcement may be made by the latter Government agency soon.

Mr. Silver says that the farmers are determined to demand that products warehoused on farms shall be approved by the Government.

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# The Commerce Department

## The United States in Burmese Markets—Austria Today—French Financing of the Rhur Occupation—June Aspect of German Business

*Special Correspondence of The Annalist.*

WASHINGTON, July 14.



MONG the countries where Far Eastern experts believe there is an opportunity for extension of American trade is Burma, one of the wealthiest per capita of the Provinces of India. Numerous inquiries have been received recently by the Commerce Department concerning conditions there, and this led to a study of the factors involved by the Far Eastern Division, of which Frank R. Eldridge is chief. The conclusion was reached that, while the showing made by American exporters has its encouraging angles, Burma may properly be included as among the countries where real opportunities are being neglected. Rangoon, the leading port of Burma, through which the bulk of the foreign trade passes, ranks as a port next to Calcutta and Bombay, and is reported as the world's leading port in the exportation of rice, teak and cutch.

Partial returns for the total merchandise trade in Burma in 1922-23 indicate a marked general increase over the two preceding years, which averaged 526,700,000 rupees, compared with 348,000,000 rupees for 1919-20 and an average of 363,000,000 for the five pre-war years. India is largely dependent on Burma for supplies of kerosene, benzine and petroleum, which rank second in importance to rice in Burma's exports and, in addition, for large quantities of timber. Shipments of wolfram are becoming rare.

The nature of Burma's available raw products naturally restricts the export trade with the United States. Notable, however, are the marked increases in medicinal chemicals from 212,800 pounds in 1921 to 677,000 pounds in 1922, and in raw rubber from 44,645 pounds to 145,600 pounds. The value of the latter was nearly trebled while the former showed an increased valuation of 81 per cent. The amount of timber also increased, while rice and paraffin war showed decreases.

The returns show a revival of the rice trade with Germany which is now a close competitor with Ceylon as the heaviest purchaser of this cheap food, while demand by England and Japan has declined. A comparison of recent and prewar statistics suggests that the market for Burma rice in India is a permanent one, because in India many food crops have been displaced by other more remunerative ones.

Practically all the raw cotton and one-third of the pig lead is shipped to Japan, while Belgium is almost an exclusive purchaser of the zinc exported, as Hongkong is of the available jade. The European and American market for teak is depressed, but a lively trade with India is still maintained.

Commerce Department experts find that America's share of Burma's imports are increasing, with the opportunity open for enlarged business relations. In Burma's iron and steel trade there has been a steady increase since the war in imports of pipes and tubes from the United States, the latter having outstripped Great Britain by 4 per cent. in 1921-22 and remaining in the ascendency in 1922-23. The United States is supplying practically 23 per cent. of the hardware, Great Britain 57 per cent. and Japan and Germany 7 per cent. The United States is also supplying nearly 50 per cent. of the electrical machinery and most of the irrigation and mining machinery and machine tools.

In the last two years the United States also has practically controlled the automobile market in Burma. Accurate statistics regarding the United States trade are, however, difficult to obtain, as goods are transhipped at Hongkong and Singapore and often entered as a part of the trade returns of these two countries, regardless of their origin.

Burma purchases large quantities of cotton yarn, gunny bags and vegetable oil from India. England furnishes the bulk of the piece goods imported, and shipments of colored goods from the Netherlands are increasing. Japan controls the silk goods trade. The United States has lost much of the cotton goods trade gained during the war, while Australia has captured our share of the trade in food-stuffs and France in leather goods.

Investigations indicate that the political awakening in Burma, resulting from its complete administrative independence from India, gained through the introduction of the reformed Constitution on Jan. 1, 1923, is being accompanied by encouraging signs that the Burmese are bestirring themselves to take a greater part in the industrial life of the Province. Burmese leaders in commerce, finance and industry,

in co-operation with prominent foreign residents, are urging the necessity of development along lines best adapted to the natives and the utilization of Burmese capital wherever possible.

The general apathy of the people toward the Government, it is said, also seems to have altered to an intelligent interest, which fore-shadows marked trade expansion.

Burma has great agricultural, forest and mineral resources. In addition, it is free from debt, and has an estimated working balance of more than 30,000,000 rupees for the present fiscal year, notwithstanding the retrenchment made in common with other Provinces. While it is not possible to determine its wealth definitely, measured by the value of merchandise exports, which in 1921-22 aggregated \$110,442,000, the purchasing power is approximately \$8 per capita, against \$2.50 for the rest of India, \$3.25 for Indo-China, \$7.25 for the Philippines and \$8 for Siam.

Post-war financial stringency necessarily curtailed public works in Burma, but with the shade of the loans for all India allotted to this Province improvements are being pushed in road and harbor construction, in obtaining adequate water supplies for the towns and in rehabilitating the railroads, which are entirely inadequate and whose condition has handicapped the industries and trade of the country. All important hydroelectric resources are being carefully surveyed also, with a view to their later application to commercial projects.

The economic welfare of the inhabitants depends upon agriculture. Rice is the staple produce and approximately 75 per cent. of the entire population are engaged in its cultivation, transportation and milling.

In the modern industrial sense, Burma is still a relatively undeveloped country. With the exception of a new glass factory at Rangoon and a cotton spinning and weaving mill at Myingyan, both of which were established and are managed by Burmese, the only important successful factories operated in the country are connected with the petroleum, vegetable oil, rice milling and lumber industries.

Mining has been carried on by primitive methods, but the mineral deposits have been generally located. Oil is the key of this mineral production. The annual output for the five years, 1917-21, averaged 283,292,000 imperial gallons. A new factor in Burma's petroleum industry last year was the importation of 18,000,000 gallons of oil from Persia, and the construction of added storage facilities at Rangoon, indicative of the intention to make Rangoon an important depot for the supply of fuel oil.

Next to oil, silver and lead ore is the most important mineral product, but this industry is yet in its infancy. Burma also furnishes practically all of the commercial jade for the world and has valuable worked deposits of precious stones, tungsten, zinc and tin, but the present price of the last commodity discourages further development of the industry.

Curtailment of transportation facilities and lack of permanent labor seriously embarrass efforts toward further progress in mining.

Among the important cable dispatches received last week by the Department of Commerce is one from Trade Commissioner William Ford Upson at Vienna, in which he reports that "the first stage of the Austrian reconstruction program has been virtually completed." The Austrian share of the reconstruction loan, he says, has been substantially all subscribed by the public. The National Bank's sound money reserve continues to increase and now covers, at the legal rate of conversion, 46 per cent. of the note circulation.

Foreign exchange is steady while the cost of living and wages in Austria increase slowly and unemployment continues to decrease. Interest rates are lower. The industrial and commercial crisis apparently has been passed and industries generally are improving.

According to the reconstruction program, Mr. Upson reports, the deficit should average 190,000,000,000 paper crowns per month in the second half of the year. July estimates for expenditures are 669,000,000,000 crowns while receipts are 393,000,000,000 crowns, leaving a deficit of 276,000,000,000 crowns.

As to the general industrial conditions, Mr. Upson reported that the average metal wage index for June is 13.825 as compared with 11.817 for December, 1922 (based on July 1, 1914). Unemployed in Austria receiving relief on June 15 numbered 101,000 and there was a total of 65,000 unemployed in the Vienna district. The number of unemployed receiving Government aid at the end of May was 109,000.

Car loadings increased 6 per cent. in May as compared with April. Imports for April in thousands of tons amounted to 271 for coal, 94

Continued on Page 95.

# A Review of Foreign Opinions

## Our Money-Making Possibilities in Bulgaria—Reconstruction of Czechoslovak Finances



NDER the title, "Re-enter Bulgaria," Mr. Gustav Herlt gives an interesting account of present-day conditions in that country in Reconstruction (Vienna, June 1). The article begins somewhat optimistically, as follows:

The economic development of Bulgaria is experiencing an upward tendency, as is shown by the increased value of the lev. This favorable condition of affairs is due chiefly to the new terms for the payment of the reparation indebtedness, recently conceded by the Reparation Commission, after prolonged negotiations. The present arrangement is better suited to the economic conditions of the country, and the Government will probably not experience much difficulty in carrying out the agreement.

The payment of the Bulgarian reparations debt is divided into two parts, the first consisting of a payment of 55,000,000 gold francs, covering a period of sixty years, at a 5 per cent. rate of interest. This interest is to be paid biannually. Each year the sum of the half-yearly payment will increase by half a million. The second part of the reparation debt cannot be claimed before April, 1953. As a guarantee for the half-yearly interest payment, the Government pledges its aggregate customs receipts, which will be deposited in the National Bank. Beyond this, Bulgaria guarantees that these customs receipts will be sufficient to cover the amount of the required annual payment, plus 10 per cent.

While Mr. Herlt's article was written at a time when M. Stambulsky and the Peasant Party gained control of the Government, an editorial note remarks that general conditions in Bulgaria are not likely to undergo much change under any particular Government.

After describing the political tendencies of the country, with especial reference to the strained relations existing with Greece, which are chiefly caused by the question of Bulgarian access to the Aegean, Mr. Herlt discusses the agricultural situation, as follows:

There is, unfortunately, a dearth of laborers for the land, and of draft cattle. The farmers are, in consequence, compelled to take up seriously the question of utilizing agricultural machinery. The Government is also encouraging the use of machinery in every possible way. The most popular types are the small, cheap machines, as the small landowner predominates; the heavy and expensive English and American machines are considered unsuitable to local conditions. Cheap German, Austrian and Hungarian machines find ready purchasers. The light, durable German plows manufactured by Sachs & Eberhardt are very much in demand; also the small threshing machines of Lanx & Hofherr and Schrantz-Clayton-Shuttleworth, as well as cheap American reapers. Germany does a successful business in agricultural machines, and Hungary sells comparatively more today than in prewar times. A number of Hungarian firms have been established in Bulgaria for many years and stand in close relations with the British-Hungarian Bank. The terms of payment are usually 25 per cent. of the purchase price on receipt of the goods, the balance to be paid after the harvest in alternate yearly instalments. Therefore, only firms which are well capitalized and have a competent selling organization can deal successfully in agricultural machinery in Bulgaria.

Mr. Herlt states, however, that the farmers are becoming more and more convinced of the advantages of machinery, so that motor plows and the tractor plows of the Benz type are much in demand. Electricity will soon be employed for threshing machines, as well as for other agricultural and household machinery. Extensive projects are afoot for the development of the enormous water power of the country, but here the great difficulty lies in the obtaining of capital for building.

The natural resources of the country are also considered. Among these are lignite, anthracite, copper, lead, zinc, iron ore, chalk and asbestos. Lignite is now being produced by the State mining works at Pernik, Bobow-Dol and Maritza. Later the works of Belnowarack will also be in a position to undertake production. The annual output of the Pernik works, which are the largest in Bulgaria, amounts to something more than 800,000 tons. In 1922 the Bulgarian coal supply reached a maximum of 1,021,000 tons. Foreign capital is not yet much interested in Bulgaria. The State plants cover most of the coal requirements of the country and, notes the Austrian writer, when the water-power resources are developed, very little coal will be required from abroad.

The cry for capital, however, is becoming more pronounced in Bulgaria. Mr. Herlt says:

The Bulgarians believe that, with the economic development of the country, foreign capital may soon become interested in the possibilities of its natural resources. Attention should be given to the rich ore deposits and the favorable situation in connection with the Levant market. The rich kaolin deposits and fine stone quarries are lying quite undeveloped owing to the lack of capital. It is true that in the

last few years various stock companies have been formed for the purpose, but nothing definite has yet been accomplished. The scarcity of capital is also a serious obstacle to the development of Bulgarian industries. These have, in the last few years, made great progress in spite of the many difficulties which have had to be overcome. Bulgarian industries are chiefly concerned in turning domestic raw material into manufactures, such as tobacco products, the manufacture of cigarette tobacco and finished cigarettes, the sugar milling industry, the production of attar of roses, schajak weaving, cotton spinning and wood-working. Bulgaria produces large quantities of industrial raw materials—tobacco, wool, cotton, raw silk, timber, hides and skins.

Stock companies are increasing in Bulgaria. At the end of 1922 there were 545 stock companies, with a capital of 1,679,050,000 leva, which includes foreign capital.

Transport difficulties, however, are prejudicial to the full development of the country. In this connection, Dr. Oskar Rosenfeld, writing in the same number of the Viennese economic organ, states that the development of the transport and railway system is making headway. Dr. Rosenfeld is, however, by no means as optimistic in his estimate of the industrial possibilities of the country as Mr. Herlt. In this regard, he states:

On the whole, it may be said that the prospects for capital investments in industrial establishments are not tempting because of the general technical deficiencies, more especially the lack of skilled workers and an adequate supply of raw material. The development of the country, of course, is decisively affected by the question of reparations. In this respect, Stambulsky certainly scored a great success when he obtained a reduction of the reparation amount from two and a half milliards to 550,000,000 gold francs, payable in sixty years, a reasonable sum which Bulgaria should be able to pay without any disorganization of her finances. Although the general situation of Bulgaria is not very rosy at this moment, the natural resources of the country and, consequently, the possibilities of development are such that foreign offers of loans for the construction of railways and seaports are not lacking. The reparations question having now been settled, foreign capital is likely to flow into this active and industrious country.

The cereal and tobacco situation in Bulgaria appears to have been most satisfactory last year. The yield of wheat and corn, reports Dr. Rosenfeld, was plentiful, and considerable quantities of the grain outputs of 1922 are still available in spite of the heavy exports. The chief buyers of Bulgarian cereals are Austria and the Levant.

The tobacco crop, too, remarks the same authority, was satisfactory. Exports amounted to 15,000 tons of raw tobacco which, owing to the prevalent high prices, means a satisfactory asset in the balance of foreign trade. In view of the rich tobacco resources of the country high hopes were placed in cigarette manufacturing, but these have not been fulfilled so far owing to a lack of technical equipment in the factories, which has affected the quality of the output. Tobacco export, on the other hand, is said to be excellently organized and obtains high prices in the world markets. The principal buyers are the Central European countries which, in return, supply Bulgaria with industrial manufactures.

La Vie des Peuples (Paris, April, 1923) contains an informative article, by Louis Eisenmann, concerning the reconstruction of Czechoslovak finances. The writer commences by pointing out that Czechoslovakia was the first of the new States to display any financial



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soundness, tripling in value the Czechoslovak crown in the last six or eight months. The somewhat daring, and certainly drastic, policy which achieved this result, however, has not been without inconvenient consequences as regards the economic life of the country.

The whole credit for this achievement, remarks Mr. Eisenmann, must be given to Dr. Rasin and, in connection with the work of the late Financial Minister, the writer makes the following comment:

The value of Rasin's reforms, however, lies in the fact that he did not act solely upon a technical basis but in response to a moral conception. He had the courage to teach his nation, suddenly freed from a century-old yoke and embarked upon independent political existence, of which it only saw the enjoyments and the advantages, that there is no real independence unless it be conquered and assured by work and effort.

The Czechoslovak Government decided that all connection between Austrian and Czechoslovak currency must be completely severed. In Austria this measure was attributed to Czech bitterness and desire for revenge but, states the writer, the futility of such an opinion may be shown by the fact that the Czech Government did everything in its power to come to some agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Bank, which might insure a continuance of a common currency. The negotiations broke down on one point, namely the bank's insistence on continuing to make advances on war loan. Czechoslovakia, having already guaranteed the former monarchy to the extent of ten milliards of kronen, felt that to remain in the bank and currency union while paper money increased at fantastic rates would endanger her security to an unknown extent and, therefore, separated as a measure of self-preservation. Even so, this step was only undertaken by M. Rasin after failure to induce the Allies to place the bank under international control.

Following the prohibition of advances on war loan by the Czech branches of the Austro-Hungarian Bank came the establishment of a special regime for these branches which led to the final establishment of the Bank of Czechoslovakia on May 12, 1919. This was set up in the form of a special section of the Ministry of Finance, with regulations of its own, to prevent confusion of its business with that of the State and degeneration of its paper into purely State paper. The bank office, notes the writer, is simply a provisional organization until the bank proper can be put on its feet as a private organization in which the State participates.

Stamping of Austro-Hungarian notes in circulation in Czechoslovakia brought to light the fact that one-fifth of Austro-Hungarian banknotes was held there, whereas the country contained one-quarter of the population of the former empire. The stamped notes were replaced, whenever possible, by new ones of different appearance and inflation was carefully guarded against in the issue of new notes. When this operation and the minor ones involved had been completed, however, a new crisis arose in the economic life of the country. This was the crisis of subsidized prices, foreign trade monopolies, rising wages and Bolshevik thinking. The Russian advance on Warsaw saw the apogee of the crisis in the Summer of 1920. After that

event, convalescence set in and a comparison of the Czech budgets for 1919, 1920 and 1921 shows, better than any other form of description, the gradual amelioration of the financial situation:

#### CZECHOSLOVAK BUDGET

	In Millions of Czech Kronen		
	Ordinary	Extraordinary	Total
1919—			
Receipts	2,307	506	2,813
Expenditures	2,125	4,589	6,714
Total deficit			3,901
Actual deficit after supplementary budget votes			4,906
1920—			
Receipts	5,324	2,427	7,751
Expenditures	4,927	5,439	10,366
Total deficit			2,615
Actual deficit after supplementary budget votes			3,794
1921—			
Receipts	12,079	2,051	14,130
Expenditures	8,997	4,845	13,842
Apparent excess			288
Actual deficit			2,765

The state of the Czechoslovak debt, says Mr. Eisenmann, is also well worth studying. This may be analyzed as follows:

1. The war debt, contracted in the fight for independence, including the amount taken up in restamped Austrian notes and the question of Austrian war loan recognized by the Government;
2. The national debt, contracted since the establishment of the republic for its organization and administration;
3. Prewar debt, including the Czechoslovak quota of the old Austrian debt and of indemnities paid in virtue of treaties for the acquisition of the properties of the former Austrian and Hungarian States.

The amounts of these debts in the new currency, after deducting the amounts now liquidated, are as follows:

War debt	17,233,000,000
National debt	8,625,000,000
Prewar debt	4,500,000,000
Total	30,378,000,000

Were exchange parity to be restored the amount of the debt would fall to 15½ milliards, and the interest charges to 775,000,000 annually.

Referring to the future of the mark, Mr. Eisenmann states that well-informed observers have long expected it to follow the course of the Austrian kroner. The danger that this presented to the Czech Republic was foreseen by M. Rasin, who took the most stringent measures to prevent the dragging down of the crown by the depreciated Austrian and German currencies. This policy, says the writer, is responsible for the efforts of the Czechoslovak Government to induce its nationals to deal directly with countries having stable currency instead of having recourse to German or Austrian intermediaries. The stabilization of Czechoslovak finances, concludes the article, is an immensely important political event in Central Europe.

## Official Washington

Continued from Page 69.

If favorable action fails to come quickly, it is the intention to take this matter before Congress and ask that legislation be adopted which would leave the administrative departments of the Government without discretion in the matter. Mr. Silver takes it for granted that this fight will be won, either with or without the aid of Congress. In his annual message now on its way to the farmers, he cites the co-operative marketing act, the creation of the intermediate banks and amendments to the warehousing act as steps of first importance to the farmer, and adds a few words which, because of their frank optimism, are of interest:

"Assuming that the farmers of this country have enough intelligence and initiative to use their rights on the one hand and their credit machinery on the other, it is not too much to say that we have accomplished an industrial revolution of supreme importance not only to farmers but to the entire nation."

As to the present status of the wheat situation there are some in Washington who believe that the dismal pictures painted in many quarters have been overdone, particularly by those who have asserted that the surplus this year will be in the neighborhood of 250,000,000 bushels. One expert said that, in view of all the gloomy statements that had been distributed about the country, he was not surprised that wheat had sold below a dollar. The wheat farmer's position, because of increased production abroad and large crops at home and in Canada, is not as strong as it might be but, unless official estimates are all awry, it does not involve an actual surplus of more than 200,000,000 bushels.

The group of economists and statisticians called here by the Secretary of Agriculture to go over the Government data made the

interesting comment that "this committee is less impressed with the immediate wheat supply situation than it is with the future possibilities in case present exporting countries fail to readjust their acreage to offset increasing bread grain production in Europe." It also said that "Russia will not export grain in large quantities in the immediate future." It was the belief of the committee that exports might decline because of increased production abroad and a decrease in the purchasing power of Europe, but that domestic consumption would remain at about the same level as in 1922-23. On the whole, the viewpoint expressed was not as discouraging as was generally expected in view of the nature of reports which had been read recently in the newspapers.

As to a reduction of production to meet the world situation of supply and demand, Mr. Silver contends that orderly marketing, which he argues is quite another thing than deliberately withholding wheat from the market to stimulate prices, will go furthest to solve that problem.

"The farmer will, in this way, be a free agent," he said, "doing business in a businesslike way, having the same opportunity of producing and marketing his product as other producers. At any time there are large crops and consequently more than normal carry-over, it will be in the farmer's hands, and, being a burden to him, he will automatically arrange his acreage in such a way as not to persist in a greater production than the market will rightfully absorb. This will assure us a balanced production that will cover our needs and, at the same time, protect us from the broken markets and the unhappy train of circumstances following in the wake when farm crops sell at or below the cost of production."

# Stocks



STOCKS were irregular and without definite trend last week, with markets which averaged barely a half-million shares a day, and without particular breadth or outstanding stability. Trading was on a smaller scale than at any time since mid-

July of last year, and while no particular weakness was apparent, stocks on the whole drifted moderately downward, as is usually the case when buying-power is curtailed, as at present. Some of the reasons why stocks marked time last week were the crisis in international affairs, the possible breakdown in the Entente, and the speech of Premier Baldwin, outlining Great Britain's attitude on the present reparations snarl.


Viewing the market as a whole, however, stocks at the low points of the week encountered good resistance. Some was represented in banking support, some in institutional buying for investment, some of the shares went to bargain hunters, while some were purchased by those who had sold earlier for the decline. The situation developed extremely firm "resistance points" in such stocks as United States Steel, Studebaker, American Can, Baldwin Locomotive and other like speculative vehicles. On three or four occasions in the last fortnight these resistance points were touched but not definitely broken through. Trading, as a whole, is firmly held in the grip of speculative operators, and the day-to-day fluctuations, which present an irregular appearance, are to a very large extent due to experiments on one side or the other by these professionals. Such "sore spots" as developed in the financial district in the last month or so, due to the sharp declines in the stock market or from other causes, were either drastically eliminated or else healed up by time. Forced liquidation at the moment is not a considerable factor in the market. The attitude of stockholders, as well as of many speculators, is to stand aloof from the market and allow it to drift until there is a development of sufficient importance to get it out of the doldrums, in which it has been for several weeks.

The industrial news, to which stock markets are so sensitive, was not of an unsettling nature. There were several constructive developments, however, last week. Possibly the most important of these is the fact that all previous records for carloadings were broken in the final week of June, when 1,021,770 cars were loaded in the United States. Also, for the second consecutive month, the first-class railroads of the country earned more than 6 per cent. on their assessed valuation, the return for the month of May having been on an annual basis of 6.33 per cent.

Other constructive factors last week were an increase in the dividend on Continental Can shares from 3 to 4 per cent. a year, and the declaration of a \$3.50 dividend on Nash Motors compared with \$2.50, the payment made six months ago. On the other hand was the reduction of 595,090 tons in the amount of forward business carried on its books, as of the close of business June 30, by the United States Steel Corporation, a larger reduction in general tonnage than anticipated.

At the moment it is particularly difficult to forecast the immediate future of the stock market. There are so many factors that the course of prices for stocks is more than ordinarily clouded. The arrival at a point where further declines in commodities would be stopped might prove the turning point in the stock market. But there is not sufficient incentive now either to buy stocks or to sell them, and the result is narrow, uninteresting and altogether listless markets. Many pieces of industrial news which, under ordinary circumstances, would cause a sharp fillip in the market, were either glossed over or ignored entirely. The future of the market will depend to a large extent on how fall business develops. Stocks have been literally "sold to death." The short interest on the Stock Exchange is a moderately large one, and the professional bears show no disposition to cover their commitments at present prices.

There are three possible sources of very heavy buying orders in sight—one of them from the professional shorts, who must repurchase what they have sold for the decline; another is reinvestment demand, which has been almost entirely absent this year; while the third is the natural enhancement in market value of this or that stock, brought



In the upper portion the black line shows the closing average price of fifty stocks, half industrial and half railroads. The black area shows for each week the highest and lowest daily average price of the twenty-five industrials, and the white area the corresponding figures for twenty-five rails. In the lower portion the black area shows total weekly volume of sales and the white area weekly volume of the fifty stocks used in the preparation of this chart.


## Shares Sold on New York Stock Exchange

Week Ended July 14, 1923

	1923	1922	1921
Monday .....	513,345	565,553	424,712
Tuesday .....	365,375	506,000	341,090
Wednesday .....	366,877	771,920	391,580
Thursday .....	343,168	783,830	354,300
Friday .....	375,466	806,643	381,030
Saturday .....	146,700	286,775	109,910
Total for the week ..	2,110,931	3,720,721	2,002,622

about in order to liquidate shares which were purchased by institutions in market support in the last month or so, but these developments will await the arrival of a factor of sufficient importance to dispel the clouds which now hang heavy over the financial districts of the country. It would not be surprising should the problem over which the markets are most alarmed at the moment, that of reparations, eventually prove, in its settlement, the factor which will turn the market completely about and start it on an upward trend.

## Transportation



TOTAL carloadings for the last week of June exceeded those of any other week on record, being 3,000 more than the previous record made in the second week of October, 1920. The six months' loadings were nearly three million cars over the same period in 1920, the previous peak. Each class of commodity listed in our table, with the exception of grain and grain products, also shows the highest loadings for any year from the same period.

Manufactured products recovered from the decline recorded during the last three weeks, and returned to about the average percentage above normal established during the first three months of the year. The recovery in this class of commodity, which is made up largely of building materials, taken in combination with the steadily growing shipments of forest products, would seem to indicate that builders are still receiving a large quantity of materials ordered earlier in the year.

Grain and grain products, which began to fall below normal in the first week of May, have recovered the lost ground, and for the first time since that date the week's movement is above the normal.

Despite the heavy traffic, the car shortage again registers a slight decline, and the surplus cars a small rise. Freight car distribution has in fact achieved an almost ideal condition, in large measure the result of the development of the efficiency program adopted this year by the railroads.

The percentage of serviceable freight cars again shows improvement and, standing at 91.6, is within less than four points of the goal of 95 per cent. set by the railroads to be achieved by Oct. 1. Serviceable locomotives have advanced much faster since the first of the year than have freight cars, which were not so badly affected by the shopmen's strike of last year.

# Bonds



THE bond market pursued an upward course last week, a fact which is regarded as an encouraging sign in view of the numerous developments which would normally be expected to have a disquieting effect. Probably the most important factor in the week's trading was the widespread interest displayed in the announcement of Stanley Baldwin, Great Britain's Premier. Trading the early part of the week was conducted on a decidedly restricted scale, as investors were inclined to wait for a definite announcement of England's policy and to watch for the market's reaction to it before making commitments on an important scale. No noteworthy effect on prices was observed after the ticker printed the news, but trading became somewhat lighter than before.


The decline in unfilled orders of the United States Steel Corporation and apprehension as to the possible course Congress may follow in railroad legislation next Fall, were also disturbing influences. Trading was quiet, and the slight upward tendency of prices was largely attributable to a lack of securities offered for sale.

New issues were offered in moderate volume, the percentage of corporation bonds being unusually small. Of the latter, probably the most important was the \$5,000,000 Cleveland Union Terminal Company first mortgage 5 per cent. sinking fund gold bonds, series B, due 1973. They were offered at 94½ and interest, to yield over 5.30 per cent. to maturity, a price which was generally regarded as reasonable in view of their strong first mortgage security, supported by the unconditional guarantee of principal and interest by the New York Central, the Big Four, and the Nickel Plate Lines. The syndicate managers reported an excellent reception of the issue and trades were completed at a slight premium over the issue price on the day they were offered. Of the municipal issues, the largest was \$2,000,000 State of Michigan 4½ per cent. bonds due August 1, 1943, issued for the construction of State highways. They were offered at 102.66 and interest, yielding about 4.30 per cent. to maturity. A complete list of the week's flotations with prices and yields will be found on page \_\_\_\_?

The market for municipal bonds was dull, the distribution of the new issues representing about all the interest shown in the week in this class. Prices were rather soft, and in several of the recent issues which have not been thoroughly digested concessions of about .05 per cent. in the yield to maturity were made in order to facilitate the process. Federal Farm Loan and Joint Stock Land Bank bonds were firm. In connection with the latter there seems to be a growing tendency to discriminate between the obligations of the various issuing banks. The Joint Stock Land Banks, while similar in purpose and in the method of supervision, are individual units, operated and financed by private capital, and the length of time the bank has been in operation, ability and experience of the management and the character of the farms on which their loans are made are important factors which naturally are reflected in the prices which their obligations command.

Liberty bonds all made fractional advances, a fact which was attributed by several brokers to purchase for the account of the British Government for use in settling its indebtedness to this country.

Railroad bonds generally were strong, which was only natural in view of the continued excellent showing in their reports of traffic and earnings. Obligations of the seasoned roads, which would probably cover charges by a good margin even with lower rates in effect, were the most consistent gainers. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe General 4s gained ½ to 89. New York Central refunding 5s advanced ¼ to 95½. Reading general 4s rose a fraction to 84½. The Canadian Pacific redeemed its entire outstanding issue (\$52,000,000) of 6 per cent. note certificates, due March 1, 1924. The fact that no new financing was necessary to accomplish this large reduction in fixed charges speaks well for the financial condition of that road. The Canadian Pacific permanent 4 per cent. debentures gained ¼ to 79. Delaware & Hudson convertible 5s jumped 2 points to 92, following sharp advances in the stock into which they are convertible at the rate of \$150 in bonds for \$100 in stock. The Erie again reported earnings in excess of its fixed charges, and the more speculative obligations of that road were generally higher. New Haven bonds were



## Par Value Sold on New York Stock Exchange

Week Ended July 14, 1923

	1923	1922	1921
Monday .....	\$ 7,619,250	\$13,770,900	\$10,784,500
Tuesday .....	9,094,550	16,474,050	8,732,100
Wednesday .....	8,751,400	13,499,900	13,094,000
Thursday .....	7,579,600	13,169,450	9,987,250
Friday .....	7,839,750	17,259,500	7,129,500
Saturday .....	4,403,000	5,788,000	2,994,250
<b>Total for week</b>	<b>\$45,287,550</b>	<b>\$79,961,800</b>	<b>\$52,721,600</b>

particularly strong on Friday, the 4s of 1956 gaining a point to 40 while the 6 per cent. debentures jumped 2½ to 56.

Trading in public utility bonds was quiet, the total being unusually light. Prices changed little, with gains just about balancing declines. Telephone company obligations as a class gained ground, Northwestern Bell 7s getting above their redemption price to 107¾. The utilities in the light and power field are affected to a large extent by the volume of power utilized in industrial pursuits and, as a result, quotations for their securities were irregular, a good many losing fractions.

In connection with the trend of prices in the industrial list as a whole, since the basic factors affecting different organizations vary widely, prices for their securities fluctuated in sympathy with individual developments. The sudden reduction in the price of refined sugar, which for a time took on the aspects of a price war between several of the large refiners caused uneasiness, and some of the bonds suffered losses.

The Foreign Government list evidenced a tendency to gain until Premier Baldwin's speech was published on Thursday, after which the advance stopped abruptly and prices then about held their own.

*OUT OF WORK. By G. D. H. Cole. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.*

THIS little volume is described by the author as "an introduction to the study of unemployment," and therefore we have no right to expect a thorough analysis of a subject which is disturbing Great Britain. We presume that Mr. Cole's remarks have special reference to British labor conditions because he makes a dark implication against a sinister person known as "a Pall Mall clubman." These clubmen are the time-honored opponents of honest workingmen and would delightedly wallow in their gore if the circumstances permitted. These haughty incarnations represent capitalism, and it is capital that Mr. Cole would destroy as the one obstacle to continuous employment. If the capitalists were true benefactors of the human race, or, preferentially, that particular section of it known as laboring men, they would pay out wages at all times, whether the men were working or not! That is Mr. Cole's panacea for unemployment, if we put aside for an instant the elimination of the capitalist. Perhaps paying a thousand men for a year doing nothing is the pleasing method to be adopted for the suffocation of employers, and it is certainly painless if not pleasing.


*RAW PRODUCTS OF THE WORLD. Vol. I. Africa. By Ralph Davol. Taunton, Mass.: Davol Publishing Company.*

The resources of the African continent are here listed in 264 pages with care and accuracy, and Mr. Davol's efforts to provide information on the products of each of the world's continents will no doubt meet with appreciation at the hands of those for whom it is intended. The material of the book has been obtained from official sources and from acknowledged works of reference. There is very little attempt to do more than the enumeration of the many minerals, oils, fruits and manufactures of Africa, but those who are engaged in African trade or who are contemplating engagements embracing that continent will find much useful data in Mr. Davol's comprehensive compilation.

# Money

## Potential Supply

	Week's Price Range	
	Call Loans	Time Loans 60-90 Days
Last week . . . . .	6 @4 1/2	5 1/4 @5
Previous week . . . . .	6 @4	5 1/4 @5
Year to date . . . . .	6 @3 1/2	5 3/4 @4 1/2
Same week, 1922 . . . . .	4 1/2 @2 3/4	4 1/4 @4
Same week, 1921 . . . . .	6 1/2 @5 1/2	6



Ratio of total reserves of the Federal Reserve System to deposits and Federal Reserve note liabilities combined.



ITH the midyear settlements out of the way, and with the funds with which these settlements were made back once more in their natural depositories, the market rates for money exhibit an easier tendency, borrowings by institutions of the Federal Reserve system have been sharply reduced, and the temporary strain coincident with the end of the half-year period has definitely passed. The outward reflection of this natural sequence of events has been the easing of the call money rate from 6 per cent. on Monday of last week to 5 per cent. and then to 4 1/2 per cent. compared with the 5 1/2 per cent. to 6 per cent. figures which were frequently paid by short-term borrowers the preceding week. The rates for funds for longer periods, the commercial paper rate or the rate for bankers' acceptances were not disturbed by the fluctuations evident in the call market and have remained practically constant for the last month. Time money lends currently at 5 per cent.; commercial paper appears to be more or less "pegged" at 5 per cent. for the best names; while the bankers' acceptance rate varies from 4 per cent. up to 4 1/4 per cent., according to description.

The passing of the strain of the midyear settlements was most actively represented in the Federal Reserve Bank statements at the end of the week. The rediscos of the system as a whole exhibited a decline from \$1,128,751,000 at the end of the previous week to \$1,032,663,000 at the end of last week, while for the New York Bank this decline in rediscos was approximately \$38,000,000. There was a sharp decline, too, in Federal Reserve notes in circulation, amounting to almost \$20,000,000 for the system as a whole. These factors, coupled with a moderate flow-back of gold certificates to the Federal Reserve institutions, caused an increase of 1 per cent. in the ratio of total reserves to deposits and Federal Reserve note liabilities combined for the system as a whole and of 1.8 per cent. in the New York bank's ratio. The reserve figure for the system now stands at 75.4, as compared with 77.3 per cent. at this time last year. For the New York bank it is 81.1 per cent., compared with 80.8 per cent. for the same period in 1922.

A survey of the money situation, through figures issued by the Federal Reserve, through clearing house statistics and from reports made by institutions in all parts of the country, indicates no possibility of a money strain this year. Many loans which matured at the end of the half year were not renewed; it requires only moderate amounts of capital to carry on business at its present pace—at least, not as great an amount as was required in the first and most of the second quarters of the year. Inventories in all lines are not particularly large, and this hesitancy on the part of buyers to lay in large stocks of raw or semi-raw materials, because of uncertainties as to what the Autumn will bring forth, was reflected, in a measure, by a flow-back of funds to the centres. Large amounts of it are employed temporarily in Treasury certificates, Government bonds or other paper of perfect liquidity. The reinvestment demand for long-term obligations, anticipated at the turn of the half year, hardly measured up to expectations because of unsettled market conditions. Possibly this will be one of the features of the Fall markets.

Already the money markets are commencing to look to the harvest and quietly to make arrangements for credits to harvest and move the crops. The initiative was taken by the Federal Reserve Board in a movement to bring about the education of co-operative marketing agencies, producers and buyers of agricultural products, particularly those interested in the harvesting and marketing of wheat in regard to the new credit facilities provided by the recent Congress. Directions were sent to all Federal Reserve agents to inform themselves fully regarding the new laws in order that additional steps can be taken in the process of orderly marketing of agricultural products. An even

more evident symptom of the approach of the crop-moving season, however, was the withdrawal of funds from the call money market of the so-called "country banks." This has been in progress for about a fortnight, and was one of the active factors in bringing about a temporary tightening of call money rates in the market centres July 1. This is a seasonal activity which will offset, in a measure, seasonal dullness in other directions. That this dullness was over-emphasized is suggested by the car-loading figure for the last week of June, which established a new high record. These tell a vivid story of production and of distribution of goods to consumers which tends to minimize the descriptions of spreading inactivity.


It is too early to say what will be the ultimate effect of the advance in the Bank of England rate from 3 per cent. to 4 per cent. Thus far, its effect on our money market is nil, and rumors which got abroad last week that our Federal Reserve rates of rediscount were to be advanced were officially denied. The bringing up of the Bank of England rate to 4 per cent., however, will probably prove effective in stopping the drain on London, imposed by "cheap money." Borrowing in London and re-lending here was quite profitable in the recent past and no doubt the advance in this rate abroad will put a summary stop to this practice. In other directions, however, reflections in our market of the politico-financial move are not anticipated.

Passing of the strain of settlement day was in evidence in foreign bank statements as it was in our cwn. After declining to 14.24 per cent. in the week of July 5, the proportion of reserve to liabilities of the Bank of England advanced to 17.53 per cent. last week, and in the Bank of France's statement 250,000,000 francs were clipped from the circulation account, while some 300,000,000 francs were returned by the State to the Bank. Meanwhile, loans and discounts declined from 5,104,000,000 francs in the previous week to 4,493,400,000 francs last week.

## Foreign Exchange

### Week's Range

	Sterling	Francs
High. . . . .	\$4.60 3/4	5.98c
Low. . . . .	\$4.56 1/8	5.80c
Closing. . . . .	\$4.60 3/8	5.87 1/2c



The Range of Discount on Sterling and Francs.



FTER a fortnight of weakness and irregularity, in which financial and commercial occurrences here and abroad were undoubtedly the main factor, the foreign exchange markets of the world again turned to international polities for a clue to action last week and, considered as a whole, displayed a good deal of quiet strength. In anticipation of Premier Baldwin's explanation of the British attitude on reparations, before it was delivered and in appreciation of that attitude after the speech was made, sterling was moderately strong. Between the week's low mark and its highest was a spread of two cents to the pound, of which more than one cent was accomplished in a single day of the week. The other exchanges followed sympathetically, as they generally do.

If the action of the foreign exchanges may be taken as a criterion of opinion abroad—and they have been well-nigh infallible in the past—then a most favorable construction must be placed upon the declarations of Britain's Premier. The course of sterling as well as the franc will be watched with more than usual interest in the next three or four weeks.

Possibly our trade figures for June, made public last week, explain in large measure the recent weakness in foreign exchanges as measured in terms of the dollar. They tell the interesting story that, after five months in which the balance of foreign trade worked against us, it is now once more in our favor by a close margin. Our exports decreased sharply in value last month, probably a direct reflection of the decline in commodity prices here. Exports for the twelve months ended June, 1923, were \$3,965,967,460 against \$3,771,156,489 for the twelve months ended with June, 1922. For the same period the imports were \$3,789,002,114, compared with \$2,608,079,088. In other words, while our exports, over the year-long period, showed only the moderate growth coincident with reviving international trade, the imports in the same period forged ahead by more than one billion dollars. Through shipments of gold, through the purchase of our securities, through the importation of foreign capital, through actual Government payment of obligations and through "invisible balances," the debt of Europe to the United States is slowly but surely being liquidated.

The pumping of more than four trillion marks into the German circulation at the turn of the half year, and the continued depreciation

of that currency to a point where faith in its worth has been entirely shattered, has led to a discussion of what is to happen in Germany when the mark becomes entirely worthless, as it is indubitably bound to do. Will the complete elimination of the paper mark bring about economic chaos in Germany and where may Germany turn, then, for a medium of exchange? Under present circumstances, she probably would be no worse off without the mark than with it—possibly better. Already rye and other cereals are mediums of circulation; foreign currencies, particularly the dollar and the pound, are gaining a foothold there. There is growing agitation by powerful interests in that country for the establishment of a "taxation dollar," whose value would be stable. One thing appears certain. The mark has been completely wrecked by the wild printing press of the Reischbank and has accomplished the very purpose which was intended, the most grotesque inflation the world has ever seen. The problem of bringing deflation out of inflation, of eliminating a currency which has grown to fantastic proportions, of establishing a medium of exchange whose backing will be tangible assets of a constant and sustained sort, is a problem of national finance which must be settled in the near future, either by Germany herself or by the Allies.

## Iron and Steel

The Situation to Date	End of June, 1923
United States Steel orders, tons	6,386,261
Daily pig iron production, tons	122,280
Monthly iron production, tons	3,668,413
Pig iron, Bessemer, at Pitts., ton	\$29.27



EW business continues to come into the iron and steel industry in only moderate volume and, as a reflection of this, operating ratios were let down several notches from the figures of the preceding week. In one or two lines, particularly that of pig iron, there was some overproduction because of the failure of buyers to take up their commitments, and in these scattered lines prices were weak and irregular. Taken as a whole, however, the present daily production of iron and steel in the United States continues high in comparison with previous years; there is still a considerable backlog of orders which accumulated in the second quarter; and it might be said that the future of the industry, so far as the balance of the third and fourth quarters of 1923 is concerned, is yet to be judged because buyers as a whole have given no indication of coming into the market for forward deliveries in enthusiastic fashion. The reduction in operating ratios has not proved a surprise—rather it was the anticipated development, in view of the fact that what would amount to good business for the year, or at least three-quarters of the year, was placed in the first two quarters. This probably overemphasized the seasonal lull now taking place, and while buyers continue to be indifferent about forward commitments, on the ground that better price arrangements possibly may be made later, the steel industry is far from pessimistic, and the belief is expressed by leaders that new business will develop between this time and the Fall in sufficient proportions to make the year one of the best in the industry's history. It is to be doubted, however, that the ingot production for the full year will be double what it was in the first half, when a total of 23,213,243 tons was turned out. This constituted a new high record for the industry for that period.

Figures for the month of June, now at hand, place the ingot production at 3,748,890 tons, or 144,188 tons a day, and approximately 7 per cent. less than the output of May. From the high output of April, which represented 49,000,000 tons a year, there was a drop last month to an annual rate of approximately 45,000,000 tons. Such curtailment as took place in the last week or so was largely in merchant blast furnaces. Last week six stacks were blown out, including two in Southern Ohio, one in Wisconsin, one in New Jersey, one in Western Pennsylvania and one in Alabama, and several additional stacks have been banked.

The decision of buyers to "stay close to shore," so far as forward business is concerned, is well reflected in the attitude of automobile manufacturers. Motor car makers are keeping close to June schedules in output and the new business which they put on steel markers' books in the last few weeks was so small as to permit the mills to catch up entirely on orders. In this line particularly the decline in volume of raw materials ordered shows a reduction of more than 50 per cent. There was some revival in railroad buying of freight cars, and more than 2,000 were ordered last week, of which the New York Central Railroad will take 1,500 cars. Car orders for the first six months of the year totaled 80,000, compared with 10,000 for the corresponding period of last year. It was reported from Chicago last week that the steel rail orders under negotiation amount to about 160,000 tons, of

which the Illinois Central Railroad will get 60,000 tons. Railroad bridge work was in heavier demand, but fabricated steel has again slumped. Pipe makers have about all they can handle for the rest of the year. This is due in part to the fact that there is a heavy over-production of oil in the country.

Price levels continue to show considerable revisions. Last week's composite price on fourteen iron and steel products, compiled by one trade authority, was placed at \$45.49, compared with \$45.72 the preceding week, \$46.46 for the month of June and \$37.50 a year ago. Prices on pig iron fell another dollar, making four dollars within the month, and the pig iron composite price at \$26.04 per gross ton is \$4.82 below the high point of last Spring and 75 cents per ton below the figure of the preceding week. For the tenth consecutive week the composite price for finished steel, compiled by one of the trade authorities, stands at 2.789 cents per pound, compared with 2.446 cents at the beginning of the year and 2.169 cents one year ago.

Forward bookings of the United States Steel Corporation, made public last week, were of interest in the trade because they usually prove a good barometer of what is going on in the industry as a whole. The corporation reported that it now has on its books total orders for 6,386,261 tons, a reduction from the last report of 589,090 tons. This is the smallest total reported since the close of August last year, when forward business aggregated 5,950,105 tons. This represents a drop of more than a million tons from the peak total of 7,288,509 tons for 1923, reported at the close of March, with 6,981,351 tons at the close of May this year and with 5,635,531 tons at the close of June last year.

The labor situation is easier because the mills are not now so hard-driven, and are more able to assume an independent attitude with their employees.

There is some talk of a combination of European steel masters to control foreign trade, but it is not considered seriously yet. So far as foreign competition is concerned, it has not become an important factor, and the iron and steel industry abroad is reported to be languishing, with a decline of some 75 per cent. in operations of the mills in the Ruhr Valley.

Reports in the copper trade place June sales at 195,000,000 pounds to 200,000,000 pounds. This compares with 190,000,000 in May and 195,000,000 pounds in April. For the first six months of the year refinery shipments approximated 1,175,000,000 pounds, while the output was estimated at 1,053,000,000 pounds, thus causing a reduction of 122,000,000 pounds in surplus stocks between Jan. 1 and June 1, 1923. In June it is estimated there was a further reduction of 5,000,000 pounds of surplus stocks, reducing such stocks to 210,000,000 pounds, or slightly more than one month's supply at the June rate of demand.

The copper market was moderately firmer, although neither offerings nor inquiries were large. Other metals are dull and irregular. Two separate cuts were made in lead in one day last week and at the same time a fractional advance was made in the quotations on zinc. These irregular fluctuations possibly are their own best demonstration that the metal trade as a whole is more or less irregular and is seeking indications of the attitude of buyers.

## Cotton

### Week's Price Range

	High	Low	Closing	Net Change
July.....	27.25	26.66	27.23	+ .23
October.....	24.60	23.39	24.17	+ .44
December.....	24.15	22.90	23.68	+ .44
January.....	23.93	22.60	23.43	+ .43
March.....	23.93	22.55	23.41	+ .42
May.....	23.80	22.48	23.31	+ .41



N consideration of the weakness in other commodities and in securities, the steadiness in cotton last week excited considerable comment. Conditions in the trade did not change a great deal, but while weakness in other markets brought irregularity in cotton and some measure of speculative selling, still there was no tremendous break in cotton such as occurred in other commodities and in securities, and it is within about three to four cents, for all options, of the year's best price.

The finished goods market continues to be quiet, without positive indication of the attitude of buyers. There were additional shutdowns in mills, both in Northern and Southern sections of the country. There is a disposition once more to keep a watchful eye on the rapidly decreasing visible supply of the old crop, as well as on the prospects for the new, rather than on the present state of the wholesale and retail goods trade. Foreigners took a little more cotton, although their purchases were not sufficient to give definite assurance that foreign purchases are about to revive on a normal scale.

crop report, particularly on acreage, in which an estimate was made that the total planted had gained 12.6 per cent. over the previous year, to an aggregate of 38,287,000 acres, about 1,250,000 acres more than the general average of private estimates. There is a disposition to believe that the Government's estimate on acreage is too high, and many traders and spinners are content to stand aloof until more definite news is received of the growing crop. They point out that many things can happen to new cotton between now and the time it is brought to market, and it is remarkable how the trade scoffs at a new bumper crop. Possibly this is caused to some extent by the small amount of cotton remaining from the old crop; at any rate, sentiment is almost unanimous that the outturn for 1923-1924 will fall far short of most of the estimates made.

The developments in the international situation did not have much effect on the market last week.

Exports continue to run well over 1,000,000 bales below the corresponding period last year. Thus far this year they are 4,696,171 bales, compared with 5,885,200 bales at the corresponding period last year. This difference of more than 1,000,000 bales represents a slack which many here consider more or less as a backlog of potential demand which must eventually be filled, rather than a real and lasting discrepancy.

Weather in the belt was moderately good for the new crop last week. It was generally clear and warm in the South, with moderate moisture in many sections. The fear of extremely dry, hot weather did not materialize, and the condition of the growing crop has improved much in the last two or three weeks. Fewer reports are heard of insect damage, although there is still overhanging the market the possibility of weevil damage as the bolls mature later on.

The labor situation in the South does not improve, and complaints are heard from many sections about its scarcity and high cost. The South was not very bullish on its own crop the last fortnight, and the labor situation has probably been a factor. At any rate a great deal of the pressure which the market has been called on to withstand developed from below the Mason and Dixon line.

## Textiles

### Week's Price Range

Spot Printcloths	Open	Close
39-inch 68-72s.....	*11c	*10½c
38½-inch 64-60s.....	*9½c	*9c
*Nominal.		



In a great many respects the past week in the textile trades duplicated those which immediately preceded it. Some jobbers came to town to study the situation at first hand before attending the meetings that are scheduled for them this week, but they did very little buying. In fact, an air of uncertainty pervaded all the cloth markets, with the possible exception of silks, and not a little of this feeling was contributed by the possible shrinkage in consumer demand growing out of the break in the price of what. Not for a long time has any single happening outside of the Textile Industries aroused so much comment in them, and there was a more or less general disposition to look for restricted buying on the part of the wholesalers.

Aside from the opening of new lines of shirting fabrics by one of the leading houses in the trade, at prices not given out for publication, there was nothing of particular interest in the cotton goods. The present week, however, will doubtless see the repricing, at substantially lower levels, of several types of heavy colored goods, among them cheviots and plaids. These goods have not moved freely for some time, and some kind of sales stimulus is required. Whether price cutting alone will be enough to start trading, however, is a question. It is certain that it did not have the desired effect in interesting buyers of bleached goods in a large way, following the recent reductions in standard lines of this merchandise. Gray goods continued to drag and prices slipped off considerably as a result. At the close spot printcloths were nominally held on the basis of 9 cents for 38½-inch 64-60s.

The chief interest in the woolens and worsteds was supplied by an unofficial report that the leading company in the industry would price three classes of its goods for Spring a week from today. One of the smaller houses set August 13 as its Spring opening date. The failure of the retailers to buy more Fall suits than they have has put a definite check on duplicate business in heavyweight suitings. Reports concerning the amount of this business that is being done differ quite a little, but the best indications are that there is less of it than the manufacturers would like to see. No changes of importance were reported during the week in the raw materials, the London wool auction being interrupted by the dockworkers' strike.

Raw silks took an upward turn early in the week but failed to sustain the rise throughout. Sinshiu No. 1 closed at \$7.80 a pound. In

the finished goods the manufacturers did somewhat better business than in weeks recently past, and there were signs of withdrawals of some of the price concessions that had been offered to start buyers in the way they should go. At this season of the year the silk trade should be somewhat more active than the others, due to the fact that there is more direct selling to retailers done in it than in any of the other cloth trades.

The week in the linens was productive of less feature than for some time, which means that it was very dull indeed. Until more is done for the coming Spring season by the importers, there will not be a great deal of interesting information on tap in the trade. Reports coming from the other side regarding the flax situation are rather contradictory, with the result that buyers in this country have little definite information on which to base their present and future buying plans.

Chiefly of interest in the burlaps was the announcement about mid-week of the estimate of acreage planted to jute in India for the coming fiscal year, and also of the estimate of the crop for the same period. The planted area was estimated at 2,297,500 acres, against 1,455,806 acres in the last fiscal year, while the forthcoming crop was set at about 8,000,000 bales. The crop for the fiscal year just closed was about 6,500,000 bales. Buyers of burlaps marked time, confining their efforts here largely to trying to get goods out under the figures holders were asking. In this they were none too successful. Shipments from Calcutta to North American ports during June amounted to 92,000,000 yards, against 91,000,000 during May.

## Grain

### Week's Price Range

	WHEAT		CORN		OATS	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
July.....	\$1.04	.99	.84½	.81	.39½	.38½
Sept.....	1.03½	.98½	.77½	.73¾	.35½	.34
Dec.....	1.06½	\$1.01½	.67	.62	.37½	.35½



For all the commodity markets that of wheat is the most perplexing because it is one of the country's "money crops" and because of the dissatisfaction which prevails among the group which must be depended upon to produce it. Wheat last week sold in the open market below one dollar a bushel. This is not only the lowest price at which it has sold in the present season, but is below the prewar average, which for five years before the war was \$1.04½. The peculiarities of the situation have developed a wide gap between the price the farmer receives for his crop and the price he must pay for its cost of production, as well as for his necessities of life. Wheat at one dollar is far below the cost of production, and estimates which have been made by agricultural experts are that the wheat farmer would be making little money even at \$1.25 a bushel. The wheat farmer must now pay his laborer practically twice as much as he did in 1913; he must pay an average of at least 60 per cent. more for the goods he buys with whatever net receipts may happen to be left to him. In many sections of the wheat belt the wave of land speculation, which swept over the country two or three years ago, forced the market value of wheat farms to inflated prices, placing still another obstacle in his path.

Although the position of the wheat farmer is fully understood and sympathy is felt for him, none of the panaceas which have been suggested to bring his commodity back to a price which will give him a living return appear to fit the present case. It is true that through the new financial arrangements, completed by the last Congress, his credits this year will be more extensive and possibly easier to obtain, but that does not help the situation greatly as long as the cost of his crop is greater than the net receipts from it. Proposals of various kinds to limit the volume of marketing, through associations or otherwise, although they have been agitated for a long time, have not worked out well in actual practice, and it is safe to say that for the present crop the wheat farmer cannot look to any artificial aid, Governmental or otherwise, to help him out of his existing dilemma.

The present situation in the wheat market to a large extent bears the European trade-mark. European buyers actually and absolutely control the situation at present, and they are taking wheat only in moderate volume and on such reactions as occur from time to time, but without sufficiently constant buying power to make much difference in the quotations. It does not appear that the crop will be particularly large; at least, from present estimates it cannot be forecast as a bumper crop. The latest estimate of the year's crop, made public by the Department of Agriculture, is 821,000,000 bushels. This compares with a crop of 862,000,000 bushels in 1922, and an average crop for the five years from 1918 to 1922 inclusive of 876,700,000 bushels. Added

Continued on Page 89.

# How to Choose Among Security Offerings

*The Annalist's Complete Index and Guide to Current Issues*



HEREWITH The Annalist inaugurates a new service for the investing public and for the syndicates and firms handling new issues of securities throughout the United States and Canada. The service is unique among co-operative methods in the magazine field.

Below will be found a complete list of securities, including preferred stocks, common stocks, bonds and notes offered to the public in the week ending July 14.

In the issue of each subsequent Monday a complete list of security offerings in the preceding week will be published in similar manner. Information as to the name of the offering, the amount, the rate and date of interest payments, the dates of issue and maturity, the offered price and the yield at this price will be given. For quick

reference the list has been arranged by classification and in alphabetical form.

Quarterly, in the initial issue of each three months, this weekly information will be assembled into a complete Index of Security Offerings. The list will be supplemented by the publication as well of such display announcements as may have appeared in The Annalist in the last quarter, containing facts indicative of the strength, safety and special features of the issues.

While The Annalist will not discriminate among securities nor advise as to the wisdom of investments, it is prepared, through its service department, to provide additional detailed information for those desiring it.

Here is the list of last week:

## Bonds

NAME	AMOUNT	DATE OF ISSUE	MATURITY	OFFERED AT	INTEREST RATE	INTEREST DATE	YIELD
Alabama, State of, P. R. H'way, Series B Amer. Invest. & Realty Co. of Calif....	\$1,734,000	July 11	June 1, 1943, to 1948 (serially)	.....	4 1/2%	.....	4.40%
	\$1,000,000 (1st mtge.)	July 13	\$50,000 Annually May 1, 1924, to 1937 inc. \$300,000 May 1, 1938	Par & Int.	6%	M. & N. 1	5%
Asheville, N. C.	\$925,000 (Gold)	July 13	June 1, 1925, to 1964, inc. (serially)	.....	5 3/4%	.....	over 4.65% to opt. date & 5% thereafter
Atlanta Joint Stock Land Bank, Atlanta, Ga.	\$1,000,000	July 11	Dec. 1, 1952, opt. Dec. 1, 1932	102 1/2 & Int.	5%	.....	.....
Automatic Elec. Washer Co., Inc., Newton, Iowa	\$175,000	July 11	June 1, 1925, to 1933	Par & Int.	6 1/2%	J. & D. 1	.....
Buckhorn Collieries Co., Cleveland, Ohio	\$300,000 (1st mtge.)	July 12	July 1, 1938	99 1/2 & Int.	7%	.....	.....
Camaguey Elec. Co., Ltd.	\$1,500,000	July 11	Oct. 1, 1952	.....	6 1/2%	.....	.....
Cleveland Union Terminals Co.	\$5,000,000 (Gold) Ser. B 1st mtge.	July 13	April 1, 1933	94 1/2 & Int.	5%	A. & O. 1	over 5.30%
Consolidated Utilities Co. (privately) Dodge Bldg., New York	\$1,250,000	July 9	April 1, 1938	90 & Int.	6%	.....	7.10%
Doubleday & Williams Land & Livestock Co., Owyhee County, Idaho	\$1,200,000 (1st mtge.)	July 13	July 1, 1943	Par & Int.	6 1/2%	J. & J. 1	.....
Estes Hall, Chicago	\$100,000 (1st mtge.)	July 10	April 1, 1926, to 1933, annually	Par & Int.	7 1/2%	A. & O. 1	.....
Franks (C. D.) & Co. Realty & Warehouse Corp.	\$575,000	July 9	From 1 1/2 to 10 years	Par & Int.	6 1/2%	.....	.....
Florida Realty Corp.	\$150,000 (1st mtge.)	July 14	July 1, 1943	7%	Par & Int.	.....	.....
Freemont Joint Stock Land Bank	\$1,400,000 (1st mtge.)	July 12	July 1, 1943	Par & Int.	7%	.....	4.62% to opt. date; 5% thereafter
Gimbel Brothers, Inc.	\$1,000,000	July 12	June 1, 1953, optional June 1, 1933	103 & Int.	5%	.....	.....
Goss Printing Press Co., Chicago	\$356,000 (1st mtge.)	July 9	May 1, 1928	101 & Int.	6%	M. & N. 1	Over 5%
	\$500,000 (1st mtge.)	July 14	\$50,000 annually, July 1, 1925, to 1932, & \$100,000 July 1, 1933	6 1/2%	Par & Int.	J. & J. 1	.....
Graemere, Chicago	\$1,350,000 (1st mtge.)	July 10	Feb. 15, 1925, to 1933	.....	6 1/2%	F. & A. 15	.....
Hall Bros., Inc., Kansas City	\$135,000 (1st mtge.)	July 13	July 1, 1925, to 1933 (serially)	Par & Int.	6 1/2%	.....	6% to 6.40%
Herschel (R) Mfg. Co.	\$350,000 (1st mtge.)	July 13	Aug. 1, 1924, to 1933	Par & Int.	6 1/2%	.....	.....
Hightland Plaza Apts., Birmingham, Ala.	\$565,000	July 10	.....	Par & Int.	7%	.....	.....
Imperial Cotton Mills Co., Los Angeles, Calif.	\$500,000 (1st mtge.)	July 12	June 1, 1926, to 1933, incl. serially	Par & Int.	7%	J. & D. 1	.....
Los Angeles County, Calif.	\$1,250,000	July 11	\$62,000 annually, July 1, 1928, to 1937, & \$63,000 annually July 1, to 1972 & 1938, to 1947	102.22 & Int.	5%	.....	4.50%
Magee Realty Corp., Taunton, Mass.	\$575,000 (1st mtge.)	July 11	June 15, 1943	Par & Int.	7%	J. & D.	.....
Market St. Realty Co.	\$1,250,000 (1st mtge.) (Gold)	July 9	\$75,000 annually Sept. 1, 1927, to 1936, & \$500,000 Sept. 1, 1937	Par & Int.	6%	M. & S. 1	.....
Medford, Mass.	\$438,000	July 9	July 1, 1924, to 1946, annually	.....	4 1/4%	.....	4.20 to 4 1/2%
Michigan, State of, Highway	\$2,000,000	July 12	Aug. 1, 1943	102.66 & Int.	4 1/2%	.....	4.30%
Minnesota, State of	\$1,000,000	July 12	July 15, 1943	102.66 & Int.	4 1/2%	.....	4.30%
Newburgh, N. Y.	\$225,000	July 12	\$12,500 annually July 1, 1924, to '41	Par & Int.	4 1/2%	.....	4.10 to 4.05%
Newburgh, N. Y., Water Imp.	\$275,000	July 12	Due \$12,500 annually July 1, 1942, to 1963	Par & Int.	4%	.....	4%
Northern States Power Co. (of Minn.)	\$3,000,000	July 11	April 1, 1941	99 1/2 & Int.	6%	.....	over 6%
Palmetto Apts., Detroit, Mich.	\$900,000 (1st mtge.)	July 10	Dec. 1, 1925, to 1940	Par & Int.	6 1/2%	J. & D. 1	.....
Placentia Orange Growers' Assn.	\$300,000 (1st mtge.)	July 9	\$30,000 annually Oct. 1, 1924, to '33	Par & Int.	6 1/2%	A. & O. 1	.....
Pratt Chuck Co.	\$200,000 (1st mtge.)	July 9	May 1, 1938	Par & Int.	7%	M. & N. 1	.....
Professional Bldg. Co., Los Angeles, Cal.	\$525,000 (1st mtge.)	July 9	Dec. 1, 1924, to June 1, 1936, semi-annually	.....	6 1/2%	J. & D. 1	6.60%
Ramsey County, Minn.	\$1,050,000	July 11	Aug. 1, 1924, to 1943, annually	100.15 to 104.62	4 1/4%	.....	4.60% to 4.40%
Rosedale Park Land Co., Detroit	\$600,000	July 10	June 1, 1933	Par & Int.	6 1/2%	.....	.....
Rosslyn Fireproof Bldg. Co., Los Angeles, Cal.	\$450,000 (1st mtge.)	July 9	Feb. 1, 1926, to 1943 annually	.....	7%	F. & A. 1	6.75%
Sacramento Valley Colony Co.	\$350,000 (1st mtge.)	July 9	Nov. 1, 1927, to 1932, annually	Par & Int.	7%	M. & N. 1	.....
San Diego, Cal.	\$876,000	July 11	July 1, 1925, to 1963 (serially)	.....	5%	.....	4.70% to 4.60%
17 East 96th St. Apts., New York	\$800,000	July 10	June 14, 1925, to 1933	.....	6 1/2%	J. & D. 1	.....
Stern (Charles) & Sons, Inc.	\$400,000 (1st mtge.)	July 9	May 1, 1926, to 1937, annually	Par & Int.	7%	M. & N. 1	6.45% to 7%
St. Louis County, Minn., School Bldg.	\$139,000	July 10	.....	102.11 & Int.	6%	.....	5.25%
St. Louis County, Minn., School Bldg.	\$500,000	July 10	Aug. 9, 1926, to 1935, annually	102.42 & Int.	6%	.....	5.25%
St. Louis County, Minn., School Bldg.	\$500,000	July 10	Jan. 30, 1927, to 1936	106.84 & Int.	6%	.....	.....
Southeast Arkansas Levee Dist.	\$300,000	July 10	Sept. 1, 1928, to 1933, annually	Par & Int.	5 1/2%	.....	5.40%
Tehama Court Apts., Detroit, Mich.	\$440,000 (1st mtge.)	July 9	Aug. 15, 1926, to 1937, annually	98 1/2 & Int.	6%	.....	6.15%
Tomahawk Kraft Paper Co.	\$1,200,000 (1st mtge.)	July 9	April 1, 1938	.....	6 1/2%	J. & J. 1	Over 6%
Virginia-Western Power Co.	\$3,500,000 (1st mtge.) Series A	July 14	July 1, 1953	95 & Int.	5%	.....	.....
Westbrock Corp., Buffalo, N. Y.	\$900,000 (1st mtge.)	July 13	3 to 15 year serial coupon bonds	.....	6 1/2%	.....	.....
Windermere Courts Apt. Bldg., Phila., Pa.	\$400,000 (1st mtge.)	July 13	2 to 4 years serially	Par & Int.	6 1/4%	.....	.....
Woonsocket, R. I.	\$1,000,000	July 13	July 1, 1924, to 1933, incl.	.....	5%	.....	4.75%

## Stocks

American Multigraph Co.	30,000 Shares Com.	July 14	.....	\$23 per sh.	.....
Bang Service Stations, Inc., New York (privately), Unsold Co.'s Pfd.	.....	July 12	Par (\$100) & divd.	F. M. A. & N. 1	.....
Blanchard Moshannon Mining Co.	\$200,000 Pfd.	July 11	At par \$100	7%	.....
Continental Bldg. Co., Indianapolis, Ind.	\$600,000 Cumul. Pfd.	July 9	Par & ac- crued divd.	6%	J. & J. 1
Kauffman-Straus Co., Inc., Louisville, Ky.	\$100,000 Pfd.	July 11	Par & divd.	7%	M. J. S. & D.
McCrary Stores Corp., Unsold portion.	\$3,000,000 Cumul. Pfd.	July 11	Par & divd.	7%	F. M. A. & N. 1


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# The Development of the British Empire

By

F. C. CHAPPELL

*Vast Plans Maturing for Placing the Empire on a Progressive Basis*



PEAKING shortly before his resignation, the late Prime Minister said that if we have to spend money on unemployment—and we must—it is infinitely better to spend it on buying material which we can send to develop the Empire than in any other possible way. Mr. Bonar Law's successor has lately put the matter in a more striking way. The Government, he said, are going to make the phrase, "Empire Development," live. England today is industrialized up to the safety limit and this island is overcrowded. It is intended to grapple with the problem in resolute fashion next October when the Empire Conference meets in London. The time will not be occupied in passing pious resolutions, but in the consideration of real business. The whole policy of the Government is to co-operate with the dominions, not merely for the celebration of emigration schemes, but for the intensive development of inter-imperial trade and the exploitation in the interests of the whole Empire of its natural resources. Imperial communication and the vital question of preference and the possibilities of its extension will be closely examined. Already very important schemes for the development of the crown colonies—as distinct from the self-governing dominions—are ready, and wait only for the sanction of Parliament for voting the necessary funds, and this will shortly be given. The policy of appointing trade commissioners is to be extended and new commissioners will be appointed in Vancouver, Bombay and many other important centres.

American readers should understand that the real object of all these plans and conferences is ultimately to make the Empire as self-contained as it is humanly possible to be. At the same time, it is recognized that these plans will take a long time to mature. The Prime Minister uttered a word of warning recently on this point. "If, while we devote our attention to these objects, we allow Europe to disintegrate and collapse before our eyes, nothing can save England either, in the first place, from a continuance of the appalling trade conditions of the last two years, or, in the second, from social reactions among the people that may be beyond the power of statesmanship to cope with." Putting it in a selfish way, Britain cannot afford to let Europe "stew in its own juice" a moment longer than possible. She needs both the European and the colonial markets for her foreign trade. But the restoration of Europe to an economic equilibrium will probably be a protracted undertaking. Unless miracles happen, we must exclude from our prognosis any real prospect of a European revival in the next five years, perhaps longer.

With this perception has arisen a school of thought which has come to regard the expansion of trade within the British Empire as the only solution of the problem of British trade. In view of the high expectations which now prevail as regards the future of imperial commerce, it will be as well to look a little closely into the facts. If we lost the continental trade, the discovery of fresh and the expansion of existing markets within the Empire could not at once compensate for their loss. We cannot turn from a devastated Europe to an unimpaired imperial trade. For instance, India depends largely on sales to Europe to provide the means of payment for her imports of British goods. If she cannot sell to Europe, she cannot buy in the same proportion from us. Although our home and colonial markets absorb a large proportion of the total production of Britain, the remainder, together with our invisible exports, have to finance Great Britain's essential needs for imported food and raw materials. The British Empire supplies only 35 per cent. of our grain and 27 per cent. of our cotton, whereas 36 per cent. and 64 per cent. of these commodities, respectively, come from the United States.

Again, what imperial developments can be effected which will afford immediate relief to our necessities? As regards the self-governing dominions, the first object of consideration is their capacity for consuming a far greater proportion of our exports than they do at the present time. It may very appropriately be pointed out that there is little room for any speedy improvement in this direction, because the whole tendency of our colonies is to foster their own industries for the supply of their own requirements. The official records show that Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Newfoundland and South Africa received between them 17.5 per cent. of the value of our exports for 1913, 13.6 per cent. in 1920 and 15.7 per cent. in 1921. It will, therefore, be difficult to effect any marked improvement in a short space of time. The surest way of doing this is by emigrating a part of our surplus popula-

tion and thus steadily year by year increasing the number of potential colonial buyers of our goods. I may add that far-reaching plans are now being effected for carrying out such emigration on a big scale in combination with the colonial Governments. We have today quite 1,500,000 of surplus population for whom there is no work, and no reasonable likelihood of there being any permanently. Before the war we used to emigrate from 250,000 to nearly 500,000 people annually, the majority going to the dominions. In place of an emigration of, say, 3,000,000 for the seven years ended 1920, the actual exodus from the United Kingdom has only been 340,000.

It should be pointed out, too, that this emigration is accomplished by a corresponding movement of material capital, the result being not only relief in the labor market at home, but an increase in the demand from the colonies for our manufactured products. The importance of this is readily seen from the following facts: The official statistics show that while our dominions, the Channel Islands, Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus, contained in 1913 only 21,000,000 people, the total value of our exports of manufactured goods to those areas amounted during that year to nearly £83,000,000, or an average of approximately £4 per head. On the other hand, exports of British finished products to all European countries and to North and South America totaled £179,000,000 for a population of about 526,000,000, an average of only 6s 10d per head. So that our colonies absorb per unit of population nearly twelve times the value of our manufactures as do foreign nations. At the same time the aggregate value of the foreign trade with Europe and the American Continent must not be lost sight of. The immediate benefit of the emigration schemes now under way will be the easement of the labor market and the reduction in the amount of taxation due to poor relief, &c. This has cost us £2,000,000 sterling a week, and has been a terrible burden on industry, adding, as it did, very much to the total cost of production in all industries, with the consequent handicap in selling the goods in foreign markets.

Mention must also be made of the importance, in this connection, of the British crown colonies. The total value of the import and export trade of our dependencies in tropical Africa alone is now about £60,000,000 a year, an increase of 156 per cent. on the trade in 1906, and there is every reason to believe that the next decade will see a vast increase in this direction. The crown colonies have a population of about 37,000,000 people, and in 1913 were as important to us, from a trade point of view, as China and Japan, which have a combined population of nearly 500,000,000.

There is another fact to be considered as regards the extension of our colonial trade. It is important to remember that during the last thirty years it has not been increasing, but steadily declining proportionate to the trade transacted with other countries. For example, thirty years ago 67 per cent. of New Zealand's imports were from England; today the proportion is only 48 per cent. In the meantime the imports to New Zealand from the United States have risen from 5 per cent. to 19 per cent. and are steadily rising. The same relative rise and fall has taken place in all the other dominions. Canada is certainly not taking the same proportion of goods from us as the other dominions. Enormously as America has increased her position in the other dominions, we are face to face with competition of a much more intensive character in Canada. One of the objects of the forthcoming imperial conference in October next will be to find out the real cause of this decline in our imperial commerce. A proper standard of comparison makes adequate allowance for the reduced value of money, and it is necessary to take present values on the basis of commodity prices current in 1913. On this basis, our overseas commerce fell 29 per cent. last year, against 1913. To a certain extent, just pointed out, growing foreign competition may account to a certain extent for this; but there are other and more important causes at work, the most important being the interdependence of nations in trade. For example, in 1913 we sold to India goods to the value of £70,000,000 and we received back from her goods to the value of £36,000,000, leaving us with a credit of £34,000,000. In the same year our exports to Germany totaled £41,000,000 and our imports from thence equaled £76,000,000, or a debit against us amounting to £35,000,000. Putting the two countries together for trade purposes, our imports and exports nearly balanced. Examining the trade in that year between Germany and India, we see that India's exports to Germany were £27,000,000 and her imports from that country only £7,000,000. Thus India had an excess of exports to Germany of £20,000,000, and the surplus she thus obtained

provided her with the means of paying for British goods. Practically the same interdependence of trade governs the relationship of all nations. Thus the breakdown of the European markets hampers British foreign trade not only with her own colonies, who are large exporters to Central Europe, but handicaps her commerce in the Far East, South America and elsewhere. The Indian ryot cannot buy Lancashire's cotton goods because Russia cannot buy India's teas. It is the same story all over the world. Mr. McKenna, whose name is well known to American readers as a skilled banker and practical economist, recently pointed out the fallacy of thinking that as British industry benefits most from our export of manufactured goods, it will therefore be comparatively easy by an extension of our imperial and South American markets to make good the loss we now suffer from the breakdown in Europe. To what extent, he asks, should we have to lend the money to our imperial and South American customers to enable them to pay for our manufactures? If we loaned more we should sell more. But we cannot conduct our export trade entirely on that basis, as he very acutely points out. In large part, at any rate, our exports are needed to furnish us with the means of paying for our imports. As we did not lend much to Europe before 1913, so our exports to that Continent cannot be replaced by exports which represent the proceeds of our own loans.

Another reason why we should not expect too great results from empire trade development is that the colonies take practically no coal from us, having their own supplies. From the point of view of ocean transport—and this matter is vital to English commerce—our coal export trade plays an all-important part in our oversea commerce, as it represents 80 per cent. of the total weight of our export cargoes, and its carriage finds employment on the outward voyage for upward of one-third of the total shipping tonnage entering and clearing from our ports. Practically none of our coal is taken by Australia, New Zealand, India, Canada, the Cape or Natal, while before the war the rest of the Empire only took about 4 per cent. of the total shipped.

As indicating the scope for improved trade between the United Kingdom and the Empire, the following figures are very suggestive:

BRITISH POSSESSIONS IMPORTS, 1913 AND 1919  
(Including Bullion)

	1913	1919	Inc., P.C.
From United Kingdom	£240,000,000	£306,000,000	25
From other British possessions	79,000,000	187,500,000	80
From foreign countries	244,000,000	494,750,000	102

Thus we see that our competitors have firmly established themselves in the colonial markets, in spite of the preferential duties granted by the colonies to British imports.

The real value of our Empire trade to England is that it is complementary, not competitive. Indeed, the trade of greatest value to any nation is complementary rather than competitive. From the point of view of employment it is obviously desirable to stimulate exchanges with markets which purchase highly finished goods and supply in return food and raw materials. That is the nature of our trade with the dominions, whereas in the case of Germany almost the opposite conditions prevail. In 1913 the total imports into the United Kingdom from that market were valued at over £80,000,000, the bulk of this being manufactured goods. In the same period our exports thither amounted to only £40,000,000, half of which were in the form of raw materials and partly manufactured goods, such as yarn. Compare this trade to that of India. To India, British exports amounted in value to £70,000,000, while imports thence were £48,500,000. The British exports consisted mainly of cotton manufactures and other products into all of which a large percentage of home labor had entered. The imports from India were in the form of raw materials and foodstuffs, jute, wheat and tea, representing £25,000,000. It has been well said that the sale of a pair of boots to a German customer is not really of great benefit to the nation if it be counterbalanced by the purchase of another pair of boots from Germany, though both transactions will help to swell the total commercial interchange of the two nations. It would certainly have been better for England to have exchanged boots for leather—or, better still, hides—since in that case the real nature of the transaction would have been the exchange of leather brought to the form of boots by British labor for raw material sufficient to make more than one pair of boots, the margin representing the proceeds of work done. The point is that in Anglo-German trade this country has been buying more labor than it sold, and consequently it was a bad exchange so far as employment was concerned. We have felt the loss of the Russian market not because of the value of her direct purchases from us, but because Indian products, such as tea, as mentioned above, were largely sold there and the failure of that outlet for her goods rendered India less able to buy British manufactures. Before the war our total net exports of coal and manufactures (mainly coal) to Europe were £32,000,000 a year, compared with £98,000,000 to extra-European countries and £164,000,000 (mostly manufactures and part manufactured goods) to the British Empire.

The coming economic conference will mark a turning point in British fiscal policy, if such a conference is to be a reality. The colonial press, and especially the Canadian and Australian newspapers, have

declared plainly that if it is to have any practical result, "it must begin with the British tariff." Canada is reaching out for foreign markets, as witness her recent commercial conventions with France, and the probable arrangement with Italy, Belgium and Australia, to mention only some of the competitors for Canadian trade. The contention is that Britain must be willing to risk the loss of some of her foreign markets to gain an equivalent in the markets of the empire.

The Australian press thinks that, as Australia has adopted a high tariff, any negotiations must be on a basis of generous reciprocal preference. If so, is Britain prepared to abandon free trade to establish reciprocal trading? The Premier of the Australian Commonwealth has just declared that the present trade relations with England are so unsatisfactory that they cannot continue. The preference granted by the Commonwealth to Britain has restricted Australian foreign trade, as she has to compete in the English markets against the goods of foreign countries. The Australian meat industry, he pointed out as one of the grievances, has languished while England was packed with Argentine beef. The British Government also sends huge meat contracts abroad when Australian industry is depressed. The Premier very bluntly declared that if England is sincere she must give due weight to other considerations than cheapness. Foreign nations were anxious to conclude reciprocal trade treaties with her and she could not permanently ignore such overtures. We cannot maintain a strong imperial sentiment if the interests of one portion of the empire lie, through its commerce, in the direction of a foreign power.

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## The Foreign Situation

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reparations in a form different from money payments by the German Government. Poincare, before his service as President of France (1913-1920), had been eminent as a lawyer, and especially as the trusted adviser of the large banking, industrial and commercial groups which had actively opposed (co-operating with British interests) German schemes in the Near East and German expansion in general. Associated with him in these enterprises was Millerand, now President of France.

As Premier for some eight months before his election as President, Millerand had stood for an inflexible enforcement of the Versailles Treaty against Germany; and when thus elected, he attacked French precedent by insisting that he and not the moderate Premiers Leygues and Briand should shape the foreign policy of the Republic. When Poincare followed Briand as Premier, he had already set forth in a series of articles published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* his own policy of relentless hostility to Germany, in all things, and at all times. In their present united support of the French policy, Poincare and Millerand represent, as formerly in professional life, the views of the richest and most conservative "big business" interests of France.

If, then, the Ruhr occupation is destroying the economic capacity of Germany, as Baldwin contends—if, as is reported from many neutral observers in Europe, the present strain in Germany is tending toward a splitting up of the country into smaller political units of doubtful capacity to reunite, the imminence of such a result would be far from unsatisfactory to the interests which Poincare and Millerand formerly, and perhaps now, represent. Obviously, if security for France against German armed aggression cannot be secured through an adequate alliance with other powers, it might conceivably be secured through a disruption of Germany herself. This obviously possible explanation of French insistence on the present Ruhr policy has pretty certainly received attention in London; and if it represents a large element of fact in the present French policy, it may be counted on to evoke a determined resistance from the British side.

It has been reported, with what correctness is not now apparent, that London has been exerting herself in opposition to the French policy of dominating the Continental inter-relations of the Succession States; and specifically, that British influence at Belgrade was responsible for softening very notably the Serbian reaction to the recent revolution in Bulgaria.

Lausanne has at last achieved peace—as it was announced some days ago—but at the last moment the Turks have raised new requirements, the American representative is objecting to certain matters in relation to foreign concessions in Turkey, and the dove is still hovering in search of a resting-place. Presumably this will be provided in the near future, but the end is not quite yet.

Also, France has made a contribution to American sentiment by ratifying, after some eighteen months' delay, the naval disarmament treaty and the four-power treaty framed by the Washington Arms Conference. Much must be forgiven to the exigencies of internal politics in any country, but the French delay on these treaties, especially if Paris considers the present action a placating of American sentiment, may fairly be accounted one of the least reasonable subordinations of international relations to domestic circumstances.

# Foreign Securities in American Markets

## Sweden, an Example of Sound Financing



**I**N considering the dollar loans of the Scandinavian countries in the United States, the country which first comes to mind is that one which has had the least recourse to this market for funds—Sweden. Sweden has only one external loan outstanding in this market, the twenty-year 6s of 1939, which are selling on a basis which puts Swedish credit in the forefront of foreign Governments as judged by investment market opinion.

These bonds are selling at 105½, to yield about 5.48

per cent. to maturity, a rate which is not approached by that on a loan of any continental country in the American market with the exception of the Swiss 5½s of 1929, now practically a short-term obligation and selling on approximately the same basis.

This loan was offered in the New York market in June, 1919, and is the only public external borrowing of Sweden since the outbreak of the World War, with the exception of the \$5,000,000 obtained in this country in 1914 against two-year Treasury bills. The 1919 loan was offered to the amount of \$25,000,000, bearing 6 per cent. interest and for a term of twenty years extending from June 15, 1919, to June 15, 1939. It was offered to acquire funds for the purchase of commodities in the United States—the offering price being 99½. While its course since that time has fluctuated with the trend of interest rates and also in response to the particular forces affecting foreign bonds, it has uniformly reflected the excellent credit standing of the Swedish Government in local investment circles. This credit is so high that it seems unlikely that Sweden, barring unforeseen developments, will need to resort to this market in the near future.

The bonds are an unsecured, direct obligation of the Swedish Government, repayable at par but redeemable as a whole at 102 and interest on June 15, 1929, or any interest date thereafter upon sixty days' notice. They were issued as coupon bonds, registerable as to principal, in \$1,000 denomination, and are exempt from all present or future taxes of the Swedish Government or any of its political subdivisions. Interest is payable semi-annually on June 15 and Dec. 15, both principal and interest being payable in gold coin of the United States of the present standard of weight and fineness.

In the year of offering the bonds declined, along with the general list, to 89, and in 1920 to 83½, and early in 1921 to 78. Before the end of the year, however, a recovery to 97¼ had taken place and in 1922 they not only reached par but continued on to a high of 107 in September, as compared with a low of 94 in the first week of the year. In the current year they have not fallen below the February low, 103½, and have had a high of 106. The issue has been listed on the New York Stock Exchange since April 5, 1921.

Sweden is a constitutional monarchy based on the Constitution of 1809 and as further defined by the Law of Succession of 1810, the law of Liberty of the Press of 1812, and the regulations for the formation of the Diet of 1866 and as since modified up to 1921. In 1814 Norway was ceded to the King of Sweden, but its independence was proclaimed in union with Sweden. A mutual agreement of dissolution was adopted on June 7, 1905, and since that time Sweden has made truly noteworthy progress in the management of its financial affairs. The executive power is vested in the King, acting with the advice of the Council of State and, in legislative matters, in conjunction with the Diet. The Council of State serves as a ministry responsible to the Government, while the legislative powers are exercised by the First Chamber, whose members are elected by the Provincial representatives ("Landstings") and the electors of the six cities not represented in the "Landstings," and by the Second Chamber elected by universal male and female suffrage by proportional vote.

Sweden today has an area of 173,035 square miles, or more than that of six New England States, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania combined, while the population, of an unusually high degree of pure Scandinavian stock, is approximately 5,900,000, or about thirty-four per square mile. The six towns possessing more than one-one hundred and fiftieth of the total population, which are administered separately from the "Landstings" by municipal councils, are Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö, Norrköping, Helsingborg and Gävle. Their population ranges from 420,000 for Stockholm to about 38,000 for Gävle.

Since the outbreak of the World War two significant developments have characterized the conduct of the country's finances. First, the distribution of the debt as between external and internal. Whereas 92 per cent. of the total debt was external on Dec. 31, 1919, at the present time only 20 per cent. of the debt is held abroad. There were two major situations contributing to this altered balance, the first of which, of course, was the practical closing in the war period of the usual international investment markets to any but the borrowings necessary to prosecute the war. And, in addition, there was the growth of pros-

perity in Sweden, principally incident to the acquisition of large international credits out of the possession of an out-of-the-ordinary export balance of trade—a state influenced not only by the sale of the wartime materials but also by the import restrictions which Sweden felt it wise to impose. As a result, Swedish nationals have repurchased since the outbreak of the war bonds of their Government held abroad to the nominal amount of 800,000,000 kronor.

The outbreak of the World War also marks the beginning of the accumulation of a floating debt. Prior to that time, Sweden had practically no floating debt, occasional transitory advances comprising the only unfunded debt. While not a belligerent, Sweden was compelled to make large expenditures to maintain her neutrality, and the \$5,000,000 two-year loan was obtained in the United States in 1914. The wartime blockade also necessitated the establishment of various governmental commissions to insure a sufficient supply of fuel, foodstuffs and other essentials of life and, consequently, entailed large extraordinary expenditures which were not met out of revenues. For a time, all these funds were obtained from the Riksbank (Government Bank) with the exception of the 1914 loan in the United States. In 1918, however, a 550,000,000 kronor credit was obtained from twenty-three private banks, and a further 100,000,000 kronor credit was obtained for the purpose of acquiring credits abroad. These debts, due to war-time emergency, are now fully repaid.

The floating debt as of Dec. 31, 1913, amounted to only 20,064,000 kronor, out of a total debt of 648,286,603 kronor, but by February, 1919, after having remained relatively low for three years, the unfunded debt had reached a peak of 646,000,000 kronor. By Dec. 31, 1922, the floating debt had been met or consolidated except for 86,450,000 kronor, and consisted of loans from State institutions and of National Debt Office bills. The funded debt showed a movement similar to but less extensive than did the floating debt. From Dec. 31, 1913, to 1916, the funded debt increased from 628,222,063 kronor to 985,542,684 kronor, and in the following year passed the one billion mark. On Dec. 31, 1922, the funded debt amounted to 1,465,010,000 kronor and the total debt to 1,551,460,000 kronor. This figure is, however, considerably below the 1,656,128,909 kronor debt on Dec. 31, 1918.

In gauging the funded debt and in making international comparisons, Sweden has this much in its favor—it has fairly closely adhered to the principle of devoting borrowed funds to productive purposes. These include railways, telephone and telegraph and water power developments. The value of these enterprises far exceeds the total debt. At the end of 1922 the productive investments of borrowed funds amounted to 1,619,600,000 kronor as an offset to a total debt of only 1,551,460,000 kronor. The surplus of State assets, including the investments of funds derived from taxation in productive purposes and other State assets, showed a surplus over debt at the end of 1921 of 1,546,400,000 kronor, as compared with 858,887,305 kronor in 1913.


As a result of the possession of these revenue-producing assets the burden of the debt upon the tax resources has been negligible. In normal years the revenue from the State enterprises has been sufficient to meet full interest charges and at last a part of the amortization charges on the entire public debt. In several years since 1918 these revenues have declined so that interest charges have not been fully covered. In 1922, however, there was again a surplus over interest charges and the budget for 1923-24 again contemplates a surplus over interest charges available for debt retirement purposes.

Sweden has had, consequently, more than ordinary success in balancing her budget, the whole program for which was reorganized in 1911 with the object of consolidating all revenue and expenditure accounts in one system and arriving at a balance. This object was accomplished, although the supplementary credits and budgets in the late war and early post-war periods for a time made results less satisfactory. In part to eliminate the necessity for preparing supplementary budgets, the budget has again been reformed so as to extend over the fiscal year, July 1 to June 30, instead of coinciding with the calendar year. This new program becomes effective July 1 of the current year, the first six months being covered by a special budget.

The maintenance of budgetary surpluses, which have been the rule rather than the exception, is partly the result of the commendatory practice of setting aside the surpluses of good years in a Reserve Fund which is transferred to the Treasury as a special account to meet future deficits. This Reserve Fund, in the prosperous 1916-20 period, was built up to the sum of 500,000,000 kronor and was instrumental in alleviating the financial stringency in the recent years of depression. In 1921 there was no budget deficit but 143,100,000 kronor were drawn from the fund to cover expenditures, 172,600,000 kronor in 1922 when

Continued on Page 90.

# Curve of the Food Cost of Living



An index number is a means of showing fluctuations in the average price of a group of commodities. The Annalist Index Number shows the fluctuations in the average wholesale price of twenty-five food commodities selected and arranged to represent a theoretical family's food budget.

## The Annalist Index Number

### Weekly Averages

July 14, 1923. 172.607  
 July 7, 1923. 168.047  
 July 15, 1922. 193.672  
 July 16, 1921. 167.719

\*1923. 180.884  
 1922. 186.290  
 1921. 174.308  
 1920. 282.757

(Base—Averages 1890-99=100 Per Cent.)

### Yearly Averages

1919. 295.607  
 1918. 287.080  
 1917. 261.796  
 1916. 175.720

\*Year to date.

## Financial Transactions

## BAROMETRICS

## The State of Credit

	Last Week.	Same Week.	Year to Date.	Same Period.
Sales of stocks, shares...	2,110,931	136,804,015	1,447,748,255	
Sales of bonds, par value...	\$45,287,550	\$79,961,241	\$2,489,748,255	
Average price of 50 stocks...	High, 76.45 Low, 78.71	High, 76.52 Low, 77.32	High, 80.21 Low, 79.40	
Average price of 40 bonds...	High, 76.31 Low, 76.20	High, 80.33 Low, 80.44	High, 80.33 Low, 75.95	
Average net yield of 10 high-priced bonds...	4.710%	4.430%	4.600%	4.644%
New security issues...	\$21,620,000	\$38,120,000	\$1,855,941,356	\$1,279,177,760

	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Year to Date.	Same Week.
British Cons. Bills...	58 @ 56%	58% @ 55%	50% @ 53%	58% @ 57%
British 5%...	100% @ 99%	101 @ 99%	103% @ 96%	100%
British 4%...	97% @ 96%	98 @ 97%	99% @ 97%	95% @ 95%
French rentes (in Paris)...	56,400@56.10	56,000@55.80	59,000@55.60	58 @ 57.65
French War Loan (in Paris)...	75,200@74.70	75,200@74.85	76,700@72.00	75.45

## Potentials of Productivity and Measure of Business Activity

### THE METAL BAROMETER

	—End of June						—End of May					
	1923.	1922.	1923.	1922.	1923.	1922.	1923.	1922.	1923.	1922.	1923.	1922.
United States Steel orders, tons...	6,386,261	5,632,531	5,632,531	5,254,228								
Daily pig iron production, tons...	122,280	78,701	124,764	74,400								
Pig iron production, tons...	*3,668,413	*2,961,028	13,867,604	*2,306,678								

\*Month of June      +Month of May.

### ALIEN MIGRATION

	April.	March.	Febr.	Jan.	Dec.	Nov.	Oct.	Sept.
Inbound	52,433	43,888	30,118	28,717	43,984	49,814	54,129	49,881
Outbound	4,509	3,610	2,749	4,232	18,830	7,077	7,192	7,077
Gain or loss	+47,924	+39,278	+27,369	+24,485	+25,154	+42,737	+46,937	+42,554

### GROSS RAILROAD EARNINGS

	First Week in July.	Fourth Week in June.	Third Week in June.	Month of April.	From Jan. 1 to April 30.	From April 30 to May 31.
1923.	8 Roads.	14 Roads.	194 Roads.	194 Roads.	194 Roads.	194 Roads.
1922.	185,000,776	222,781,996	\$18,069,158	\$25,167,177	\$20,067,861,750	
Gain or loss	+\$1,677,587	+\$2,408,002	+\$894,215	+\$106,026,829	+\$317,915,572	+\$18,895
+12.60%	+11.82%	+5.92%	+5.40%	+25.40%	+18.895	

### SUMMARY OF IDLE CARS AND CAR LOADINGS

	May 31	May 22	May 14	May 7	April 30	April 22
Idle cars...	78,401	68,658	71,636	68,618	64,741	62,247
Car loadings...	June 30	June 23	June 16	June 9	June 2	May 26

### COMPARISON OF WEEK'S COMMERCIAL FAILURES (DUN'S)

	Week Ended July 12, 1923.	Week Ended July 13, 1922.	Week Ended July 14, 1921.	Week Ended July 16, 1920.	Week Ended July 17, 1919.
Total, Over \$5,000	Total, Over \$5,000	Total, Over \$5,000	Total, Over \$5,000	Total, Over \$5,000	Total, Over \$5,000
East...	116	166	99	106	46
South...	78	35	146	70	51
West...	70	39	98	63	54
Pacific...	27	9	45	23	35
U. S. ....	201	147	445	255	324
Canada....	76	32	59	24	49

### FAILURES BY MONTHS

	June.	July.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Number....	1,358	1,740	9,724	13,384	9,035		
Liabilities....	828,678,276	838,242,450	8259,424,068	8373,716,338	8310,671,004		

### BUILDING PERMITS (BRADSTREET'S)

	June.	July.	Aug.	Sept.
1923.	1922.	1922.	1922.	1921.
153 Cities.	153 Cities.	151 Cities.	151 Cities.	138 Cities.
\$225,000,818	\$234,296,872	\$265,528,769	\$243,545,638	\$291,872,862

## The Week in the Money and Exchange Market

### COST OF MONEY—NEW YORK

Call Loans	Time Loans 60-90 Days	Six Mos.	Com. Dis.
6 @ 4%	5@4.5%	5@4.5%	5@4.5%
6 @ 4	5@4.5	5@4.5	5@4.5
6 @ 3 1/2	5@3 1/2	5@3 1/2	5@3 1/2
6 @ 3 1/2	5@3 1/2	5@3 1/2	5@3 1/2


New York funds in Montreal were quoted at \$29.68@\$25.62 premium. Montreal funds in New York were quoted at \$29.68@\$25.62 premium. The week's range of exchange on the principal foreign centres last week compared as follows:

DEMAND	LAST WEEK.	PREV. WEEK.	YEAR 1923.	YEAR 1922.	SAME WK.
High.	4.35%	4.50%	4.50%	4.50%	4.275%
Low.	4.22	4.22	4.22	4.22	4.275
High.	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75
Low.	5.62	5.62	5.62	5.62	5.62

### BANK CLEARINGS

	Entire country, estimated from complete returns from cities representing 92.3 per cent. of the total. Percentages show changes from preceding years.	1923. P. C.	1922. P. C.	1922. P. C.
Last week	\$7,809,000,000 + 0.8	\$7,872,000,000 + 19.2	78,00	
Week before	8,392,000,000 + 17.08	7,168,000,000 + 26.8		
Year to date	223,002,000,000 + 6.08	208,888,000,000 + 7.6		

# Federal Reserve Gold Holdings and Total Stock of Gold



The space between the base line and the broken line represents the cash reserves required, that between the broken line and the light line the excess reserves, or free gold, and the whole space between the base line and the heavy line represents the total stock of gold. The supply is computed monthly, so that the record can never be brought to the date of publication. The chart records the last figures published.

By Telegraph to The Annalist

## Bank Clearings

Week Ended Saturday, July 14.

Central Reserve Cities	Last Week		Year to Date	
	1923	1922	1923	1922
New York	\$4,008,273,647	\$4,346,674,088	\$120,528,076,502	\$118,965,987,798
Chicago	622,859,303	554,678,618	17,318,499,315	14,766,040,464
Total 2 C. R. cities	\$4,631,132,950	\$4,901,352,706	\$138,146,576,117	\$133,732,028,262
Increase	*5.5%	3.3%		
Other Federal Reserve cities				
Atlanta	\$47,507,157	\$39,555,808	\$1,406,660,612	\$1,071,488,121
Boston	365,000,000	324,000,000	10,773,000,000	8,400,000,000
Cleveland	117,518,037	100,839,821	3,021,538,958	2,341,561,117
Kansas City, Mo.	140,577,919	133,624,240	3,750,444,497	3,527,548,670
Minneapolis	75,431,551	67,272,630	1,930,543,900	1,649,395,493
Philadelphia	490,000,000	453,000,000	13,473,000,000	11,463,000,000
Richmond	48,869,000	41,937,000	1,360,287,000	1,124,167,694
Total, 7 cities	\$1,284,903,664	\$1,160,229,499	\$35,715,474,967	\$29,667,161,095
Increase	10.7%	20.3%		
Total, 9 cities	\$5,916,036,614	\$6,061,582,205	\$173,862,051,084	\$163,399,189,357
Increase	*2.3%	6.4%		
*Decrease.				

Other Cities	Last Week		Year to Date	
	1923	1922	1923	1922
Cincinnati	\$71,367,000	\$59,879,000	\$1,917,982,000	\$1,564,884,085
Columbus, Ohio	18,129,800	15,507,400	445,652,800	391,314,200
Denver	19,566,130	20,460,557	561,064,130	520,214,729
Los Angeles	152,770,000	106,091,000	3,538,373,000	2,652,082,000
Louisville	32,223,292	26,964,905	875,297,741	701,465,200
Milwaukee	41,101,931	33,670,414	1,012,821,746	822,913,627
New Orleans	45,908,620	42,907,985	1,427,861,967	1,206,043,736
Omaha	44,234,229	40,729,676	1,203,459,271	1,031,981,309
St. Paul	36,168,153	36,176,136	929,811,737	818,373,675
Seattle	40,671,982	33,558,510	1,020,885,976	866,514,343
Washington	22,448,624	18,718,957	604,561,468	522,849,145
Total, 11 cities	\$524,609,691	\$434,661,540	\$13,537,771,839	\$11,098,636,049
Increase	20.6%	21.9%		
Total 20 cities	\$6,440,640,305	\$6,496,243,745	\$187,399,822,323	\$174,497,825,466
Increase	*0.8%	6.8%		

## Actual Condition

## Statement of the Federal Reserve Banks

July 11

Dist. 1.	Dist. 2.	Dist. 3.	Dist. 4.	Dist. 5.	Dist. 6.	Dist. 7.	Dist. 8.	Dist. 9.	Dist. 10.	Dist. 11.	Dist. 12.
Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Cleveland	Richmond	Atlanta	Chicago	St. Louis	Minneapolis	Kansas City	Dallas	San Fran <sup>ce</sup>
Gold reserve	\$267,725,000	\$1,000,481,000	\$227,843,000	\$306,139,000	\$77,060,650	\$137,781,000	\$562,730,000	\$83,299,000	\$85,256,000	\$82,812,000	\$220,114,000
Rediscos	21,307,000	161,777,000	44,823,000	46,563,000	27,613,000	6,403,000	31,022,000	18,495,000	7,282,000	19,817,000	4,201,000
Bills on hand	72,050,000	261,988,000	87,152,000	100,272,000	66,050,000	44,918,000	121,691,000	47,726,000	29,729,000	49,485,000	102,907,000
Due members	126,336,000	719,493,000	116,009,000	166,892,000	58,893,000	54,139,000	278,474,000	66,140,000	45,897,000	81,243,000	146,723,000
Notes in circ'n.	222,514,000	526,422,000	211,184,000	240,050,000	79,351,000	135,149,000	410,179,000	73,782,000	56,965,000	61,089,000	30,347,000
Ratio, &c.	77.8%	81.1%	71.6%	75.9%	57.2%	74.8%	82.1%	66.4%	63.0%	59.3%	43.5%

## Federal Reserve Bank Statement

## Statement of Member Banks

July 11

Data for Federal Reserve Cities and in Federal Reserve Branch Cities.	
—New York—	—Chicago—
July 3.	June 27.
Number of reporting banks	64
Loans sec. by U.S. Govt. oblig'n's	\$78,191,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	1,527,466,000
All other loans and discounts	2,150,863,000
Total loans and discounts	3,756,520,000
U. S. prewar bonds	37,600,000
U. S. Liberty bonds	404,280,000
U. S. Treasury notes	20,872,000
U. S. Victory and Treas. notes	486,433,000
U. S. ctfs. of indebtedness	30,541,000
Other loans, stocks & securities	525,990,000
Total loans, discounts, invest's	3,262,245,000
Reserve bal. with F. R. Bank	609,877,000
Cash in vault	69,783,000
Net demand deposits	4,226,796,000
Time deposits	629,742,000
Government deposits	63,092,000
Bills payable	142,541,000
All other	45,938,000
—All Reserve Cities—	—Reserve Branch Cities—
July 3.	June 27.
Number of reporting banks	259
Loans sec. by U.S. Govt. oblig'n's	\$71,173,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	2,813,067,000
All other loans and discounts	4,828,960,000
Total loans and discounts	8,713,783,000
U. S. prewar bonds	68,506,000
U. S. Liberty bonds	634,055,000
U. S. Treasury notes	40,070,000
U. S. Victory and Treas. notes	710,105,000
U. S. ctfs. of indebtedness	64,714,000
Other loans, stocks & securities	1,161,280,000
Total loans, discounts, invest's	10,531,528,000
Reserve bal. with F. R. Bank	1,033,301,000
Cash in vault	147,726,000
Net demand deposits	7,652,829,000
Time deposits	2,004,823,000
Government deposits	153,584,000
Bills payable	233,507,000
All other	184,514,000
—Other Selected Cities—	
July 3.	June 27.
Number of reporting banks	208
Loans secured by United States Government obligations	\$38,970,000
Loans secured by stocks and bonds	484,586,000
All other loans and discounts	1,397,581,000
Total loans and discounts	1,921,137,000
United States prewar bonds	105,542,000
United States Liberty bonds	21,813,000
United States Victory and Treasury notes	84,879,000
United States certificates of indebtedness	21,880,000
Other loans, stocks and securities	423,771,000
Total loans, discounts, investments	2,745,255,000
Reserve balance with Federal Reserve Bank	167,556,000
Cash in vault	75,558,000
Net demand deposits	1,672,702,000
Time deposits	850,089,000
Government deposits	23,267,000
Bills payable	44,302,000
All other	42,634,000

Total resources			
LIABILITIES			
Capital paid in	\$109,621,000	\$109,584,000	\$105,224,000
Surplus	218,369,000	218,389,000	215,398,000
Deposits: Government	15,778,000	14,657,000	20,837,000
Member bank—reserve account	1,909,006,000	1,931,762,000	1,873,229,000
Other deposits	24,938,000	27,832,000	28,871,000
Total deposits	\$1,949,722,000	\$1,974,251,000	\$1,924,637,000
Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation	2,263,149,000	2,282,054,000	2,158,122,000
Federal Reserve Bank notes in circulation—net liabilities	1,471,000	1,518,000	67,380,000
Deferred availability items	562,512,000	562,198,000	486,380,000
All other liabilities	17,071,600	16,487,600	21,351,000
Total liabilities	\$5,113,915,000	\$5,164,461,000	\$4,978,772,000
Ratio of total reserves to deposit and Federal Reserve note liabilities combined	75.4%	74.4%	77.3%
Contingent liability on bills purchased for foreign correspondents	\$33,618,000	\$33,613,000	\$26,378,000
*Not shown separately prior to January, 1923.			

Data for Federal Reserve Cities and in Federal Reserve Branch Cities.			
—New York—	—Chicago—	—All Reserve Cities—	—Reserve Branch Cities—
July 3.	June 27.	July 3.	June 27.
Number of reporting banks	64	259	206
Loans sec. by U.S. Govt.			

# New York Stock Exchange Transactions

Week Ended Saturday, July 14, 1923

Total Sales 2,110,931 Shares

Stock and												Stock and												Stock and															
High	Low	Sales	Dividend Rate	High	Low	Last	Chge.	Net	High	Low	Sales	Dividend Rate	High	Low	Last	Chge.	Net	High	Low	Sales	Dividend Rate	High	Low	Last	Chge.														
80	78	100 ADAMS EXPRESS (5)	50	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	37%	23%	12,600 Cuban American Sugar	27%	24%	26%	+	3%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	+	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%									
120	100	200 Advance Rumeley	10%	10%	10%	10%	+	1%	102%	92	100 Do pf (1)	5%	52	52	-	2%	32	20%	32	30%	32	20%	32	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%								
120	90	100 Air Reduction (4)	50%	50%	50%	50%	-	1%	124%	5	1,200 Cuban Dominican Sug.	5%	4%	5	+	1%	50	47%	50	47%	50	47%	50	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%								
140	60	1,900 Ajax Rubber	7%	7%	6%	7%	-	1%	58%	35	700 Do pf (1)	38%	35	38%	+	3%	21%	19%	21%	19%	21%	19%	21%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%								
140	50	3,300 Alaska Gold Mines	5%	5%	5%	5%	-	1%	60	54%	500 Cayambe Fruit (1)	5%	55	55	-	1%	20%	17%	5,100 Moon Motors (13)	23%	23%	23%	+	1%	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	8%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	1	3,200 Alaska Jumbo	1%	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	14	11	1,200 Mo Pacific	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	14	11	3,200 Mo Pacific	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	11%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	1	3,200 Alaska Jumbo & Dye (4)	1%	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	108%	107%	100 Do pf (1)	28%	28%	28%	+	1%	11%	11%	100 Do pf (1)	32	20%	32	30%	32	20%	32	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%					
150	100	1,000 Allis-Chalmers Mfg (4)	40%	30%	40%	40%	+	1%	121%	53%	32,000 Del & Hudson (9)	10%	95	105	+	9%	18%	10%	5,700 Do pf	32	20%	32	30%	32	20%	32	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%					
150	90	2,100 Allis-Chalmers Mfg (4)	40%	30%	40%	40%	+	1%	150%	110%	800 Del. Lack & West (6)	11%	112	113%	+	1%	18%	10%	5,700 Do pf	32	20%	32	30%	32	20%	32	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%					
150	90	2,100 Do pf (1)	90%	90%	90%	90%	-	1%	90%	90	100 Do pf (1)	100	100	100	-	1%	125	118%	100 Do pf (1)	120	120	120	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	2,000 Am Agricul Chem	14%	11%	14%	14%	+	3%	111	100%	400 Detroit Edison Co (8)	10%	100	100	-	1%	125	118%	100 Do pf (1)	120	120	120	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,100 Do pf	100	100	100	100	-	1%	108	90	200 Devoe & Ray 1st pf (1)	60	60	60	-	1%	125	118%	100 Do pf (1)	120	120	120	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,100 Do pf	100	100	100	100	-	1%	108	90	1,300 Do Beers Mines	24%	22%	25%	+	3%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Beers Mines	24%	22%	25%	+	3%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	2,000 Am Bank Note (5)	77%	77%	77%	77%	-	1%	111	100%	1,300 Do Bank Note (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Bank Note (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	500 Am Beet Sugar	32%	30%	32%	32%	-	1%	114	12%	1,300 Do Beet Sugar (1)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Beet Sugar (1)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	5,000 Am Bosch Magneto	32%	30%	32%	32%	-	1%	115	100%	1,300 Do Bosch Magneto	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Bosch Magneto	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	113%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
150	100	1,000 Am Brake S & F (5)	70%	70%	70%	70%	-	1%	116	100%	1,300 Do Brake S & F (5)	1%	1%	1%	-	1%	114%	112%	1,300 Do Brake S &amp																				

# New York Stock Exchange Transactions -Continued

1923										1923										1923									
Stock and Dividend Rate.					Net					Stock and Dividend Rate.					Net					Stock and Dividend Rate.					Net				
High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Last.	Ch'ge.						
30%	30	900	United Alloy Steel (3)	30%	30	30%	—%	75	64	2,000	Virginia-Carolina Chem.	7%	74	74	—%	14	7	1,800	White Oil	7%	74	74	—%						
85%	74%	300	United Drug (1/2)	74	76	77	+ 1	17	3%	900	Do Class B	—	74	74	—%	14	7	120	Spencer Steel	21	20	21	+ 1						
48%	46%	100	Do 1st pf (3/2)	44	44	46	+ 1 1/2	60	1	300	Do pf	21%	21	21	+ 1	14	6	120	Wickwire & Co.	64	64	64	+ 1						
153	152	320	United Fruit (8)	165	164	165	+ 1	23	15%	2,100	V. Vivaclaud (2)	17	16	16	+ 1/2	87	6	200	Do pf (7)	65	64	64	+ 1						
21%	8%	1,200	U. S. Ry. Investment	10	10	10	+ 1/2	112	8	2,200	WABASH	9	8	8	+ 1/2	103	42	6,500	Do pf	64%	61%	63%	+ 1						
62	24	1,200	Do pf	32	29	32	+ 1/2	34%	234	14,000	Do pf A	28%	26	27	+ 1/2	35	26	300	Wisconsin Central	26%	26%	26%	+ 1						
84%	64%	400	U. S. Retail Stores (3/2)	74	71	72	+ 1	100	Do pf B	—	17%	17%	17%	17%	+ 1/2	243	199	5,100	Woolworth (F. W.) (8)	23%	22 1/2	23 1/2	+ 1						
34%	24%	1,400	U. S. Cast Iron P. & F.	24%	22	24	+ 2 1/2	22%	16%	500	Waldorf Sys. new (1/2)	20	14%	400	Weber & Heilbroner (1)	13%	13%	13%	11	84	200	Worthington Pump	24	23 1/2	24	+ 1/2			
72%	64	100	Do pf (5)	—	68%	68%	+ 3/2	15%	12%	400	Wells-Fargo (2/2)	33%	34%	34%	+ 1/2	80	63	1,000	Wright Aeronautical (1)	30 1/2	29 1/2	30 1/2	+ 1						
83%	36%	100	U. S. Express	—	3%	3%	+ 1/2	54	34%	300	Western Pacific (2/2)	34%	34%	34%	+ 1/2	80	63	1,000	Youngstown S. & T. (5)	60%	63%	63%	+ 1						
69%	28	1,700	U. S. Food Prod.	3%	2	3	+ 1/2	52%	38%	300	Western Pacific (2/2)	40	40	40	+ 1/2	80	63	1,000	Yost & Co (2)	40	40	40	+ 1/2						
25	15	1,400	U. S. Hoffmann Mach.	15%	15	15	+ 1/2	48	44	100	Do pf (4)	87	87	87	+ 1/2	80	5	30,500	Willys-Overland	7	57	65	+ 1/2						
73%	40	11,600	U. S. Industrial Alcohol	48	44	44	+ 1/2	88	74	100	Do pf (4)	40	40	40	+ 1/2	80	5	30,500	Willys-Overland	64%	61%	63%	+ 1/2						
106	88%	1,700	U. S. Realty & Imp. (8)	99%	90%	92	+ 1/2	15	111	300	Western Elec. pf (7)	112	112	112	+ 1/2	80	5	5,700	Marland Oil	—	—	—	—						
108%	97%	200	Do pf	—	99	99	+ 1/2	26%	17%	800	Western Maryland	10%	10	10	+ 1/2	80	5	5,700	Marland Oil	—	—	—	—						
63%	36%	6,500	U. S. Rubber	42%	42	42	+ 1/2	204	15	1,200	Western Pacific	17%	16	17	+ 1/2	80	5	5,700	Marland Oil	—	—	—	—						
43%	24%	400	Do 1st pf (8)	97	95	95	+ 1/2	203	15	1,200	Western Pacific	17%	16	17	+ 1/2	80	5	5,700	Marland Oil	—	—	—	—						
20	100	200	U. S. Smeel	M. & F.	23%	23	23	+ 1/2	63%	53	400	Do pf (6)	57	55	57	+ 1/2	80	5	5,700	Marland Oil	—	—	—	—					
180%	89%	94,900	U. S. Steel (5)	92	89%	91	+ 1/2	119%	101	1,000	Western Union Tel (7)	103%	102%	103	+ 1	120	76	1,000	Westinghouse A B (5)	60	78	79	+ 2 1/2						
123%	116%	2,400	Do pf (7)	—	118%	118	+ 1/2	67%	52	7,000	Do E & M (4)	56	54	56	+ 1/2	80	5	2,730	Philia Electric	20%	20	20	+ 1/2						
69	48	400	U. S. Tobacco (3)	50%	49	50	+ 2 1/2	78	72	100	Do 1st pf (4)	72%	72	72	+ 1/2	80	5	1,915	Do rets full paid	20%	20%	20%	+ 1/2						
70%	56	3,700	Utah Copper (4)	59%	57%	58%	+ 3/2	10%	61%	800	Woolver & Lake Erie	74	63	74	+ 1/2	80	5	1,915	Do rets full paid	20%	20%	20%	+ 1/2						
24%	14%	2,600	Utah Securities	15%	14%	14%	+ 1/2	19	112	300	Do pf	12%	11	11	+ 1/2	80	5	1,915	Do rets full paid	20%	20%	20%	+ 1/2						
44%	24%	13,600	Vanadium Corporation	33%	27	33	+ 4	30%	23 1/2	1,000	White Eagle Oil (2/2)	254	245	254	+ 1/2	80	5	1,915	Do rets full paid	20%	20%	20%	+ 1/2						
64	33%	206	Van Realte	—	33	35	+ 1/2	60%	45	1,800	White Motors (4)	48	40	48	+ 1/2	80	5	1,915	Do rets full paid	20%	20%	20%	+ 1/2						

\*Last quarterly payment in stock. <sup>1/2</sup>Partly extra. <sup>2/3</sup>Payable in preferred stock. <sup>3/4</sup>Ex dividend.

## Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets

### Boston

#### Sales.. High. Low. Last.

43 Torrington	44 1/2	44 1/2	44 1/2
80 United Drug 1st pf.	47 1/2	47 1/2	47 1/2
204 United Fruit	165 1/2	164	165 1/2
6,275 United Shoe Machine	35 1/2	34	35 1/2
230 United Shoe Mach pf.	25 1/2	25 1/2	25 1/2
4,750 Ventura Oil	27 1/2	26 1/2	27 1/2
1,150 Waldorf System	18	17	18
49 Waltham Watch B.	9 1/2	8	9 1/2
12 Waltham Watch 7% pf.	65	65	65
50 Waltham Watch 6% pf.	19	19	19
12 Waltham Watch 6% pf.	19	19	19
175 Walworth Mfg.	15	14 1/2	14 1/2
442 Warren Bros.	30	29	29 1/2
135 Warren Bros 1st pf.	31 1/2	31	31 1/2
6 Warren Bros 2d pf.	33	33	33
100 Wickwire Spencer Steel.	8	8	8

#### BONDS.

\$28,000 A G & W 1 5/8	48	44	48
1,000 Chi. J & S Y 48	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2
17,000 Chi. J & S Y 58	93 1/2	93 1/2	93 1/2
4,000 East Mass. 5 B	72	72	72
25,000 Hood Rubber 78	101	100	100
4,000 K C M & B 58	85	85	85
2,000 Mass Gas 48s	94 1/2	94 1/2	94 1/2
19,000 Miss River Power 58	92	91 1/2	91 1/2
8,000 New England Tel 58	98	97 1/2	97 1/2
18,000 Swift & Co 58	93 1/2	93 1/2	93 1/2
17,000 Warren Bros 78s	104 1/2	104 1/2	104 1/2
6,000 West Tel 58s	95 1/2	95 1/2	95 1/2

#### STOCKS.

Sales.. High. Low. Last.			
10 Am Wholesale pf.	93 1/2	93 1/2	93 1/2
20 Arundel Corp	42	42	42
15 Arundel Corp pf.	101 1/2	101 1/2	101 1/2
5 Armstrong Canton pf.	89	88	89
20 Bait Brick pf.	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
11 Balt Tube pf.	47	47	47
40 Benesch (L) & Sons	35	35	35
100 Benesch (L) & Sons pf.	26	26	26
100 Celestine Oil	20	20	20
19 Central Teresa Sugar pf.	21 1/2	21 1/2	21 1/2
73 Chesapeake & Pot T pf.	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2
45 Citizens Bank	46 1/2	46 1/2	46 1/2
162 Com Credit	70	69	70

# Stock Exchange Bond Trading

Week Ended Saturday, July 14, 1923

Total Sales \$45,287,550 Par Value

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT LOANS

(Figures after decimal represent 32d of 1 per cent)

Range, 1923	Net	High	Low	Last	Ch'ge
101-30	100.11	Lib 31/2s, 1932-47, . . .	100.16	100.11	100.11 - 2
101-25	100.10	16 Lib 31/2s, 1932-47, reg. . .	100.10	100.10	100.10 - 2
98-30	97.5	4 Lib 1st ev 4s, 32-47, reg. . .	98.15	98.10	98.14 + 10
98-10	96.18	9 Lib 2d 4s, 1927-42, . . .	98.8	98.8	98.8 + 2
99-6	96.22	290% Lib 1st ev 4s, 32-47, reg. . .	98.14	98.10	98.13 + 1
98-26	96.20	14 Lib 1st ev 4s, 1932- . . .	98.7	98.6	98.7 - 1
		1947, reg. . .			
100.00	97.5	5% Lib 1st ev 4s, . . .	97.18	97.18	97.18 - 17
99-3	96.24	2905 Lib 2d ev 4s, 27-42, reg. . .	98.15	98.10	98.13 + 3
108-28	96.21	84 Lib 2d ev 4s, 1927- . . .	98.12	98.7	98.10 + 13
90-6	97.25	8724% Lib 31/2s, 1928- . . .	99.00	98.19	98.31 + 11
97-17	97.17	50 Lib 3d 4s, 1928, reg. . .	98.28	98.18	98.28 + 13
93-0	96.27	4980% Lib 4th 4s, 1932- . . .	98.16	98.11	98.13 + 1
90-00	96.28	50% Lib 4th 4s, 1932- . . .	98.13	98.10	98.13 + 1
		1938, reg. . .			
100-1	98.11	1197 Lib 4th 4s, 1947-52, reg. . .	99.31	99.22	99.30 + 8
100.00	98.20	11 Treas 4s, 1947-52, reg. . .	99.23	99.23	99.23 + 8
		Total sales . . .	\$19,454,050		

## FOREIGN ISSUES

103-106	94	ARGEN 7s, temp cfs. . .	27.162%	101%	101% - 3
83	77%	43 Do 5s, 1945- . . .	83	81%	83 + 1%
93%	90%	Austr Govt 7s, 1933, cfs. 91%	91%		
72%	44	CHINESE GOV 7s, . . .	51	45	44% - 3%
100-107	23	City of Bergen 8s, 1945-100	108%		
113-108%	17	City of Berne 8s, 1945-100	108%		
81-67	53	City of Bordeaux 8s, . . .	74	77%	78% + 1%
113-107%	21	City of Christiania 8s, 45-100	108%		
92%	88%	7 City of Copet 8s, . . .	94	90%	89 + 1%
85	49	City of Gr Prague 8s, . . .	52	55%	74% + 1%
83%	98	City of Lyons 8s, 1934- . . .	79	77%	76% + 1%
83%	97	City of Marseilles 8s, . . .	52	56%	86% + 1%
91%	85	City of Montevideo 8s, . . .	52	56%	86% + 1%
77	37	City of Rio de Jan 8s, . . .	46	49%	93 + 1%
97	90%	12 Do 8s, 1947- . . .	100%	92%	100% + 1%
90%	95%	1 City São Paulo 8s, 82-100	82	80%	80% + 3%
85	60%	31 City of Soissons 8s, 1936- . . .	75	75%	75% + 3%
72	71%	14 City of Tokio 8s, . . .	110	110	110 + 1%
114	110	1 City of Zurich 8s, 1945- . . .	110	110	110 + 1%
96%	75	40 Czechoslovak 8s, . . .	51	93	92 + 2%
		Total sales . . .	\$19,454,050		

100%	106%	25 DANISH M s f 8s, 1948, A. 107%	107	107%	- 3%
99%	94%	Do s f 8s, 1946, B. . .	107%	107	107% + 3%
90	75	Do Se 7s, 1942- . . .	86	85%	85% + 1%
91	81	Do Rep 5/2s, 1942, cfs. 88	87	88	88 + 1%
100	95%	30 Do 5s, 1958- . . .	99%	97	99% + 2%
101	99%	53 Dom of Canada 5s, 1926-100	100%	101%	101% - 1%
102%	100%	145 Do 5/2s, 1929- . . .	100%	101%	101% - 1%
101	99%	41 Do 5s, 1931- . . .	100%	98%	98% + 2%
90%	97%	140 Do 5s, 1932, cfs. . .	99%	98%	98% + 1%
88%	94%	108 Dutch East Indies 6s, . . .	47	96	95% + 1%
97%	92%	180% Do 6s, 1962- . . .	95%	95%	95% + 3%
91%	87%	199% Do 1953, cfs. . .	91	90%	90% + 3%
		Total sales . . .	\$19,454,050		

93%	98%	18 FRAMERICAN I D 7s, . . .	90	89	90 + 1%
101	88%	266 French Govt 8s, 1945- . . .	98	90%	90 + 1%
90%	85%	303/2 Do 7s, 1941- . . .	94%	92%	94 + 1%
92	84%	53 HOLLAND-AM s f 6s, 47- . . .	85	84%	84% + 1%
		interim receipts . . .	85	84%	84% + 1%
93%	92%	187% JAPANESE 4/2s, . . .	92%	92%	92% + 1%
91%	83%	10 Do 4/2s, 20-100	92%	91%	92 + 1%
83%	79%	69 Do 4s, sterling loan, 31	80%	80%	80% + 1%
84%	76%	86 Jurgens (A), U Man'g'n'gne Wks 6s, 1947 int cfs. . .	78%	77	77% - 1
		Total sales . . .	\$19,454,050		

STATE BOND.

93%	91%	92 ORIENT DEV deb 6s, . . .	92	91%	91% - 1%
		1953 certificates . . .	92	91%	91% - 1%
78%	63%	157 PARIS-L-M R R 6s, 1958 74	72%	72%	72% + 1%
97%	6	6 L Paulista Rf 6s, 1941- . . .	100	95	96 + 1%
		Total sales . . .	\$19,454,050		

CORPORATION ISSUES.

90%	94	4 Ajax Rubber Ss, '36- . . .	94%	94	94% + 1%
8%	5	1 Alaska G M Co 5s, 1925- . . .	94	94	94% + 1%
96	92%	2 AIA Gt Southern 5s, . . .	94%	93	94% + 1%
103%	98%	1 Alabama Midland 5s, . . .	90%	90%	90% + 1%
104%	96%	97 Am Ag Chem 7s, . . .	97	96%	97% + 1%
100%	95%	36 Do 5s, 1928- . . .	90%	95%	95% + 5%
97%	92%	11 Am Chain s 6s, 1923- . . .	94	93	94 + 1%
80%	59	14 Am Cotton Oil 5s, 1931- . . .	60%	60%	60% + 1%
90%	86%	44 Am Repub deb 6s, 1937- . . .	88%	88%	88% + 1%
90%	86%	75 Am Steel & Ref 5s, 1947- . . .	90%	89%	89% + 1%
102	99%	10 Do 6s, 1947, cfs. . .	101%	100%	101% + 1%
104	100%	44 MEX IRRIG 4/2s, 1943- . . .	30%	35%	35% + 1%
		Total sales . . .	\$19,454,050		

STATE BOND.

102%	101%	1 N Y 4s, 1961, reg. . .	102%	102%	102% + 1%
		NEW YORK CITY BONDS.			
101	99%	35 4/2s, 1960- . . .	100%	100	100% + 1%
107%	104%	3 4/2s, May, 1957- . . .	104%	104%	104% + 1%
107%	104%	4 4/2s, Nov., 1957- . . .	104%	104%	104% + 1%
		Total sales . . .	\$19,454,050		

CORPORATION ISSUES.

90%	94	4 Ankrum Rubber Ss, '36- . . .	94%	94	94% + 1%
8%	5	1 Alaska G M Co 5s, 1925- . . .	92%	92%	92% + 1%
96	92%	2 AIA Gt Southern 5s, . . .	91%	93	94% + 1%
104%	98%	1 Alabama Midland 5s, . . .	90%	90%	90% + 1%
104%	96%	97 Am Ag Chem 7s, . . .	97	96%	97% + 1%
100%	95%	36 Do 5s, 1928- . . .	90%	95%	95% + 5%
97%	92%	11 Am Chain s 6s, 1923- . . .	94	93	94 + 1%
80%	59	14 Am Cotton Oil 5s, 1931- . . .	60%	60%	60% + 1%
90%	86%	44 Am Repub deb 6s, 1937- . . .	88%	88%	88% + 1%
90%	86%	75 Am Steel & Ref 5s, 1947- . . .	90%	89%	89% + 1%
102	99%	10 Do 6s, 1947, cfs. . .	101%	100%	101% + 1%
		Total sales . . .	\$19,454,050		

STATE BOND.

102%	101%	1 N Y 4s, 1961, reg. . .	102%	102%	102%

# Stock Exchange Bond Trading—Continued

Stock Exchange Bond Trading—Continued													
Range, 1923				Range, 1923				Range, 1923					
High	Low	Sales	Net	High	Low	Sales	Net	High	Low	Sales	Net		
97 1/2	93	4 National Acme 7 1/2s, '31	93 1/2	93	9	Penn Co gtd gold 4s, '31	91	90	93	92 1/2	75	95 1/2	
32 1/2	28	8 Nat Rys of Mex p 1 4 1/2s, '31	93	93	—	Do 1/2s, 1940	82	82	92	92	—	95 1/2	
104 1/2	98	8 National Tube 6s, '32	99 1/2	98 1/2	38	Do prior 1/2s, '32	95	95	95	95	—	95 1/2	
100	59	9 New Eng. T&T 1st 5s, '32	97 1/2	97 1/2	—	Do prior 1/2s, '32	95	95	95	95	—	95 1/2	
81 1/2	77	11 N. O. & E. r'dimp 4 1/2s, '32	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2	—	78 1/2	
59 1/2	73 1/2	27 N. O. Term 4s, '32	72 1/2	72 1/2	72 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	72 1/2	72 1/2	72 1/2	72 1/2	—	72 1/2	
84	75	43 N. O. T. & M. Inc. 5s, '32	76 1/2	76 1/2	76 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	76 1/2	76 1/2	76 1/2	76 1/2	—	76 1/2	
101 1/2	106	19 N. Do 1/2s, '32	100	100	100	100% 100% 100%	78	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2
100	100	1 N. N. Y. Air Br 1st 6s, '28-29	86	84 1/2	85 1/2	Do 1st 6s, '32	71 1/2	71 1/2	71 1/2	71 1/2	—	71 1/2	
88 1/2	84	31 N. N. Y. C. ref & imp 4 1/2s, '20-31	86	84 1/2	85 1/2	Do 1st 6s, '32	71 1/2	71 1/2	71 1/2	71 1/2	—	71 1/2	
77 1/2	72 1/2	25 Do 1/2s, '32	74 1/2	73 1/2	74 1/2	Do 1st 6s, '32	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	—	74 1/2	
90 1/2	84	31 Do deb 4s, '32	86 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	—	74 1/2	
108 1/2	101 1/2	180 Do deb 6s, '32	104 1/2	104	104	Do 1/2s, '32	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	—	74 1/2	
91 1/2	89 1/2	15 Do deb 4s, '32	89 1/2	89 1/2	89 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	—	74 1/2	
98 1/2	92 1/2	319 Do ref & imp 5s, '20-31	95 1/2	95 1/2	95 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	—	74 1/2	
82 1/2	76 1/2	29 Do con 4s, '32	81	80 1/2	81	Do 1/2s, '32	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	—	74 1/2	
76	68 1/2	5 Do Lake Sh col 3 1/2s, '28-29	70	70	70	Do 1/2s, '32	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	—	74 1/2	
71 1/2	69 1/2	7 Do L. S. Col 3 1/2s, '28-29	69 1/2	69 1/2	69 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	—	74 1/2	
39 1/2	35 1/2	5 N. Do M. C. col 3 1/2s, '28-29	73	72 1/2	73	Do 1/2s, '32	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	—	74 1/2	
30 1/2	27 1/2	7 N. Do M. C. 1st 6s, '28-29	87	87	87	Do 1/2s, '32	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	74 1/2	—	74 1/2	
100 1/2	95	55 Do 1/2s, '32	100	100	100	100% 100% 100%	78	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2
88 1/2	72	2 N. Do 1/2s, '32	78 1/2	78 1/2	78 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
112 1/2	103 1/2	58 N. Do 1st & ref 6s, '21-110	109 1/2	109 1/2	109 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
83 1/2	79 1/2	14 N. Do 5s, '28-29	82	81 1/2	82	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
100	95 1/2	45 Do 5s, '28-29	98 1/2	97 1/2	97 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
98 1/2	94 1/2	13 N. Do 5s, '28-29	96 1/2	96 1/2	96 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
73 1/2	52 1/2	22 N. N. H. Col 4s, '28-29	86	85 1/2	85 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
70	49	4 Do cv deb 4s, '28-29	85	84 1/2	84 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
81 1/2	54 1/2	133 Do 1/2s, '32	90	89 1/2	89 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
71 1/2	53 1/2	29 Do 1/2s, '32	85	84 1/2	84 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
45 1/2	30	2 Do 1/2s, '32	85	84 1/2	84 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
47 1/2	30 1/2	2 Do non-cv 3 1/2s, '28-29	86	85 1/2	85 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
51 1/2	37 1/2	23 Do non-cv 4s, '28-29	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
51 1/2	38	14 Do non-cv 4s, '28-29	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
48	34	33 Do cv 3 1/2s, '28-29	86	85 1/2	85 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
70 1/2	61 1/2	15 N. Y. & W. ref 4s, '28-29	63	62 1/2	62 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
107	102 1/2	79 N. Y. Tel ref 6s, '28-29	105 1/2	105 1/2	105 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	103 1/2	61 Do s deb 6s, '28-29	105 1/2	105 1/2	105 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
100	94 1/2	47 Do 4s, '28-29	85 1/2	85 1/2	85 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
106 1/2	101 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
101	97 1/2	17 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
71 1/2	19	10 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	102 1/2	8 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	103 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	104 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	105 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	106 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	107 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	108 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	109 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	110 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	111 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	112 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	113 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	70 1/2	—	70 1/2	
108 1/2	114 1/2	13 Do 1st ref 5s, '28-29	102 1/2	102 1/2	102 1/2	Do 1/2s, '32	70 1/2	70 1/					

## Transactions on the New York Curb

WEEK ENDED SATURDAY, JULY 14, 1923

### Trading by Days

Range, 1923

Net

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# How to Choose Among Security Offerings

Continued from Page 78.

NAME	AMOUNT	DATE OF ISSUE	MATURITY	OFFERED AT	INTEREST RATE	INTEREST DATE	YIELD
Pacific Southwest Realty Co.	\$3,000,000 Cumul. Pfd.	July 12	July 1, 1929, to 1951, incl., annually	Par (\$100)	6 1/2%	J. A. J.	
Provident Freshold & Realty Co., Ltd., St. Lambert, Quebec	\$100,000 Cumul. Pfd.	July 10		& divd.	7%	J. A. J.	7.36% with 20%
Rouyn Gold Mines, Ltd.	250,000 Shares	July 9		\$95 a share	7%	& O. I.	& O. I. bonus in com. stock
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.	Block of Co.'s Pfd.	July 11		20c per sh. (par \$1.00)			
U. S. Stores Corp., Block of Co.'s Pfd.	Block of Co.'s Pfd. Prior Cumul. Convertible	July 11		at market	7%		
Western Maryland Dairy, Inc., Baltimore, Md.	875,000 Cumul. 1st Pfd.	July 13		Par \$50, at \$51.50 & div.	8%	J. A. J.	7 1/4%

## Notes

Detroit Packing Co.	\$600,000	July 11	June 1, 1933	Par & Int.	7%
Troy Foundry & Machine Co.	\$250,000	July 9	Feb. 1, 1933	Par & Int.	7%

## Dividends Declared and Awaiting Payment

Continued from Page 87.

Company	Pe. Rate.	Pay. able.	Books Close.	Company	Pe. Rate.	Pay. able.	Books Close.
Pan Am. Pet. & Trans.	\$2	Q July 20	June 30	Salt Creek Prod. Assn.	2	Q Aug. 1	July 16
Do Class B.	\$2	Q July 20	June 30	Do	2	Ex. Aug. 1	July 16
Peerless Truck & Motor.	\$1	Q Sep. 30	Sept. 19	Santee Cotton Mills	3 1/2	Q July 14	July 19
Do	\$1	Q Dec. 31	Dec. 29	Savannah Sug. Ref. pf.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 1	July 16
Permans, Ltd.	2	Q Aug. 15	Aug. 15	Standard Oil & Gas.	3 1/2-3 M	Q Aug. 1	July 16
Do pf.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 15	July 21	Do	1	Q Aug. 1	Aug. 1
Phillips-Jones pf.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 1	July 20	Securities Co.	2 1/2	Q July 16	July 26
Pick (Albert) & Co.	40c	Q Aug. 1	July 2	Shell Trans. & Trad.	\$1.13 1/2	Q July 20	July 19
Do new com.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 1	July 3	Simmons Co. pf.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 1	July 14
Pierce, Butler & Pierce.	\$1	Q July 15	July 5	Smith Paper Mills	1 1/2	Q July 20	July 5
Pittsburgh Coal	1	Q July 25	July 10	Do pf.	2	Q July 20	July 5
Do pf.	1 1/2	Q July 25	July 10	Sinclair Con. Oil.	50c	Q Aug. 31	Aug. 1
Pittsburgh Steel pf.	1 1/2	Q Sep. 1	Aug. 15	Standard Oil Co. pf.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 1	Aug. 1
Pitman (T.G.) 1st pf.	1 1/2	Q July 15	July 15	Standard Oil of Ohio pf	1 1/2	Q Sep. 1	July 27
Plymouth Cordage	1 1/2	Q July 20	July 2	Spanish R. P. & P. M.	1 1/2	Q July 16	June 30
Prairie Oil & Gas	2	Q July 31	June 30	Standard Oil of Ohio pf	1 1/2	Q Sep. 1	July 27
Prairie Pipe Line	2	Q July 31	June 30	Stand. Und. Cable.	3	Q July 10	July 2
Procter & Gamble	5	—	Aug. 15	Stearns (F. B.) Co.	50c	Q July 20	June 30
Do	4	Stk Aug. 15	July 14	Steel Co. of Can. com.	—	Q	—
Prod. & Refiners pf.	87 1/2c	Q Aug. 6	July 23	Do pf.	1 1/2	Q July 16	July 4
Do pf.	12 1/2c	Ex. Aug. 1	July 23	Sterling Products	—	Q Aug. 1	July 17
Pyrene Mfg.	2 1/2	Q Aug. 1	July 15	Standard Bras. pf.	2	Q Aug. 1	Aug. 15
River Basin Paper.	1 1/2	Q July 20	July 16	Stover Mfg. pf.	2	Q Aug. 1	July 10
Rockland & Rock. Lime Corp.	1 1/2	—	Aug. 1	Sugar East. of Oriente pf	2	Q Aug. 1	July 16
Russ. Motor Car pf.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 1	July 18	Superior Steel 1st pf.	2	Q Aug. 15	Aug. 1
St. Lawrence P. Mills.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 1	July 20	Do 2d pf.	2	Q Aug. 15	Aug. 1
Do pf.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 1	July 27	Do 2d pf.	2	Q Aug. 15	Aug. 1
St. Louis Cotton Mills.	1	Q Aug. 1	July 27	Do pf.	1 1/2	Q July 16	July 4

## Current Corporate Reports

ALLIS-CHALMERS MANUFACTURING COMPANY for the first five months of 1923 reports bookings amounting to \$14,912,015, an increase of 58 per cent., while unfilled orders now exceed \$13,000,000, compared with \$8,215,545 on Jan. 1, 1923. Actual billings against the \$14,912,015 bookings in the five months' period were \$8,158,378. May net, after taxes, was \$203,044, or \$20,907 more than the monthly rate of dividend requirements on the combined stock.

AMERICAN CAR AND FOUNDRY COMPANY for the fiscal year ended April 30, 1923, reports a surplus, after charges, Federal taxes, and preferred dividends, of \$4,113,611, equivalent to \$13.71 a share earned on the \$30,000,000 common stock, compared with a surplus of \$4,483,320, or \$14.94 a share on the common stock the previous year.

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY for May, 1923, reports operating revenue of \$6,050,498, against \$5,462,967 in May, 1922, an increase of \$587,531, and an operating income of \$2,643,284 in May, 1923, compared with \$2,437,947 a year ago, a gain of \$205,337. The five months' operating revenue this year totaled \$29,942,764, against \$26,025,049 in the corresponding period of 1922, an increase of \$3,917,715, and the five months' operating income for 1923 amounted to \$13,427,554, against \$11,228,450 in 1922, a gain of \$2,199,095.

AMERICAN THREAD COMPANY for the year ended March 31, 1923, reports surplus of \$2,113,302, after interest, depreciation, taxes and inventory adjustments, equivalent, after preferred dividends, to \$1.55 a share earned on the 1,200,000 shares (\$10 par) of common stock outstanding, compared with \$11,520, or \$1 cent a share earned on the 978,005 shares (\$5 par) of preferred stock the preceding year.

AMERICAN WATERWORKS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY and subsidiaries for May, 1923, report gross of \$2,495,270, compared with \$1,641,914 a year ago, and balance, after charges including depreciation, of \$252,281, against \$91,070 in May, 1922, an increase of \$161,311. The gross for the twelve months ended May 31, 1923, totaled \$30,178,476, an increase of \$10,302,227 over the corresponding period of 1922, and the total net income, after depreciation and other charges, amounted to \$2,495,209, compared with \$1,410,940, a gain of \$1,084,269.

BRASILIAN TRACTION, LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY for the year ended Dec. 31, 1923, reports surplus of \$6,251,968, after interest, depreciation, amortization reserve and preferred dividends, equivalent to \$5.86 a share earned on the \$106,581,000 common stock outstanding, compared with a surplus of \$2,637,681, or \$2.47 a share, the previous year.

BROOKLYN RAPID TRANSIT for May, 1923, reports gross of \$3,411,218, compared with \$3,147,921 in May a year ago, and a surplus after charges amounting to \$506,075, against \$45,256 in 1922. The total gross for the eleven months ended May 31, 1923, was \$33,589,020, compared with \$31,526,837 the previous year, and the total surplus, after charges, for the same period amounted to \$3,142,374, compared with \$2,815,383 in the corresponding period of the previous year.

GENERAL GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY and subsidiaries for May, 1923, report gross of \$1,267,000, compared with \$1,036,561 in May, 1922, and net operating revenues of \$971,871, against \$811,070 a year ago. The total gross for the twelve months ended May 31, 1923, amounted to \$14,544,860, while the net operating income for the same period totaled \$3,884,290, leaving a balance applicable to General Gas and Electric stock amounting to \$1,079,600.

HARTMAN CORPORATION for June, 1923, reports sales of \$1,012,000, compared with \$962,625 in June, 1922, showing an increase of \$49,384, or approximately 5 per cent. The total sales for the six months ended June 30, 1923, amounted to \$9,509,743, against \$6,664,030, a gain of \$2,935,713, or about 44 per cent.

NIPISSING MINES COMPANY for June, 1923, reports ore mined having a net value of \$181,942 and shipments aggregating 151,882 ounces of bullion, having an estimated value of \$98,791 (with silver figured at 63 1/2 cents an ounce).

PENN SEABOARD STEEL CORPORATION for the five months ended May 31, 1923, reports net sales amounting to \$1,729,663, leaving a final surplus, after interest charges, idle plant expenses and "amount applicable to minority holding" of \$58,736, which, when added to the profit and loss account in the balance sheet, brought the total of this item up to \$3,419,843.

REPROLOGE STEEL COMPANY for the quarter ended March 31, 1923, reports a consolidated loss, after expenses, taxes and reserve for depreciation, amounting to \$109,867. The balance sheet as of March 31, 1923, follows: Cash, \$185,816; accounts and notes receivable, \$508,366; accounts and notes payable of affiliated companies, \$288,160; Liberty bonds, \$20,000; inventories, \$1,867,672; property, plants and railroads, after reserve for depreciation and amortization, \$11,030,949; stocks and bonds, \$1,750,180; deferred charges, \$50,015; total, \$15,641,158. Accounts and wages payable, \$583,716; deferred items in suspense, \$4,153; reserves for insurance, taxes, &c.; \$142,815; capital stock (375,000 shares of no par value), \$14,950,000; deficit, \$39,526; total, \$15,641,158.

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY for May, 1923, reports net sales of \$1,012,000, compared with \$962,625 in June, 1922, showing an increase of \$49,384, or approximately 5 per cent. The total sales for the six months ended June 30, 1923, amounted to \$9,509,743, against \$6,664,030, a gain of \$2,935,713, or about 44 per cent.

AMERICAN WATERWORKS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY and subsidiaries for May, 1923, report gross of \$2,495,270, compared with \$1,641,914 a year ago, and balance, after charges including depreciation, of \$252,281, against \$91,070 in May, 1922, an increase of \$161,311. The gross for the twelve months ended May 31, 1923, totaled \$30,178,476, an increase of \$10,302,227 over the corresponding period of 1922, and the total net income, after depreciation and other charges, amounted to \$2,495,209, compared with \$1,410,940, a gain of \$1,084,269.

AMERICAN WATERWORKS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY and subsidiaries for May, 1923, report gross of \$2,495,270, compared with \$1,641,914 a year ago, and balance, after charges including depreciation, of \$252,281, against \$91,070 in May, 1922, an increase of \$161,311. The gross for the twelve months ended May 31, 1923, totaled \$30,178,476, an increase of \$10,302,227 over the corresponding period of 1922, and the total net income, after depreciation and other charges, amounted to \$2,495,209, compared with \$1,410,940, a gain of \$1,084,269.

Company	Rate.	Pay. able.	Books Close.	Company	Rate.	Pay. able.	Books Close.
Sullivan Machinery	\$1	Q July 16	June 30	Wahl Co.	50c	III Aug. 1	July 14
Thompson (J. R.) Co.	25c	M July 1	June 23	Do	50c	M Sep. 1	Aug. 24
Underwood Type.	new	75c	M Sep. 1	Do	50c	M Oct. 1	Sept. 12
Union Bag & Paper.	1 1/2	Q July 16	July 6	Do pf.	1 1/2	Q Oct. 1	Sept. 22
Union Bag & Paper.	1 1/2	Q July 16	July 6	Union Bag & Paper.	1 1/2	Q Oct. 1	Sept. 20
Union Oil of Cal.	\$1.80	Q July 28	July 11	Union Tank Car.	1 1/2	Q Sep. 1	July 26
Union Tank Car.	1 1/2	Q Sep. 1	Aug. 7	United Cigar Stores.	2	Q Aug. 1	July 15
United Drug 1st pf.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 1	July 16	United Drug 1st pf.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 1	July 29
United Drug 1st pf.	1 1/2	Q Aug. 1	July 16	United Eastern Mining.	15c	Q July 1	July 15
United Finishing.	1 1/2	Q July 16	June 28	United Finishing.	1 1/2	Q July 1	July 20
U. S. Glass.	50c	Q July 27	July 18	United Finishing.	1 1/2	Q July 1	July 20
U. S. Ind. Alcohol pf.	1 1/2	Q July 16	June 30	United Finishing.	1 1/2	Q July 1	July 20
U. S. Realty & Imp.	1 1/2	Q Sep. 15	Sept. 5	United Finishing.	1 1/2	Q July 1	July 20
U. S. Rubber 1st pf.	2	Q Nov. 1	Oct. 20	United Finishing.	1 1/2	Q July 1	July 20
United Verde Ext.	\$1	Q Aug. 1	July 5	United Verde Ext.	\$1	Q Aug. 1	July 5
Ventura Con. Oil Fields	75c	Q Aug. 1	July 16	Yellow Cab Mfg. Cl. B. 50c	M Aug. 1	July 20	
Vulcan Det. pf. & pf. A.	1 1/2	Q July 20	July 9	Yellow Cab Mfg. Cl. B. 50c	M Aug. 1	July 20	
Vulcan Detinning pf.	1 1/2	Q July 20	July 9	Yellow Cab Mfg. Cl. B. 50c	M Aug. 1	July 20	
Do 7% cum. pf.	1 1/2	Q July 20	July 9	Yellow Cab Mfg. Cl. B. 50c	M Aug. 1	July 20	

## Grain

Continued from Page 77.

to this production must be figured the exceptionally large carryover from last year, estimated at from 130,000,000 to 150,000,000 bushels.

Two factors doubtless contribute to the disappointing volume of European purchases—first, and probably most important, is the fact that Europe herself is raising a larger grain crop than was anticipated two or three months ago. Canada again will raise a bumper crop, and there have been wide acreage increases this year in India and North Africa, but overhanging the entire European situation is the report which filters into our financial districts that Russia again must be considered a factor, and that more grain was seeded in that country this year than at any time since the war. The other factor in the decline is the restriction in the purchasing power of Europe influenced by financial and economic conditions abroad, which has no doubt encouraged hand-to-mouth buying. An interesting phase of this view is shown in a report which has just been made by a group of economists and statisticians, who were requested by the Department of Agriculture to review the factors involved in the agricultural outlook. They reported that "the foreign demand for American foodstuffs during the current marketing season will apparently not be as great as it was a year ago," and that "Europe will probably have less

## Foreign Securities in American Markets

Continued from Page 81.

there was a deficit and 51,900,000 kronor are appropriated for the first six months of 1923. The new budget for 1923-24 was drawn up, therefore, on the premise that it shall balance without recourse to the Reserve Fund, now fairly well exhausted. This was accomplished without new and increased taxation largely by reduced bonuses to officials and decreased unemployment grants. At the same time revenues were estimated at lower figures, on the whole, than the actual yield for 1922.

The original Government project contemplated a budget of 737,500,000 kronor but this was increased by the Riksdag to 775,700,000. This compares with 930,600,000, 1,118,300,000, 939,400,000 and 944,500,000 kronor, but this was increased by the Riksdag to 775,700,000. Revenues in 1913 were only 241,000,000. Borrowings, according to the new budget, are estimated at 87,500,000, as compared with 99,600,000 in 1922 and 229,400,000 in 1921. Actual loan receipts in 1913 were 40,000,000. The budget contemplates expenditures on capital account of 13,200,000 kronor, as compared with 210,000,000 in 1921 and 37,000,000 in 1913. Interest on national debt, 80,300,000 kronor; amortization, 51,800,000 kronor; total 132,100,000 kronor; whereas the State's productive funds are estimated to yield 114,100,000 and profits from the Riksbank 16,000,000, a total of 130,100,000 kronor. Sweden has a moderate expenditure for military and naval purposes, as it has enjoyed peace for more than one hundred years.

A further significant change which occurred in the financial scheme since the outbreak of the war was the use of direct taxation as a major source of income. In 1914 this source yielded 24.5 per cent. of total revenues, indirect taxes 48.6 per cent. and State investments 21.5 per cent.; but in 1920 (estimated) the respective figures were 61.1 per cent., 27.2 per cent. and 10.1 per cent. This development is largely accounted for by the imposition of war profits and excess profits taxes and by the decline in customs, the chief form of indirect taxation, in view of import restrictions. Sweden has followed British and American practice in meeting the greater share of its expenditures out of taxation rather than by loans. A swing back toward the former ratios has been noticed in recent years following the reduction of war taxes, the revival of the import trade and the recovery of earnings on State enterprises.

Economically, Sweden has long been a predominantly agricultural people, although at the present time agricultural pursuits do not occupy more than one-half the population. In 1870 about 20 per cent. were engaged in non-agricultural callings and in 1910 about 45 per cent. In 1919 there were 428,000 farms in cultivation, of which nearly 400,000 are under fifty acres in extent. The value of all crops in 1919 was placed at 1,384,000,000 kronor, as compared with 2,016,000,000 the previous year. The chief crops were wheat, 342,293 tons; rye, 706,445 tons; oats, 1,111,828 tons; potatoes, 1,864,974 tons; sugar beet and fodder roots, nearly 4,500,000 tons, and hay and fodder plants over 4,000,000 tons. Live stock in 1919 included more than 2,500,000 cattle, 1,500,000 sheep, 700,000 horses, and a like number of pigs.

Industrially the timber, wood and paper industries dominate, although small industries are diversified and rather evenly spread out over the country. These include iron and steel, telephone supplies, dairy equipment, motors, electrical machinery, and porcelain and glass, the products of which are in high repute throughout the world.

The forests cover nearly 24,000,000 acres, of which more than 17,000,000 are Crown and ecclesiastical forests. In 1919 there were 1,400 saw and planing mills, with an output valued at 520,000,000 kronor; 625 joining and furniture factories, with an output of 86,000,000 kronor; 106 wood-pulp factories, and 71 paper and pasteboard mills. The output of bleached and unbleached pulp in 1922 amounted to 745,000 tons, as compared with 467,000 the previous year and 705,300 tons in 1913. The recovery from the depression of 1921 is further indicated by the output of sulphate pulp last year, which amounted to 245,000 tons, as compared with 116,800 tons in 1921 and 155,400 tons in 1913. This output was at a rate of 88 per cent. of the normal capacity, as compared with 45 per cent. the previous year. The exports of sulphate pulp were the highest on record, amounting to 207,500 tons, of which more than 70 per cent. was shipped to the United States. The bleached and unbleached pulp industry was also working at about 85 per cent. of capacity in 1922, and the exports were 687,400 tons, or more than double the exports of the previous year. Exports of dry pulp last year were 42,800 tons, as compared with 14,700 the previous year, while the corresponding figures for wet pulp were 219,300 and 88,100 tons. The exports of sawed and planed timber in 1922 amounted to 1,032,000 standards, as compared with 544,000 the previous year and 1,099,000 in 1913.

Other important industries are match, tannery, shoe, chemical, tobacco, brewing and textile works. Total factory employes in 1919 amounted to 392,911.

Sweden normally had an import balance of trade, but, due to the

war-time boom among neutral countries and the limitation of imports imposed by the Swedish Government, an export balance was the rule from 1914 to 1918, inclusive. Following the armistice and with the removal of the import restrictions, the normal import balance again returned on a magnificent scale. The normal import balance before the war ranged between 20,000,000 and 30,000,000 kronor, the 1913 balance being 30,000,000 kronor; but in 1914 there was an export balance of 45,000,000 kronor, which steadily increased to the peak of 591,000,000 kronor in 1917. The unfavorable balance in 1919, however, was 911,000,000 kronor. That substantial progress has been made since 1919 in the reduction of the import balance, however, is indicated by the fact that in 1922 the excess of imports over exports amounted to only 12,000,000 kronor, as compared with the record unfavorable balance of 1919 and an unfavorable balance of 162,000,000 kronor in 1921. Considerable credit for this is due to the revival in the timber, paper and wood industries. The exports of wood pulp and other allied products in 1922 amounted to 611,200,000 kronor out of a total export trade of 1,162,400,000. Imports for that year were 1,164,400,000. Other chief exports were minerals, of which iron ore comprises a considerable portion; meat, fish and shipping. The chief imports are textiles, raw mineral materials, colonial produce and fuels.

The Swedish krona, together with the Swiss and Dutch monetary units, is among the few currencies in the world which have approached their dollar parity. With a par of 26.8 cents, the krona reached a high in 1917 of 47.50 cents and did not fall below par thereafter until December, 1919, when it reacted to 20.50 cents. The low for the war period was 17.70 cents, reached in February, 1920. Its dollar parity was again reached in 1922, and a high of 27.05 was reached on Dec. 29. In the current year the range was 26.38 cents to 27.02 cents, with a present quotation of about 26½ cents per krona. Note circulation of the Bank of Sweden on May 5, 1923, was 546,068,000 kronor, with gold holdings of 273,404,000 kronor, while the corresponding figures for Aug. 1, 1914, were 241,776,000 and 102,906,000 kronor.

At present Sweden is experiencing the recovery from the post-war depression partly as a reflex of the revived purchasing power of the United States and other important export markets. She is still confronted, however, with many of the problems brought on by the inflationary period. The index of wholesale commodity prices is now about 159, as compared with 363 in July, 1920. The average for 1922 was 162; for 1921, 211; and for 1920, 347. This is on the basis of the 1913-14 price equaling 100. Industry at the present time is suffering from high wages, which have not receded simultaneously with price levels—from the high cost of fuel in particular, and burdensome transportation charges. Other principal problems are the delay in the recovery of the Central and Eastern European markets and the presence of surrounding producing areas with depreciated paper currencies.

## Development of British Empire

Continued from Page 80.

We cannot keep the Empire together on terms of mutual admiration and sympathy. Our aims must be measured in terms of service and reciprocity. In 1913 Canada gave us a preference of 33 1-3 per cent., and that cost her \$13,000,000; South Africa also gave us preference in that year at a sacrifice of £554,000; Australia has sacrificed over £2,000,000, and in 1921 the Commonwealth gave preference to us costing some £9,000,000. On the other hand, England has given the colonies preference to the annual value of over £11,000,000 a year. It is the intention of the home Government to extend the preference, but to what extent it is impossible to say at present. That is the business of the forthcoming economic conference to determine. This system of preference is not to be confined to the interchange of products, but will include preference in postal service, cables, airship service, the provision of British capital for the extension of empire development, while it is intended to effect a system whereby it will cost less to invest in empire securities than in foreign investments. In every direction the path of the man who wants to put his money in the empire is to be made smoother than the path of the man who puts his capital to earn a profit which mainly employs the people of other countries.

At one time, not far distant, the United States supplied us with a vast quantity of our foodstuffs. That is gradually ceasing and America, instead of being an exporter of food and raw materials, is becoming an importer. England has to look elsewhere for her future supplies of such products. It is essential, if she is to retain her position as a great exporter of manufactures, that she obtain cheap food and raw materials, and one of the principal purposes of the coming conference is to bring about this consummation.

# Forces and Trend in Business

Continued from Page 67.

overproduced, prices have receded nearly \$5 a ton since the peak in the Spring, and some customers are now failing to accept their orders. Similarly, steel prices have softened, irregularly, but visibly. Automobile makers, while continuing production nearly up to the June rate, are taking much less steel, and the tapering off for that industry seems already in sight.

Despite the high figure for car loadings of building materials, there is also a falling off of steel consumption in that direction, together with an apparent somewhat decided decline of building operations in the country generally. On permits in June, Bradstreet's reports the June total of permits in 153 cities some 20 millions less than in May—a decrease of 8.4 per cent., which happens to be also nearly 4 per cent. below the total for June, 1922. On building contracts awarded in June, the F. W. Dodge Corporation reports an increase in New York City of 20 per cent. over May, and of 21 per cent. over June of last year. But for the country at large the Dodge report shows a decrease of 14 per cent. On the New York City situation, the Dodge report notes the interesting fact that total construction started during the first six months of this year is 6 per cent. under the figures for the corresponding period of 1922. "The fact is," it remarks, "that the peak of the building revival in New York occurred in April, 1922; the peak of this year's activity to date [occurring in March] was 27 per cent. under last year's maximum figure." Of construction activity for the whole country the report says that the increase over the first six months of last year is about 9 per cent., but that the excess over last year has been dwindling for three months past.

Another significant event of the week was the fall of wheat in Chicago to just under one dollar a bushel—the first time since 1914 that the price has gone so low. Earlier calculations that there will be a surplus this year of some 200,000,000 bushels have not been displaced by later estimates. At prices close to a dollar a bushel it is credibly judged that wheat will not return to the wheat farmers the cost of producing it—at all events no profits that will go far to sustain the business of the country. Whatever hopes there may have been that Europe would be a better buyer of the next crop have been seriously dampened by the committee of Government statisticians and economists which has reported to the Department of Agriculture that Europe is pretty certain to buy less American wheat next year than this. The European crops are better than last year, it is explained, and European buyers will have less purchasing power in American markets. Curtailment of American wheat acreage is suggested as the rational remedy for the condition—a rational remedy indeed, but one peculiarly difficult to carry into execution. As a partial relief to the wheat farmer's situation, the Federal Reserve banks are attempting to inform him of the possibilities of the new agricultural credits system by whose aid he may market his wheat in orderly fashion and obtain possibly somewhat better prices for it.

The probable and indeed inevitable result from this position of the wheat crop is a limitation of farmer buying capacity that cannot fail to be felt by merchants and manufacturers—as indeed it has already been felt. The new agricultural credits will probably give some relief in the direction of strictly farm financing, but they cannot reasonably be looked to for sustaining the markets for miscellaneous manufactures.

The general trend is illustrated in a further though slight downward tendency in commodity prices during the week. Some items were firmer, but in the comprehensive list compiled by Dun & Co. there were decreases on 47 items compared with increases on 28.

Notably small total transactions on the New York Stock Exchange during the week, with prices generally weak and irregular despite a slight improvement at the end of the week, furnish another indication of the same general tendency. The price trend on the whole was downward.

The European economic outlook continues pivoted mainly on the continuing German reparation crisis. Premier Baldwin's statement in the House of Commons was fair and moderate in tone, and ought, in a just scheme of things, to lead to some advance in an abatement of the difficulty over Germany and the Ruhr. But week-end dispatches from Paris indicated that the official French attitude toward the studied moderation of the British position, so far as the latter had been definitely announced, was rather hostile. It is greatly to be feared that the rigidity of the French position will not be lessened except by some British move more emphatic and even divisive of Entente sentiment than now appears possible.

On the point urged by Premier Baldwin, that the Ruhr occupation is destroying Germany's economic capacity, most informed observers will probably prefer the French view that what is being wrecked is not Germany's actual producing capacity but her financial system—the

latter wreck being chargeable wholly to the German official policy of preferring anything to payment of reparations.

Apparently competent information coming through American as well as other sources indicates that the plant and equipment of German industry are in exceptionally good order. Manufacturers, especially the larger organizations, have been doing and are still doing a considerable export business, profiting by the spread between foreign selling values and a cost of production in Germany, which is artificially low on account of the continued depreciation of the mark. There is evidence that these exporting manufacturers are accumulating in foreign centres a considerable bulk of gold values which are practically immune from German taxation, but which might and probably would be drawn on heavily for loans to the Government if German finances were reorganized on a sound basis after the reparation total and annual payments had been settled on a reasonable footing. The really critical issue within the larger reparation crisis is what is to be done to induce Germany to set her finances in order and begin payment on some mutually accepted scheme of reparations. In seeking to earn the funds for reparations, Germany would have to contend with the same dislocation of finance and business which now vexes the rest of Europe; but with her affairs on a rational basis, the general course of Europe should be definitely upward. The British note to Germany and the attitude of the Allies on the British position are awaited not without anxiety.

## Grain

Continued from Page 89.

portance to act as a lever on the wheat market. A sudden reversal in crop condition would bring this about, but harvesting is well under way in most sections of the belt and the bulk of the crop has already been made; also a sudden settlement of the tangled European political situation probably would bring about a sympathetic upturn in our grain markets, but this would probably not be of permanent benefit to wheat, because it could not change the capacity of European purchasing power over night.

Weather conditions in the belt last week were extremely good for harvesting, although there was some rain in Ohio and Indiana. There were disturbing reports of rust from many sections of the belt, but these were not sufficiently definite to have considerable effect and were outweighed by other and more depressing factors. The visible supply of wheat now is 25,567,000 bushels, against 26,313,000 bushels the previous week and 16,879,000 bushels the corresponding week last year.

The market for corn was relatively firm, although it declined sympathetically on the days when wheat was weakest. Corn is statistically in a better position than wheat, and there has been a ready market for it all year at prices approximately twenty cents above those of last year. The visible supply is abnormally low, and although the new crop is expected to be a good one, an entirely different situation exists in the corn market from that in the wheat market. The visible supply of corn is placed at 3,167,000 bushels, against 3,366,000 bushels the previous week and 42,400,000 bushels the corresponding period of 1922. The Government forecast is that 2,877,000,000 bushels of corn will be harvested in 1923, compared with the final outturn of 2,891,000,000 bushels for the corresponding period last year. The Crop Board estimated that the farm price of corn on July 1, 1923, was 86.5 cents a bushel; on July 1, 1922, the farm price was only 62.2 cents a bushel. The acreage of 103,112,000 in corn on July 1 was 100.7 per cent. of the 1922 acreage. The Government's July 1 forecast was based on a yield of 27 bushels per acre, compared with 28.2 bushels in 1922 and an average of 28 bushels in the 1917 to 1921 period. Iowa continues to be the banner corn State.

There is a great deal of grumbling in the grain trade at the results of the operation of the Capper-Tincher bill, and, in the opinion of many market experts, this is one of the most prominent factors in depressing prices for grain. The bill provides that a report must be made to the exchanges, and through the exchanges to the Department of Agriculture, of every holder of contracts calling for more than one million bushels of grain. This has the effect of frightening many speculators who, under ordinary circumstances, provide a good balance-wheel for the market, and at intermittent periods a definite and sustained buying power. The effect, as viewed by many market experts, has been to frighten this potential buying power away from the market and into other speculative vehicles, and has also had the effect of dumping a large amount of grain on the market at a time when it could least afford to take it.

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Liberty 1st 4½s, 1932-47	98.00	99.00
Liberty 2d 4½s, 1927-42	98.34	98.38
Liberty 3d 4½s, 1928	98.04	98.08
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Panama 3s, 1961	94	94%
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Fed. Land Bank 4½s, '42, op. '32	99	99%
Fed. Land Bank 4½s, 1943-5	99½	—
Fed. Land Bk. 5s, '53, op. '33	96½	100
Fed. Land Bk. 5s, '41, op. '31	101½	102½

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Argentine 4s, 1926 (unification)	60	62
Argentine 5s, '45 (large unlisted)	77	78
Argentine 5s (listed numbers), '45	81	82½
Argentine 5s, '45 (small, unlisted)	70	77
Belgium:		
Belgian Govt. (restoration) 5s	41	43
Belgian Govt. (restoration) 5s, '18	41	43
Belgian Govt. (premium) 5s, '20	44	46
Belgian Govt. 5s, premium...	44	46
Bolivia:		
Bolivian 6s, 1940	70½	78
Brazil:		
Brazilian Govt. 4s, 1889	38	38½
Brazilian Govt. 4s, 1889	38½	39½
Brazilian Govt. 4s, 1910	38	38½
Brazilian Govt. 4s, 1911	32	17
Brazilian Govt. Reces. 4s, 1900	39½	39½
Brazilian Govt. 4s, 1883	39	39
Brazilian Govt. 4s, 1883	44	45
Brazilian Govt. 5s, 1893	41	42%
Brazilian Govt. 5s, 1893	40½	42%
Brazilian Govt. 5s, 1893	40½	47½
Brazilian Govt. 5s, 1893	61	64
Brazilian Govt. 5s, 1908	15	20
Brazilian Govt. 5s, 1913	40½	47½
Brazilian Govt. 8s, 1941	96%	96%
Canada:		
Canadian 5s, 1925	97	98
Canadian 5s, 1925	100	100%
Canadian 5s, 1931 (external)	99½	100%
Canadian 5s, 1931 (internal)	98	—
Canadian 5s, 1937	90%	100%
Canadian 5s, 1937	98½	99%
Canadian 5s, M. & N., 1952	98½	99%
Canadian 5s, 1923	97	98
Canadian 5s, 1924	99%	100%
Canadian 5s, 1932	99%	100%
Canadian 5s, 1933	102½	103%
Canadian 5s, 1934	100½	101%
Canadian 5s, 1937	104½	105%
Canadian 5s, '27 (Vic., internal)	100%	101%
Canadian 5s, '29 (Vic., external)	101	101%
Chile:		
Chilean 5s, 1911, 1st series	73	76
Chilean 5s, 1911, 2d series	75	76
Chilean 8s, J. 30 and Dec. 31	121	125
Chilean 8s, M. & S.	121	126
China:		
Chinese Govt. 4s, 1895	75	79
Chinese Govt. 5s, 1913	61	63
Chinese Govt. Hu-Kuang Ry. 5s	44	45
Cuba:		
Cuban Govt. 5s, 1905	80	83
Cuban Govt. 5s, 1918 (internal)	85	86
Cuban Govt. 6s, 1920	94½	96
Cuban Govt. 6s, 1917 (s. p.c.)	94	96
Costa Rica:		
Repub. of Costa Rica 5s, 1911	56%	58
Colombia:		
Colombian Govt. 6s, 1947	67	69
Czechoslovakia:		
Czechoslovakia 4½s	25	30
Czechoslovakia 6s	24	28
France:		
French Govt. 4s, 1917	36	36%
French Govt. 4s, 1917	36½	37
French Govt. 4s, 1918	35	36%
French 4s, 1917	36½	37
French Govt. 5s (Victory)	43½	44
French Victory 5s	43½	44
French Victory 5s	43½	44
French Premium 5s, 1929	52	53
French Premium 5s, 1929	52	53
French Premium 5s, 1929	52	53
French 5½s, 1917	76	78
French 5½s, 1917	76	78
French 6s, 1920	51	52
French 6s, 1920	51½	52½
French 6s, 1920	51	52
Germany:		
German Govt. 5s	12	15
Great Britain:		
British Govt. Funding 4s	80%	81½
British Govt. Victory 4s	81½	82½
British Govt. 5s, 1927	97	98
British Govt. 5s, 1929	95½	96½
British Govt. 5s, 1929-37	91	92
British Govt. Exchequer 5½s	92%	93%
Greece:		
Greek Govt. 5s, 1964	74	79
Italy:		
Italian Govt. 5s, 1918-25	37	37½
Italian Govt. 5s, 1925 (Treas.)	43	44
Italian Govt. 5s, 1925 (Treas.)	42%	43%
Italian Govt. (consol.) 5s	37	37½
Kingdom of Italy 6½s, 1925...	96%	96½
Japan:		
Japanese Govt. 4s, 1931 (large)	80	80½
Japanese Govt. 4s, 1931 (small)	78½	79½
Japanese Govt. 1st series 4½s, '25	92%	92½
Japanese Govt. 1d series 1 p. 4½s, '25	91%	92
Japanese Govt. 2d series 1 p. 4½s, '25	90	92
Japanese Govt. 5s, '35 (small)	79	81
Japanese Govt. 5s, 1907	79	81
Mexico:		
Mexican Govt. 3s	9%	10½
Mexican Govt. 4s, 1954	32%	34%
Mexican Govt. 5s, 1899	53	54
Mexican Govt. 6s, 1923	56%	57%
Mexican Govt. 4s, '45 (French issue)	36%	37%
Mexican Govt. 6s (Treas.)	56	57
Norway:		
Norwegian Govt. 3½s, 1900	54	56
Norwegian Govt. 3½s, 1902	52	54
Norwegian Govt. 3½s, 1904	51½	52½
Norwegian Govt. 4s, 1911	65	69
Norwegian Govt. 6s, 1921	160	165
Norwegian Govt. 6s, 1920	164	168
Norwegian Govt. 6s, 1920	160	170
Norwegian Govt. 6s, 1921	165	175
Norway, King of, 8s, sk., '10...	110	111

**ADVERTISEMENTS.****U. S. Government Loans**

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**Transactions Stocks—Shares**

Week Ended July 14, 1923.

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
1923	1922	1922	1921	1921	1921
513,345	505,533	504,712	504,712	504,712	504,712
266,772	264,990	264,990	264,990	264,990	264,990
366,997	771,920	391,586	391,586	391,586	391,586
343,168	783,830	354,300	354,300	354,300	354,300
375,466	806,643	381,030	381,030	381,030	381,030
146,700	288,775	100,910	100,910	100,910	100,910
2,110,931	3,				

## Open Security Market—Bonds

## FOREIGN SECURITIES, INCLUDING NOTES—Continued

## GOVERNMENT ISSUES—Continued

## Bid Offered

POLAND:			
Polish Internal 5s.	15	25	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Polish External 5s.	43	47	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
RUSSIA:			
Russian Govt. 4s (rentes).	34	44	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Russian Govt. 5% 1926.	24	24	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Russian Govt. 5% 1921.	10	12	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Russian Govt. 5% (ruble war loan).	2	2	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Russian Govt. 5% (ctfs).	10	12	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Russian Govt. External 5% 21.	10	12	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Russian Govt. 6% 1919.	10	12	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Russian Govt. 6% (ctfs).	10	12	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Russian Govt. 6% 1919, ex loan.	10	12	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
ROMANIA:			
Romanian Reconstruc. 5s, 1920.	4%	5%	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
SANTO DOMINGO REPUBLIC:			
Dominican Republic 5s, 1958.	97	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
SWEDEN:			
Sweden, Kingdom of, 6s, 1939.	104%	104%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
SWITZERLAND:			
Swiss Confederation 5% (gold).	99%	100%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Swiss Confederation 8s, (s. f.).	115%	116	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
URUGUAY:			
Uruguay Govt. 3% F.M.A.N.	50	52	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Uruguay Govt. 5s, 1919.	66%	68	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Uruguay Govt. 8s, 1946.	103%	104	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
MUNICIPAL ISSUES			
ARGENTINA:			
Buenos Aires 3% 1906.	42%	43%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Buenos Aires gold 5s, 1915 (10).	52	54	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Buenos Aires 5% 1920.	57	58	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Buenos Aires gold 5s, 1915 (20).	76%	78%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Buenos Aires 6s, 1926.	36	37	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Cedula 6s.	330	345	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
AUSTRALIA:			
Brisbane 6% 1941.	97%	99	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Queensland 4% 1925.	87	90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
AUSTRIA:			
Vienna 5s.	15	18	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
BRAZIL:			
Pelotas Loan of 1911 (J.D.D.) 5%.	50	52	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Rio de Janeiro 5s, 1909.	70	73	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Sao Paulo 5s, 1907.	58%	57%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Sao Paulo 5s, 1915.	69%	70%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Sao Paulo 6s, 1914.	81%	82%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Sao Paulo 8s, 1936.	97	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Sao Paulo 8s (ex Dutch issue).	372	378	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Sao Paulo 8s (guilder).	349	390	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
CANADA:			
Calgary 6s, 1924.	99	100%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Calgary 6s, 1971.	99	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Calgary 7s, 1928.	102	104	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Edmonton, Alberta, 5% 1924.	97	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Edmonton, Alberta, 6% 1924.	90%	90%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Gt. Winnipeg Water Dist. 5% 1924.	94	95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Maisonneuve (Mont., Que.) 5% 1944.	94%	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Montreal, City of, 5s, 1954.	95%	96%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Montreal, City of, 5s, 1956.	95%	96%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Ottawa 5s, 1944.	94%	95%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Point Grey 5s, 1953.	87	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Quebec 5s, 1927.	97%	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Toronto 4% 1925.	97%	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Toronto 5% 1925.	100%	102%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Toronto 5% 1926.	100%	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Toronto 6s, 1950.	104	107	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Toronto Harbor Com. 4% 1953.	87	88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Victoria 4% 1925.	96%	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Victoria 6s, 1928.	98%	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Winnipeg 5s, 1926.	97%	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Winnipeg 6s, 1930.	100%	102%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
CZECHOSLOVAKIA:			
Karlsbad 4s.	18	22	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Prague 4s.	20	24	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
DENMARK:			
Copenhagen 4s, 1949.	74%	76%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
GERMANY:			
Berlin 4s.	13	16	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Cologne 8s.	10	14	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Dresden 8s.	9	13	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Frankfort 8s.	10	13	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Hamburg 4% 8s.	15	17	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Leipzic 8s.	10	13	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Munich 8s.	7	13	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
Stuttgart 8s.	9	13	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
HUNGARY:			
Budapest 4% 8s.	15	25	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C....Whitehall 500
JAPAN:			
Tokio, City of, 5s, 1952.	70%	75%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
CANADA:			
Alberta 4% 1924.	99	99%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 3s, 1925.	98%	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 3s, 1926.	98	99	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 5% 1927.	99	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 5% 1929.	99	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 5% 1939.	100	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 5% 1947.	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 5% 1952.	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 6s, 1925.	100%	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 6s, 1926.	100%	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 6s, 1930 M. & N.	101%	102%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 6s, 1941.	104%	106%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 4% 1925.	97%	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 5s, 1925.	98%	99%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 5s, 1939.	95	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 5s, 1949.	100	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 6s, 1925.	100	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 6s, 1926.	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 6s, J. & J. 25.	100	100%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 6s, 1941.	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Colony of Newfoundland 3% 1928.	99%	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Colony of Newfoundland 3% 1928.	99%	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Colony of Newfoundland 3% 1928.	99%	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Colony of Newfoundland 3% 1928.	99%	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Manitoba 5s, 1926.	97%	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Manitoba 5s, 1939.	100	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Manitoba 5s, 1942.	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Manitoba 6s, 1925.	100	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Manitoba 6s, 1946.	106	108	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Manitoba 6s, 1930.	101%	102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Manitoba 6s, 1928.	100%	102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Manitoba 6s, 1931, M. & N.	101%	103%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Manitoba 6s, 1931, J. & J.	100%	103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
New Brunswick 5% 1929.	99%	100%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
New Brunswick 6s, 1931.	101	103	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
STATE ISSUES			
CANADA:			
Alberta 4% 1924.	99	99%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 3s, 1925.	98%	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 3s, 1926.	98	99	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 5% 1927.	99	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 5% 1929.	99	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 5% 1939.	100	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 5% 1947.	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 5% 1952.	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 6s, 1925.	100%	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 6s, 1926.	100%	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 6s, 1930 M. & N.	101%	102%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Alberta 6s, 1941.	104%	106%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 4% 1925.	97%	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 5s, 1925.	98%	99%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 5s, 1939.	95	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 5s, 1949.	100	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 6s, 1925.	100	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 6s, 1926.	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 6s, J. & J. 25.	100	100%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
British Columbia 6s, 1941.	100%	101%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Colony of Newfoundland 3% 1928.	99%	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Colony of Newfoundland 3% 1928.	99%	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 0813
Colony of Newfoundland			



# The Commerce Department

Continued from Page 70.

for lignite and 23 for coke. The wholesale price for coal in Vienna at the end of June amounted to \$11.16 a ton.

Consul Foster at Vienna reported last week that declared exports to the United States in June amounted to \$431,000, against \$383,000 for May. The principal items were electric lamps, wrapping paper and leather manufactures.

In connection with the French financing of the occupation of the Ruhr, a cable from Commercial Attaché C. L. Jones, at Paris, to the effect that the statement of the Bank of France for July 5 showed an increase of nearly 1,000,000,000 francs in note circulation over May 31 was read with interest. Advances to the State by the Bank of France also showed an increase of about 900,000,000 francs for the same period. On July 5, the cable stated, the total notes outstanding amounted to 37,682,000,000 francs and the Bank's advances to the State had reached 23,900,000,000 francs. Neither are records, however. On March 31, 1921, note circulation totaled 38,435,000,000 francs and advances to the State by the Bank were at 26,400,000,000.

An interesting statement by Mr. Jones was that unemployment remains negligible in France, although the general trend of the French situation was reported by him as "less favorable in June than in preceding months." The estimated number of unemployed on June 23 for all of France was but 11,000.

The general aspect of German business in June was reported in a cable from Commercial Attaché Herring, at Berlin, as good, despite unstable financial and economic conditions. Unemployment decreased somewhat on account of slightly improved industrial activity resulting from the new depreciation of the mark by nearly 200 per cent. "In the Ruhr district, however," Mr. Herring stated, "the business depression is worse than ever, production in nearly all industries having largely ceased except for small local needs."

It was also reported by Mr. Herring that the Government's latest attempt at control of speculation in foreign exchange has not proved effective. There has been a constant demand, he cabled, for the use of a fixed standard of value in certain business transactions and a fixed value wage is being demanded by labor. The growing lack of any confidence in the mark is evidenced, he said, by increasing desire on the part of the public to invest in fixed value securities, as shown by the success of the rye and other commodity loans.

ADVERTISEMENTS.

ADVERTISEMENTS.

# Open Security Market—Stocks

## SUGAR SECURITIES

Bid	Offered	
Caracas Sugar Co.	11 15	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C. John 6428
Central Aguirre Sugar (ex div.)	80 83	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C. John 6428
Fajardo Sugar	107 110	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C. John 6428
Federal Sugar Refining Co.	60 65	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C. John 6428
Nat. Sugar Refining (ex div.)	89 92	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C. John 6428
New Niquera Sugar Co.	93 102	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C. John 6428
Savanna Sugar Refining	60 65	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C. John 6428
Savannah Sugar Ref. (ex div.)	81 84	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C. John 6428
West Indies Sug. Fin. Corp. pf.	35 40	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C. John 6428

## RAILROADS

Bid	Offered	
Ala. Gt. Southern ordinary	49 52	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Ala. Gt. Southern pf.	56 60	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Albany & Susquehanna	188 195	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Beech Creek R. R.	36 39	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Canada Southern	50 52	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Cleveland & Pittsburgh 7%	67 70	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Cleveland & Pittsburgh 4%	38 40	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Ft. Dodge, Des M. & So. pf.	68	John Nickerson & Co., 61 B'way, N.Y.C. Bow. Gr. 6490
Ft. Wayne & Jackson pf.	101 105	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Illinoia Central Leased Line	71 74	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Joliet & Chicago	112 120	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Kalamazoo, Allegan & R. R.	102 108	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Mobile & Birmingham pf.	59 63	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Minn. St.P.&S.M. Leased Line	59 63	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Morris & Essex	73% 75%	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
New York & Harlem	124 132	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Northern Central	71 74	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. pf.	137 139%	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Rensselaer & Saratoga	110 112	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
St. Louis Bridge 1st pf.	104 108	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
St. Louis Bridge 2d pf.	59 52%	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Schuylkill Val. & R. R.	45 50	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Tunnel R. R. of St. Louis	104 108	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
United N. J. R. R. & Canal	188 194	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377
Valley Railroad	94 98	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C. Broad 4377

## BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES

Bid	Offered	
Bank of Manhattan Co.	144 148	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. B. Gr. 0290
Bankers Trust	351 372	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. B. Gr. 0290
Central Union Trust	401 406	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. B. Gr. 0290
Commercial Bank	1200 1215	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. B. Gr. 0290
Guaranty Trust	230 255	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. B. Gr. 0290
Mechanics & Metals	390 395	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C. B. Gr. 0290

## PUBLIC UTILITIES

Bid	Offered	
Adirondack P. & L. com.	20 22 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Adirondack P. & L. Co. 1% pf.	15% 17%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Am. Cas. & Ind. 1% pf.	40 41	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Am. Gas & Elec. C. com., new	33% 34%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Am. Lt. & Trac. 8% (ex div.)	109 111	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Am. Lt. & Trac. 6% (ex div.)	89 91	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Am. Pow. & Lt. 6% pf.	150 153	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Am. Public Service 7% pf.	82 85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Am. Public Utilities com.	30 35	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Am. Public Utilities part. pf.	38 43	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Appalachian Pow. 7% pf.	80 83	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Appalachian Pow. Co. com.	29 30%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Ark. Lt. & Pow. pf.	24 26	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Ark. Lt. & Pow. Co. 7% pf.	27 29	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Atlantic City Elec. pf.	82 86	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Carolina Pow. & Lt. pf.	67 69	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Carolina Pow. & Lt. 7% pf.	96 99	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Central Ill. Pub. Serv. 6% pf.	84 87	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Central States Elec. Corp. com.	13 15	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Central States Elec. Corp. 7% pf	65 67	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813

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# Open Security Market—Stocks

## PUBLIC UTILITIES—Continued

Bid	Offered	
Cities Service com.	134 135	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Cities Service, bankers' shares	134 14	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Cities Service 6% pf.	64% 65%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Hanover 10060
Cities Service pf.	65% 65%	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C. Hanover 10060
Cities Service com.	135% 130%	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C. Hanover 10060
Cities Service, bankers' shares	13% 14%	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C. Hanover 10060
Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. 6% pf.	102 106	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. 8% com.	140 150	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Colorado Power Co. com.	108 110	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0815
Colorado Power Co. 7% pf.	89 92	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0815
Commonwealth Elec. Co. 8% com.	123 128	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Commonwealth Pow. Corp. com.	21 274	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Commonwealth Pow. Corp. 6% pf.	85% 86%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Consumers Power 6% pf.	84% 87	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Consumers Power pf.	84% 87	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Cont. Gas & Elec. com.	42 46	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Cont. Gas & Elec. 6% pf.	71 74	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Dayton Pow. & Lt. 4% com.	85 89	John Nickerson & Co., 61 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6490
Dayton Pow. & Lt. com.	64 68	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Dayton Pow. & Lt. 6% pf.	87 91	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
East Texas Elec. Co. 8% com.	104 108	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
East Texas Elec. Co. 6% pf.	81 84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Electric Bond & Share Co. 4% pf.	96% 97%	John Nickerson & Co., 61 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6490
Electric Bond & Share Co. 6% pf.	56 59	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Federal Lt. & Trac. Co. com.	67 70	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Federal Lt. & Trac. Co. 6% pf.	98 102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Fort Worth Pow. & Lt. 7% pf.	96 100	John Nickerson & Co., 61 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6490
General Gas & Elec. com.	10 12	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
General Gas & Elec. 6% pf.	17 19	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
General Gas & Elec. 7% com.	78 80	W. O. Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
General Gas & Elec. 8% com.	64 68	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
General Gas & Elec. 8% com. new	96 100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Specialists	91 10%	Alfred F. Ingold & Co., 74 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6494
Georgia Lt. P. & Rys. pf.	92 96	Alfred F. Ingold & Co., 74 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6494
Idaho Power pf.	84 86	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Illinois Northern Util. 6% pf.	84 86	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Kansas Gas & Elec. 6% pf.	49 51	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Kansas Traction com.	48 50	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Kansas Traction com. 6% pf.	80 85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Interstate Public Service 7% pf.	75 79	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Kansas Ry. & Lt. 7% pf.	90 94	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Kansas Ry. & Lt. 8% pf.	94 97	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Kentucky Security Corp. com.	30 35	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Kentucky Security Corp. 6% pf.	60 70	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Kentucky Utilities 6% pf.	80 90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Lehigh Pow. Sec. Co. capital	18% 19%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Middle West Utilities com.	44% 45%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Middle West Utilities 5% pf.	80 82	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Middle W. Util. 7% prior lien pf.	96 98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Millwaukee Elec. Ry. & Lt. 6% pf.	77 82	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Miss. Riv. Pow. Co. com.	18 20	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Miss. Riv. Pow. 6% pf.	79 82	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C. Rector 0813
Mountain States Tel. Co.	100 102%	John Nickerson & Co., 61 B'way, N.Y.C. Bowl. Gr. 6490

# Selling the Manufacturer to His Banker


*The Manufacturer seeking financing must sell his business to his banker. The success of his salesmanship depends on how thoroughly he convinces the banker of the worth of his venture. An Avram Report presents the manufacturer's proposal in its best light and gives the banker the facts he wants. From the standpoint of both it is the logical prerequisite to successful negotiation.*

## To the Manufacturer

RIGHT now, perhaps, you have plans in your mind for expanding your business, or, if not now, you will have eventually. How will you present your proposal to your banker for his support? You'll have to sell your business to him from mill to shipping room. Why? Because, like you, he is a business man. He must have reasonable assurance that any venture he finances will be profitable and devoid of risk. To convince him you must sell him with facts. How will you do it? Will you work alone, or will you have an *Avram Report* as your able ally?

An *Avram Report* on your business will sell your proposal to your banker more solidly than you can do it yourself. Why? Because, first of all, it is disinterested. Secondly, it is prepared by a recognized authority. And finally the industrial engineers who compile it are trained and experienced in the collection and presentation of the vital facts the banker wants to know. When he studies an *Avram Report* the banker sees the business from your viewpoint. When he does that he is ready and anxious to give you his support.

Whether you want to issue bonds or are looking for only a short term loan, an *Avram Report* on your business will make your task easier and its accomplishment more certain. Write us on your letterhead for a copy of our booklet, "Making Industrial History." It tells the complete story of Avram Service and explains how you can obtain an *Avram Report* to sell your business to your banker.




## To the Banker

WHEN a manufacturing executive comes to you with a proposal for financing his business you want to know more about it than is disclosed in the financial statements. Records of production, sales and earnings **show what the business has done**. An *Avram Report* will tell you what it can do.

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